

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SAME-RACE PREJUDICE

by

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The phenomenology of same-race prejudice

I declare that the above thesis is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.



SIGNATURE

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PT Makena

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is not structured as a conventional empirical study (theoretical background, method, results, discussion), but instead consists of an iterative series of attempts at making sense of same-race prejudice – hopefully systematically homing in on a richer and more acute understanding of the phenomenon.

The chapters are grouped together in pairs or triplets – each grouping addressing different but related perspectives on the problem. Chapters 1 and 2 are contextual, setting the scene historically and conceptually. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 introduce three different perspectives on using phenomenology as a means of approaching the issue of same-race prejudice. Chapters 6 and 7 are dedicated to looking at the themes of same-race prejudice, a critical interrogation of the themes from the interview discussions, the literature and how same-race prejudice is experienced, played out and sustained. Chapter 8 links back to Chapter 1 by casting another look at sensitivity and responsiveness to same-race prejudice by organisations whose work is supposedly on prejudice eradication. The chapter further links with both Chapters 3 and 4 by calling upon a phenomenological understanding to humanity as what can bring a liveable change to humanity regarding same-race prejudice. Chapter 9 serves as a summary of all the chapters, what each individually and collectively hoped to achieve, and the general findings and statements about same-race prejudice from the chapters' theoretical discussions, research interviews, and critical interrogation of both the mundane and theoretical understanding.

Keywords: authenticity, black, blackness, categorisation, critical race theory, essentialism, intolerance, naturalism, naturalist attitude, normativity, phenomenology, prejudice, prototypicality, race, racial identity, racial identification, stereotypes, white, whiteness.

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CHAPTER 1

PREJUDICE AND INTOLERANCE: REFLECTIONS ON APARTHEID AND POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I sketch the broad conceptual, historical and socio-political context within which acts of racial prejudice generally, and of same-race prejudice specifically, can be understood. Conceptually, I primarily consider definitions of, and theoretical work on, the concepts of tolerance and intolerance (further conceptual unpacking follows in Chapter 2) as well as the criteria and features that are commonly understood to define ‘intolerance’ and its consequences. Historically, I provide an overview of the various apartheid laws and practices that shaped the racial landscape of present-day South Africa. I pay particular attention to a variety of signifiers that lent credence to apartheid semiotics – including territorial, ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic demarcations. With regard to the institutional and legislative context, I review the various post-apartheid institutions (including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Human Rights Commission) and laws that have been put in place to combat prejudice and how these have been hijacked by appeals to essentialist cultural and racial identities. The chapter makes use of various illustrative examples, such as the infamous ‘spear of the nation’ case, media depictions of ‘poor whites’, and reports of xenophobic incidents, to show how neat conceptual categories, clear-cut historical trajectories, and carefully-considered legal frameworks are disrupted by the visceral realities of actual instances of inter-race and same-race prejudice.

The chapter serves, firstly, to raise and answer the question: “What is the relevance of the topic of race and prejudice, generally, and of same-race prejudice in South Africa, specifically?” This is done by considering the definition of prejudice (Akhtar, 2007; Brown, 1995; Parens, 2007) and the consequences thereof on people’s lives (Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Ingram, 1999; Moncrieffe, 2007a, 2007b; Sabourin, 2001; Sampson, 1999).

To enable further understanding of the effects of prejudice on people’s lives, the discussion explores the definition of intolerance (Guindon, Green & Hanna, 2003;

Matsuura, 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011) and considers the relationship between prejudice and intolerance (O'Bryan, Fishbein & Ritchey, 2004). The chapter also explores the various theoretical understandings that explain precursors and defining criteria of intolerance as a contributor to prejudice (Guindon et al., 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011). Later in the chapter, the confluence of race, intolerance and prejudice in apartheid South Africa is illustrated through a chronicle of the human rights violations and abuses enabled by stereotypes of identity and identification (Pucherova, 2011), limitation and denial of services and privileges (Budlender & Lund, 2011; Higgs & Evans, 2008), and the restriction of people's lives and movement to poor and unliveable conditions (Breetzke, 2012), as sustained through official laws. The discussion is juxtaposed with a look at the legal efforts instituted in post-apartheid South Africa to ameliorate the effects of racial intolerance and stereotypes, and to eradicate prejudice in general.

The second aim of the chapter is to bring up the following assertions, which are debated throughout the thesis:

1. Efforts meant to eradicate prejudice and intolerance between the races, and to promote racial unity, are eclipsed by tendencies to essentialise and polarise racial identities and forms of racial identification within the races (Bonilla-Silva & Embrick, 2001; Sunday Times, 2012b; Sunday World, 2012).
2. Constitutionally supported pursuits of racial diversity may accentuate the differences between the races as distinctively real, pure and authentically existing definitions of identity and identification (Wilkinson & Unwin, 1999) by deliberately prescribing and encouraging racially defined modes of identity and identification while frowning upon practices that fall outside of these (Espiritu, 2004; Mahon, 2004; O'Connor, Fernández & Girard, 2007; Ross, 2007; Tate, 2005).
3. Pressure to conform to essentialised (Mahalingam, 2007; Mallon, 2013; Morning, 2011; Wagner, Kronberger, Nagata, Sen, Holtz & Palacios, 2010), prototypical, normative (Hornsey, Majkut, Terry & McKimmie, 2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008) and authentic (Espiritu, 2004; Mahon, 2004; O'Connor et al., 2007; Ross, 2007;

Tate, 2005) racial definitions of identity and identification sustains stereotypes (Aspinall & Song, 2013; Eyben, 2007; Hooks, 2009; Mallon, 2013; Sampson, 1999) that lead to intolerance of and prejudice against difference within races (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

1.2 PREJUDICE EXPLAINED

Prejudice is defined briefly as being displayed through ingrained discrimination and intolerance in attitude and behaviour towards others, based on their distinctive attributes of, for example, religion, sexuality, race and gender, that serve to accentuate their differentness from us. As either negative or positive value-laden preconceived ideas, prejudice ignores any new information that runs contrary to it (Akhtar, 2007; Brown, 1995; Parens, 2007).

It is human to have prejudice. We inescapably hold stereotypes, the mental maps about life that are invariably inaccurate, leading us to be prejudiced and discriminatory. It is therefore an unfortunate fallacy to assume that one can be immune to prejudice and that prejudice is only in others, especially in the presumed other. We all judge and discriminate in our value-laden interactions with others (Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Sampson, 1999). Even philanthropic gestures to help the needy can serve to patronise and leave them with an indelible sense of worthlessness and victimhood, as we inadvertently label them as incapable and us as capable (Moncrieffe, 2007a, 2007b).

Decried and declared by the United Nations to be a scourge of nations and individuals, inflicting untold suffering on other nations and individuals based on their accentuated differentness (Sabourin, 2001), prejudice was always the bedfellow of race relations in apartheid South Africa, leading to the commission of various human rights atrocities across all political organisations and against people of different races (Ingram, 1999). Laws passed in support of apartheid ensured that people of the black race endured the brunt of inferior life services, as well as exposure to various forms of suffering, ranging from disruption of family life, displacement, receiving poor education and unemployment, to vulnerability, unremitting disease and crime (Breetzke, 2012; Budlender & Lund, 2011).

1.3 WHY SAME-RACE PREJUDICE?

South Africa has evidently designed mechanisms to bridge the rift that came with apartheid's interracial prejudice, making it reasonable to query the relevance of the subject of race and prejudice in South Africa now. One may even ask what all the fuss with race and prejudice is about, what has not been done or achieved through racial unity? Is this a new focus or is it just an area that has been there but overlooked?

An answer to these questions is provided first through an illustration of reactions and counter-reactions to a painting, which should highlight how racially polarised the nation is, as well as the extent of the unwillingness to cross the racial bar so significantly venerated during apartheid with steadfastly defended race taboos and barriers (Pucherova, 2011). The illustration should expose debates of how each race is defended as existing as purely and essentially unique, as well as how we deliberately and unwittingly perpetuate stereotypes about the race of the self and that of the other while being intolerant to race disloyalty, dissent and slurs, thereby objectifying our racial identities as naturally given. Even appeals for cultural identity may suggest identities that are essentially existing and not needing further interrogation.

Questions can be asked about how possible it is to incorporate those of the other race if even those of one's own race are not tolerated. It can also be asked how the tendency to regroup, reclassify and suppress same-race difference leads to intolerance and prejudice within races, against the rainbow nation appeals of national unity as enshrined in the Constitution and pursued through institutions such as the South African Human Rights Commission.

The biological difference between races has been proven a fallacy with no scientific foundation, only supported for political reasons (Arudou, 2013; Baker, 2010; Sarich & Miele, 2004; Tochluk, 2010; Weber, 2013). The essentialist distinctiveness of races has been proven to be a socially constructed reality. The exhortation for individuals to adhere to strict and distinct racial and cultural identities may ignore that these are lived concepts masked in stereotypes of being that signal intolerance to alternatives contrary to their identity definitions. Prejudice, intolerance and suppression of

difference within the races, while insisting on the races' pure nature, may put the country on a road to which post-apartheid South Africa is not seeking to return.

1.4 THE CASE OF DEFENDED RACES

In 2012, the Sunday Times (2012b) and Sunday World (2012) newspapers carried various pieces regarding a painting at the Goodman Gallery by Brett Murray, a South African artist, depicting Jacob Zuma, president of South Africa, fully clad but with his genitals exposed. This drew attention, increasing visits to the gallery and causing public debates, with the picture appearing in the majority of the media publications with equal reactions of both applause and disdain. The portrait (Jacob Zuma) and the painter (Brett Murray) assumed personified race, colour and cultural status. Suddenly, South Africa reverted to an apartheid era existence based on the demarcation of us and them, we and they, ours and theirs, to which Blade Nzimande, the secretary general of the South African Communist Party (as quoted by Meintjies, 2012, p. 2), responded by saying that "we have been insulted, our dignity has been assaulted and violated, and we have been made to feel naked". The "us", "ours" and "we" are used to represent those categorised as black and that which belongs to them, while white people and that which is assumed to belong to them are defined in "they", "them" and "theirs".

Prejudice-free South Africa, a sleepy, raceless, multiracial and multicultural rainbow nation, tripped into an obsession with its races and colour differences, each defended to be oblivious of its flaws, and each huddled in and rooted to its corner, with race consciousness becoming an amplified lived reality. In lament and defence of the portrait and its intended message, appeals for definitions of culture and race were bandied about, showing general ideals like "the rainbow nation" as mere hollow rhetoric untenable in the present. The reactions showed how tenuous the societal unity aspired to remains with respect to matters of affirmative action, as well as school and residential segregation (Bonilla-Silva & Embrick, 2001).

Retorts by Gwede Mantashe, secretary general of the African National Congress, (quoted by Meintjies, 2012, p. 2) that "this is not about the painting, it is about domination and subjugation. Our culture is not inferior.... We have to fight to protect our Africanness," and by Jacob Zuma's daughter (quoted by Malefane, 2012, p. 5),

that “the straw that broke the camel’s back is the notion that a black man who is associated with African culture and tradition and who does not fit the ‘perfect’ mould of western values and beliefs is less human than the next person,” show how diversity, as used to take pride in uniqueness, leads to a pursuit for exclusive rights and to intolerance of others (Wilkinson & Unwin, 1999). In this, one can see the edifice of the racial segregation of apartheid South Africa that relied on natural differentiation, although this time it leans more on culture. This is seen as masking, rationalising and retaining the old segregation of nature and biology with culture, not discarding it (Baker, 2010; Forrest & Dunn, 2006; Lee & Rice, 2007; Williams, 2006).

1.5 RACE DEFINITION LIVED AND NOT MERELY GIVEN

Racial definitions are couched in lived cultural conceptions that hide away deeply embedded negative stereotypes that go unchecked and are not scrutinised, helped by a perception that they are static, naturally given and unquestionably pure. Because racial identity is considered as naturally given and its stereotypes are never explored or questioned, it becomes an objectified existence, never given a reflective thought when in contentious comparison with the other. It is made into a pure existence, given life of its own outside of the process of experiencing itself. It becomes a solidified existence of categories whose hypnotic power denies interrogation.

With the nuanced social and political ramifications within each race ignored, we live a robotic essentialist existence whose cultures and races are untouchable taboos, their marked boundaries are not to be crossed (Makhanya, 2012; Pucherova, 2011), while conformity and veneration are defended, and dissenters are swiftly shut down. Muted dialogue and encouraged silence about race scrutiny are only lifted when we talk about its goodness. Mboweni (2012) expresses an agreement with the view of Mondli Makhanya, editor of the Sunday Times newspaper, that culture is sometimes used to buttress dialogue, and to blackmail and whitewash people into a sterile and muted existence of dogmatic followers. I consider this as causing our race to be insulated from itself.

That racial identity is not merely given is shown through the emergence of the Latin-American phenomenon of honorary white race identity. Through it, people refuse to

fall into the two-tier classification of white and non-white by dissociating from the collective black (Forman, Goar & Lewis, 2002), motivated mainly by a need to reap benefits associated with their one-side white lineage (Rockquemore, 1998).

Sibanda (2012) gives an account of white people in post-apartheid South Africa who are relegated to living on the fringes and are stigmatised by fellow white people for their poor living conditions, rejected for tainting whiteness's attributes of wealth, comfort and privilege. Authors outside of South Africa (Morris, 2006; Moss, 2003; Wray, 2006) have looked at how economically disadvantaged white people are undermined and excluded by other white people for their differing appearance to other white people while being comparably likened to black people.

Called "Oreos" and considered to be not black enough, black people that follow schooling and the education system are sidelined by other black people (Galletta & Cross, 2007) and marked as race traitors with lifestyles that betray black values.

We are not a nation that seems to see anything wrong in having its races glaringly differentiated. Arguing for the non-existence of these differences would be suggesting a stop to a discussion about the topic of race altogether (Tochluk, 2010). It is tantamount to Peters' (2012, p. 2) view that "we should not let everything be about race as we are past this," denying the racial polarisation of the country only to be awakened by slurs similar to those emanating from reactions and counter-reactions to Brett Murray's painting (Sunday Times, 2012b; Sunday World, 2012). However, we run the risk of intolerance to those who do not fit our racial identity prescripts and to diversified expressions countering racial allegiance between and within the races.

In profiling who is authentically black or authentically white, with African cultural belief systems or European cultural belief systems respectively, we also practise the exclusion of those we profile and consider as not black or not white, within the respective race categories. Prejudice of the dissimilar self or the race noncompliant within the race and the other outside the race prevails.

Like those who do not fit neatly into the race identity, those who do not subscribe to cultural prescripts are not only seen as tainting and betraying the culture, but also considered to have crossed race and cultural barriers and taboos (Pucherova, 2011).

This perception is facilitated by a failure to acknowledge that racial identity is a socially constructed reality made fixed to benefit those who do the defining politically and socially, in interracial contexts (Bailey, Loveman & Muniz, 2013; Mallon, 2013; Steck, Heckert & Heckert, 2003).

In South African Sepedi culture, a childless woman, degraded for not bearing children and considered a less complete woman, faces the scorn of being called various ghastly names until, in wedlock, another female relative is found to bear children in her name to lay claim to the cultural prescripts of a woman meriting marriage. Laced with patriarchal cultural definitions, a woman is fully considered a woman only when she can meet certain tradition-determined conditions, for example bearing children and graduating from a traditional circumcision ritual. Some lesbians subscribe to society's definition of womanhood that is conflated with motherhood, insisting to have children so as to prove society that they are complete women (Potgieter, 2003).

The nature of prejudice is further unravelled through a consideration of intolerance generally in the following section, to help understand what impact it may have on same-race prejudice specifically.

1.6 PREJUDICE AND INTOLERANCE

Described as an unwillingness to accept and respect others with values, beliefs and cultural practices that are different from ours (Moore & Walker, 2011), intolerance is seen as being responsible for untold suffering among nations and individuals across societies and the world, whose despicable results on humanity leave a lasting negative impact (Guindon et al., 2003).

Once you speak their language they immediately know you are one of them. Once I was drinking in a bar and this South African man was speaking in Zulu to me. I felt so bad because I could not reply in Zulu, when he noticed that I am not South African his reaction towards me changed. He was no longer friendly as he initially seemed (a Nigerian foreign national living in South Africa, quoted by Matsinhe, 2011, pp. 304-305).

The above quotation shows how prejudice embodies intolerance (O'Bryan et al., 2004), which is further displayed through hatred, distrust, dislike (Ahluwalia, 2013;

“As racism and intolerance linger...”, 1997; Cox, Abramson, Devine & Hollon, 2012; Gervais, Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011), ill-treatment and labelling, competition and stigmatisation (Kessler et al., 2010; Kosic, Phalet & Mannetti, 2012; Matsinhe, 2011; Nonchev, Encheva & Atanassov, 2012) against those marked as different from the self.

Intolerance is viewed as the cause of incalculable exclusion of others due to beliefs, perspectives and practices that mark them as different from us and our ideals (Guindon et al., 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011). A refusal, denial and disregard of human diversity (Guindon et al., 2003; Matsuura, 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011), it is represented in an atavistic attitude towards and treatment of others. Intolerance is a ravage to human coexistence and cooperation (Matsuura, 2003), serving as a plague to individuals within societies, societies within nations and, on international level, between nations, wiping off any inkling of unity.

As prejudice in action, intolerance helps to bring an understanding and appreciation of the pervasive nature and legion of unfortunate discriminatory practices of prejudice. Prejudice's set of attitudes and behaviours are easily comprehended through enactment of intolerance, which leads to disharmony and disunity with, and misunderstanding and constricted perspective of, others (Moore & Walker, 2011).

1.7 DEFINING CRITERIA OF INTOLERANCE

Guindon et al. (2003) and Moore and Walker (2011) stipulate the following defining criteria for intolerance, which Guindon et al. (2003) advance as useful for establishing a clinical diagnosis of an intolerant personality disorder for inclusion in the classification system of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM):

1. **Lack of diminished response.** Intolerance is displayed in a lack of restraint against a proclivity to judge and inability to remain neutral, as in the case of a foreign national respondent who mentioned in an interview with Matsinhe (2011, p. 304) that “they took one look at me and said I was too dark to be South African.” This is further shown in overt and covert antagonism towards foreign nationals in South Africa, in which inconsistent and discriminatory measures may be used to deport them (Matsinhe, 2011).

2. **Exclusion and lack of acceptance.** Mistrust of the other leads to their exclusion from and lack of acceptance in the community, as well as denial of access to life amenities as a result of believing in one's immanent superiority that subjects them to inferior existence. The use of violence and physical and political power against non-Setswana speaking residents in Bophuthatswana homeland (Higgs & Evans, 2008) meant that such residents were targeted and denied entitlement to receive life amenities such as pensions, schools and water.
3. **Lack of empathy.** The outright rejection of foreign nationals in South Africa, their expedited deportation because of such signifiers as body odour and dark skin (Matsinhe, 2011), and the suspicion and fear of manner of dress of Sikh men in the United States (US), resulting in them being murdered (Ahluwalia, 2013), show a pattern of lack of empathy and a disregard for the uniqueness of the other and his/her dignified distinction.
4. **Lack of respect.** A belief in the superiority of the self and own culture may lead to a lack of respect for the other's uniqueness, the use of violence and a lack of remorse for the pain and suffering meted out to the other.

1.8 PRECURSORS TO INTOLERANCE

The defining criteria can be both causes for one to be intolerant, and identifiers of who is tolerant or intolerant. An intolerant person embodying certain criteria can be so because of the precursors to be discussed here, or the precursors can lead him/her to cherish certain defining criteria. A distinction between precursors and defining criteria is only made for purposes of discussion. Both can act and serve the same purpose and explanation. Various precursors are discussed here.

1.8.1 Self-righteousness

Self-righteousness is defined as the dogmatic adherence to the usual, while showing intolerance to ambiguity (Falbo & Belk, 1985). Obsessed with the self that is viewed as right and superior, the other is categorised as unusual and unfit. Its unusualness brings a discomfort that cannot be tolerated. With the self being viewed as the only correct way of being, alternatives to it are looked at with suspicion, denigration and rejection.

Poor white people of West Bank in East London, South Africa, are isolated because of their diffusion of the assumed white normativity of affluence and privilege, with their poverty seen as an assumed signifier of blackness (Sibanda, 2012). Their alternative existence of destitution contradicts the esteemed definition of being white, causing them to endure the brunt of intolerance from other white people.

1.8.2 Prototypicality

Prototypicality is a term used by Kessler et al. (2010) to refer to a tendency to judge others and their group in terms of how similar or dissimilar they are to the superordinate group.

Physical body features, dress style, language usage and style, body odour, et cetera are used by South Africans as signifiers of who is a South African or a foreign national. The distinction extends to the attitudes and treatment that is afforded to people in terms of how typical they are of a South African identity, and therefore not of a foreign identity (Matsinhe, 2011). Those less typical of the South African identity evoke fear and images of threat and competition to the South African identity, thereby being seen to deserve exclusion and mistreatment (Kessler et al., 2010). Sikh males in the US are subjected to mistreatment that is justified on the basis of their dress style, which is deviant and contrary to American dress norms (Ahluwalia, 2013).

1.8.3 Fundamentalism

Cunningham and Melton (2013), and Woodford, Levy and Walls (2013) define fundamentalism as the belief that there is a single set of prescripts and characteristics that define personality and the nature of being. Using religion as an example, Cunningham and Melton (2012, p. 287) quote Altemeyer and Hunsberger as saying that religious fundamentalism is:

the belief that there is one set of religious teaching that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and

that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity.

Anything contrary to the fundamental beliefs is considered inferior, undermined and not allowed expression. The alternative is considered deviant and often subject to being converted.

In a Sunday Times newspaper (2012a) conversation of condemnation for the assault, rape and killing of gays and lesbians, the president of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa, Patekile Holomisa, mentioned that, while these practices are not condoned, lesbians and gays practise their lifestyle in contravention of their African culture (Baron, 2012). He expressed mixed sentiments in not condoning the assault practices that are not sanctioned by law, yet pouring scorn on gay and lesbian practices that are a contravention of the fundamental prescripts of African culture.

1.8.4 Right-wing authoritarianism

Right-wing authoritarianism is a social attitude of strict and unwavering adherence to conventional norms and values. It entails compliance with authoritatively held beliefs, with a propensity to seek punishment for violators of conventional norms that are uncritically adhered to (Aosved, Long & Voller, 2009; Cramer, Miller, Amacker & Burks, 2013; Duriez, 2011; Van Hiel, Cornelis & Roets, 2010). With a veneration and expectation of conformity to conventionality from others, the lack of empathic understanding by people with a right-wing authoritative attitude makes them given to intolerance and prone to aggression towards those they consider violators of convention (Duriez, 2011).

The aggressive attack on black males in the US whose wearing of a hoodie or a turban is seen as a deliberate flaunting of their differentness in violation of and refusal to conform to mainstream US dress code (Ahluwalia, 2013), as well as the physical attack, rape and killing of lesbians and gays in South Africa (Baron, 2012) who are seen as violating African cultural norms, show the extent to which non-conformity to conventionality is rendered a punishable act.

1.8.5 Socialisation and value orientation

The types of values inculcated in children by agents of socialisation determine the nature of attitudes that the children will adopt and whether they will be tolerant or intolerant of others (Duriez, 2011). Duriez (2011) and Van Hiel et al. (2010) distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic goal orientation and their relation to social dominance attitude as implicated in intolerance. Here, social dominance orientation is defined as a social attitude of preferring hierarchical dominance.

Socialisation that promotes extrinsic goal pursuit entails defining self-worth in terms of external appearance and the impression one makes on others, leading to competitiveness within one's living surroundings, as opposed to the intrinsic goal pursuit whose direction is focused on developing one's talents to meaningfully contribute to uplifting others rather than competing with them (Duriez, 2011; Van Hiel et al., 2010). Extrinsic goal orientation is further linked to materialism, which is defined as the pursuit of the accumulation and possession of material goods and the importance that people attached to it as a sign of advancement in life (Van Hiel et al., 2010). Inspired by extrinsic goal orientation, people would want to accumulate more material possessions as a personal achievement that defines their worth, rather than be driven by the satisfaction of innate psychological needs of the intrinsic goal orientation (Duriez, 2011; Van Hiel et al., 2010). Their materialist ambition causes them to view others as threats and competitors to their goal of accumulating more. To them, other people are interchangeable as objects they may require to get ahead in life (Duriez, 2011).

The need to always get ahead of others as a competitive spirit of extrinsic goal pursuit contributes to diminished empathy for differentness in social circles and the intolerance of others. It causes people to always want to acquire a dominant social position in relation to others, which further helps them to get ahead (Duriez, 2011). The high value put on materialism and the pursuit of extrinsic goals makes life a contested battle and cause immigrants to be less tolerated by locals who regard them as competitors over dwindling occupational chances and income (Kosic et al., 2012; Nonchev et al., 2012). German immigrants are seen as less prototypical of German identity and therefore as competitors over scarce resources (Kessler et al., 2010).

Social dominance orientation attitudes and the striving for extrinsic goals negatively impact on people and life chances. Foreign nationals in South Africa endure various types of intolerance as a result of being seen as the cause of dwindling employment opportunities in the country (Matsinhe, 2011). Haight (2013) notes that intolerance can cause and sustain inequality, while inequality encourages people to be intolerant of each other, blaming each other for their unsatisfying life circumstances of scarce amenities. Based on a study in Bulgaria, Nonchev et al. (2012) stipulate several variables linking intolerance to social inequality. These are low education, occupational insecurity and poverty of the older generation that make them feel threatened by immigrants resulting in the presence of the latter not being tolerated.

1.8.6 Stigmatisation

Stigmatisation is evidenced in the negative internalised perceptions about others who are labelled as different, deviant and non-conforming to the ideals of being. Displayed in devaluing perceptions of others who are subjected to negative regard and allocation to an inferior status (Cunningham & Melton, 2012), stigmatisation sentiments are often enacted through avoidance and exclusion of others (Hansson, Karnehed, Tynelius & Rasmussen, 2009; Pescosolido, Medina, Martin & Long, 2013), and the denial of service (Cunningham & Melton, 2012).

The devaluing perception of others negatively impacts on their life chances. It leads to unequal access to and denial of opportunities to others when they are seen as competitors for and a threat over ailing and scarce material resources and life opportunities (Nonchev et al., 2012), and as based on their differentness that does not comply with the ideal (Aosved et al., 2009).

The choices that individuals can make are limited by the general perceptions held in their communities. The overwhelming conception by black people in the US that homosexuality is only a white phenomenon, causes black people not only to stigmatise fellow black homosexuals, but to also be intolerant towards homosexual sportsmen of a black race (Southall, Anderson, Nagel, Polite & Southall, 2011).

People suffering from mental illness have their employability curtailed due to the stigma attached to their illness. They suffer dented self-esteem and are robbed of a chance to a fulfilling quality of life relative to others who do not suffer the same

condition as them (Russinova, Griffin, Bloch, Wewiorski & Rosoklija, 2011). This makes stigmatisation a cause of inequality.

The intolerance of interfaith relationships mainly by white people in the Bible Belt region of the US leaves individuals in those communities with impeded choice for who to be intimate with (Sahl & Batson, 2011).

1.9 RACE AND PREJUDICE IN SOUTH AFRICA

The relevance of the foregoing discussion to race and prejudice in South Africa may be questioned. Can one extrapolate convincing details for an understanding of race and prejudice in South Africa from the discussion? As a link to that, the following is meant to begin charting the outline of a debate of the racial prejudice scenario in South Africa, to indicate how intolerance has been a pivotal signifier of South African interracial prejudice regarding the inherent superiority of one race against the innate inferiority of another, marked by constant labelling and othering of the self and the other.

This is done by drawing a distinction between interracial lives during and after apartheid. The first part of the debate is dedicated to expatiating on what apartheid South Africa looked like and how it operated, and the impact this had on race and prejudice. In the second part, I expand on post-apartheid South Africa, its nature and its impact on race and prejudice.

1.9.1 Race and prejudice in apartheid South Africa

Marx and Milton (2011, p. 743) draw a distinction between apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa. They define apartheid South Africa as being distinguished by:

a system of formal racial segregation, repression and subjugation in which white South Africa had both political and socio-economic hegemony. People of colour had no voting rights, were allowed to reside in government allocated 'locations', could only study at certain institutions and were not allowed to study towards certain advanced science degrees.

Commencing in 1948 (Higgs & Evans, 2008; Mattes, 2012) and lasting until 1994, apartheid was a form of government based on a philosophy of white dominance and

superiority over a subjugated and inferior black population as sanctioned by law (Biko, 1978; Marx & Milton, 2011). Its primary aim was the segregation of the races from each other, establishing and sustaining a hierarchical ordering where the white race shall enjoy dominance over the black race, giving it privileged access to wealth, power and comfort (Pillay & Karlsson, 2013; Seekings, 2008; Sibanda, 2012).

When Rodney (1995) notes the evil nature of white American society towards its African American population, there is a parallel to South Africa as Biko (1978) recounts the racist nature of white South Africa and the apartheid government towards its indigenous black population, describing apartheid South Africa as strange, abnormal and immoral.

1.9.1.1 Apartheid laws

The apartheid government instituted various laws to pursue the goals that apartheid philosophy sought to achieve, among which the following are examples.

1. Population Registration Act

Put in place in 1950 (Christopher, 1989; Higgs & Evans, 2008; Seekings, 2008), the Population Registration Act defined people's identities in terms of physical attributes to differentiate a black race from a white race as being biologically dissimilar (Christopher, 1989; Lee & Rice, 2007; Seekings, 2008). The biological distinctiveness of the indigenous black race was contrasted with a white race with whom intermingling could not be allowed to go on unchecked.

Members of the inferior black race were meant to be confined to allocated areas whose movement and participation in South Africa's political, economic and social spheres were monitored and restricted, literally making them foreigners in South Africa (Biko, 1978; Christopher, 1989). Further divided into various distinct ethnic and linguistic groups, the black race was subjected to life confined to homelands with high rates of uncontrolled and poorly reported crime, malnutrition and ill-health (Breetzke, 2012), whose survival against daily adversity and exposure to calamity was through sheer luck (Biko, 1978).

The law essentialised people's existential identities in terms of biological race, language and ethnicity as justification for their grouping and attendant value attached to each identity. The purpose of the law was to ensure and protect separate and unequal development of white control and privilege, while controlling the freedom accorded to those of the black race. It served to sustain the wealth disparity between the races with inferior living standards reserved for and maintained in black homelands (Biko, 1978; Christopher, 1989; Sibanda, 2012).

2. Bantu Education Act

Instituted in 1953 (Higgs & Evans, 2008), the Bantu Education Act ensured that wealth and power remained in the hands of the white race. The black race, with the accompanying linguistic and ethnic classification groups of the African indigenous group, was predestined to inferiority by receiving education substandard to that received by the white race.

While those of the white race had access to almost all institutions of higher learning in the country, black people had a choice restricted mainly to those in their allocated homelands, which had far less resources and funding than those in the main South Africa. The premise of this was an envisaged white race ownership of the high quality of academic and scientific knowledge to keep it in a superior hierarchical order, with black people forever remaining wanting and subservient to white people (Pillay & Karlsson, 2013).

3. Group Areas Act

A 1950 law (Higgs & Evans, 2008), the Group Areas Act had a direct impact on the quality of life of individuals within their designated race groups. While life in white designated areas was mainly urban, that in black designated areas was rural, underdeveloped and less maintained. Biko (1978) notes that, in the latter, the land was too arid to be suitable for pastoral and cultivation farming. Higgs and Evans (2008) show that, even when given independence, Bophuthatswana was drawn outside the fertile land borders of South Africa, making it infinitely bound to depend on South Africa, with most of its people continuing to seek employment there.

Assisted by the introduction of the pass law, free movement of black people to urban white areas was curbed, resulting in high population density and competition over inadequate and unavailable resources in their localities (Budlender & Lund, 2011; Pillay & Karlsson, 2013). Budlender and Lund (2011) attribute the calamities of fractured families, violence and extramarital sex to the curtailing of black people's movement and restriction of access to a city life that was exclusively reserved for white people. Those in the black designated residential areas had less and close to nothing to compete for, and could not materially afford what was available, resulting in a dull existence with a proclivity for dangerous tendencies (Biko, 1978; Morgan, 2012).

The Act succeeded in entrenching black subjugation to white supremacy by ensuring a life of densely populated dwelling, infestation with crime and poverty, and restriction to a generally uninhabitable areas with impoverished security systems and high rates of unemployment (Breetzke, 2012).

4. Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act

Promulgated in 1949 (Higgs & Evans, 2008), the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act prohibited marriage across the race divide. It ensured the racial purity of whiteness by protecting it from dilution with blackness, rendering such transgressions unlawful and punishable through enforcement and confluence with another Act, the Immorality Act of 1950 (Higgs & Evans, 2008). Marriage across the race divide was seen as a violation of the rigidly-held essentialist race belief resulting in ostracism meted out to those who fail to observe the rule (Pucherova, 2011).

Pucherova (2011) argues that the abhorrence towards interracial mingling was a belief held and practised by both black people and white people. She argues that not only white people saw it as a taboo for black people to be romantically engaged with white people, but that black people, too, subscribed to such a belief, indicating the premise of Black Consciousness that sought the strength of black liberation by breaking away from intermingling with whiteness, as well as African poetry that evoked shame and doubt in those who engage in mixed-race relationships. She gives the example of Bessie Head, whose muddled sense of belonging and racial identity was instigated by mistreatment by both blackness and whiteness, shutting

her out and locking her up in racial ambiguity. The same call for black self-reliance is made by Biko (1978), insisting that the battle for black liberation needed a black person standing on his/her own. It was therefore argued that marriage across the race divide betrayed the mission of black liberation.

Although the disgust of blackness with interracial marriage is premised on a different understanding from that which is advanced by whiteness – the latter's is based on a belief in innate superiority and inferiority of the white and black races respectively, while the former's is hinged on a belief that blackness that stands on its own is well suited to liberate itself – both positions reek of prejudiced stereotypes about one's own race and the other's race. Pucherova (2011) finds black imagination equally guilty for unwittingly upholding apartheid stereotypes of monopoly over individual rights of free choice regarding belonging and defining normativity of existence in racial exclusivity. Implicated here, she sees the black male gender stereotype of seeing women as objects of men's sexual desires, to be devoured at the latter's wish, in discouraging black women to engage in mixed-race relationships by evoking feelings of betrayal.

5. Immorality Act

Apartheid South Africa not only had the power to instil racial dominance of white over black, it also accorded status of normativity to sexuality and gender by sowing the seeds of gender and sexuality prejudice (Shefer, 2010) of male over female and heterosexuality over homosexuality, through designation of homosexuality as immoral (Stobie, 2003).

1.9.1.2 Use of territorial signifiers

The success of racial prejudice rests on constant and efficient defence of its philosophy, and the ability of its strategy to resiliently stay afloat. With this, Lee and Rice (2007) consider how the insidious nature of racial prejudice based on biology hibernates to find expression through cultural explanations. They see this as not necessarily giving away its emphasis on innate biological superiority and inferiority of races, but as another form of subjugation of the other that subtly subverts attention from its main goal to appearances that look less damaging.

Resolute in its mission of segregating black people from white people, apartheid used various and changing signifiers of difference between the races, marking their boundaries and signifying their territories as irreconcilably dissimilar. Changing moments and times put paid to the successful usage of the various racially discriminatory Acts that could not always strengthen the logic of superior race domination. It needed to change face while the core was maintained, using other signifiers.

1.9.1.3 Signifiers of ethnicity and language

Neither the Group Areas Act nor the Population Registration Act could always deal with the influx of black people from and within their impoverished homelands. Considering the case of Bophuthatswana (Higgs & Evans, 2008), right-wing-authoritarian attitudes of violence were used against residents who were considered foreigners in that locality. Setswana language and ethnicity were used as signifiers of belonging, acceptance and exclusion of black people by other black people. Setswana language and ethnicity were used as boundary markers of existential normativity.

Not only were the non-Setswana speaking black people othered as not being prototypical of the homeland's ethnicity and language, they were also made to endure the brunt of stigmatisation that resulted in refusal to give them services such as water (Higgs & Evans, 2008).

1.9.1.4 Signifiers of culture and religion

When a hierarchical order of races could not be sustained through scientific evidence of superiority and inferiority in the physical body (Baker, 2010; Williams, 2006), evidence had to be sought elsewhere, using cultural and religious lifestyles. Fundamentalist ideas about culture and religion could not cope with the idea of uniqueness in blackness with which whiteness was not familiar.

That which did not conform to white conceptions of normative culture and religion was called barbaric, unscientific and superstitious (Biko, 1978; Hountondji, 1997; Musopole, 1994). Indigenous black people were persuaded to be ashamed of and shun their religious beliefs and practices, devalue their ancestral heroes, who were

deemed perennial troublemakers, and discard their culture for the forward-looking western culture (Biko, 1978). According to Biko (1978), this served to inculcate a sense of self-stigmatising doubt and shame that assisted apartheid's mission of black race subjugation.

With their cultures and religions stigmatised, black people were bound to be obedient to whiteness's representations and signifiers of normativity. Representations that portrayed whiteness as better did not need much cajoling pressure through oppressive regulatory Acts to have people accede timidly to them. Whiteness just needed to be made appealing while blackness was made to look hideous.

1.9.1.5 Fear, anger and hate between the races

If the philosophy of apartheid could be carried through politically and economically, it was because of its hold on the psyche of the individual. Its stranglehold on people of both black and white races reduced individuals into objects possessed by fear and hate, and driven by anger. Fear, anger and hate managed to keep the races apart.

The use of restrictive laws ensured that the black psyche was infused with white images of terror, intimidation and unrelenting harassment, while being cowed into sheepish veneration and submission to white representations. However, as Biko (1978) argues, this was not an ordinary fear. It was a fear matched with hate and anger. Underneath the veneer of sheepish submission, those of the black race harboured an impulse to annihilate whiteness. The prevailing life of restrictive bondage did not allow a free display of anger and hate emotions. Further Acts, such as the Terrorism Act, added extended layers of fear with the result that routes of compromise had to be found to expel it. Unable to quench his/her anger and hate onto a white person, a black person resorted to stinging his/her anger and hate onto another white cowed black person of a compromised psyche. Restricted by the omnipresent intimidating whiteness that hindered his peaceful independence, black people went on to harass, steal from and annihilated their fellow black people (Biko, 1978). Black people went on to hate their fellow black people, their culture, religion and language, ingratiating themselves to whiteness and sulking in peaceful agreement with apartheid's oppressive makeup (Biko, 1978).

The white race psyche was never immune from encapsulation by fear of the other race. Consumed by stereotypes of black prejudice, its fear was conspicuously made evident through the explicit employ of hateful laws and practical strategies that angrily suppressed any single black voice. In support of this, Biko (1978, p. 80) terms white people's behaviour as bordering on a wanton irrationality whose paranoia would dictate that "if they knew there are three missionaries who are dangerous to their interest but whose identity is unknown, they would rather deport 80 missionaries and hope that the three are among them than use some brain and find out who the three are."

Biko (1978) argues that, as with their black counterparts, the simplicity of white people' anger masked the extent of hate and fear they had towards black people. However, their anger was not a misdirected one, but was a legally licensed practice of anti-black right-wing-authoritarian attitudes meant to secure a lopsided white race privilege and mistreatment of black people.

1.9.2 Race and prejudice in post-apartheid South Africa

A period in South Africa following its April 1994 democratic elections, post-apartheid South Africa is differentiated from apartheid South Africa for its characteristic political, economic and social inclusivity of race relations (Marx & Milton, 2011). Whereas apartheid South Africa sought racial segregation as its goal and white supremacy as its mission, post-apartheid South Africa tasks itself with unifying the races. Whereas apartheid South Africa was a society founded on stereotypes of hierarchical organisation of the races, resulting in their conflictual prejudice of one another, post-apartheid South Africa seeks to mend the rift caused by interracial prejudice.

Enshrined in the prejudiced philosophy of racial hierarchy and practised in law that discriminated against the black race, apartheid inflicted untold harm on those who practised it and on those upon whom it was practised, leading to a declaration by the United Nations that it should be considered as being "abhorrent to the conscience and dignity of humankind" (Sabourin, 2001, p. 66).

The efforts that helped to usher in post-apartheid South Africa are situated within a broader mission defined by the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human

Rights that is highlighted by Sabourin (2001, p. 65) as echoing that “everyone, regardless of colour, sex, language or religion, was entitled to enjoy all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Sabourin (2001) also mentions that the United Nations laments the spectrum of human atrocities and violations due to prejudice that has resulted in nations’ dispersal and genocide, adding to people’s suffering the world over. With its racial stereotypes and prejudice, apartheid violated people’s right to human dignity through the restriction of movement and right of association, and the denial of services (Malherbe, 2011), contributing to compromised quality of life (Breetzke, 2012; Budlender & Lund, 2011) based primarily on race and secondarily on language, ethnicity, religion and sexuality, with the black indigenous population enduring most of its blatant disregard due to its differentness from the white population.

1.10 TASKS OF POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

In its train, post-apartheid South Africa came up with measures to curb and make up for the human injustices of apartheid. It is seeking to build a nation based on trust, tolerance, less prejudice and unity among its individuals and races, and to acknowledge and respect their diversified formations (Malherbe, 2011; Small & Grant, 2005). Its tasks are upheld by and substantially find concrete meaning through the implementation of the Constitution, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the Human Rights Commission.

1.10.1 The South African Constitution

The Constitution, a supreme law of the country enforceable through the courts whose drawing culminated in 1996, was incepted with a vision to eliminate the discrimination, inequality and injustice of the apartheid government’s laws regarding race, religion, sexuality, gender, ethnicity, etc., while ensuring that justice and human dignity prevail (Malherbe, 2011). The Constitution’s overriding aim of healing the apartheid divisions is principled on the values of respect, inclusivity and equality for human dignity (Jones, 2006; Malherbe, 2011; Small & Grant, 2005). As a direct response to apartheid’s law-enforced prejudice that saw human beings’ existence being hierarchically organised into dichotomies of superiority versus inferiority, white versus black, science against atavism, sacredness versus depravity, the Constitution

seeks to return human dignity for a just and equal society (Malherbe, 2011; Small & Grant, 2005) beyond the sectarian allocation of rights and freedoms to a select few (Amoah & Bennett, 2008; Potgieter, 2003).

Applauded for its strength of collective inclusivity grounded in Ubuntu before individualism (Du Toit, 2006; Jones, 2006; Van Zyl, 2011), the Constitution recognises equality in diversity in gender, age, ethnicity, sexuality, language, class, marital status, etc. Ubuntu is defined as an African philosophy and value orientation of connectedness, compassion, caring, interdependence and reciprocal sharing of obligation and responsibility, enabling coexistence (Jones, 2006; Mbigi, 1997; Van Zyl, 2011).

1.10.2 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa

“Within weeks at least 62 people were killed and hundreds injured. Houses and businesses belonging to immigrants were destroyed or looted” (Steenkamp, 2009, p. 439).

Intolerance of the differentially marked other due to prejudice leads to the justification and support of violence and other atrocious injustices against them. As in the example by Steenkamp (2009), those executing the acts see a need to continue unhindered to hurt the different other.

South African life under apartheid was rife with instances of privately and publicly executed atrocities committed against others primarily of a different race (Breetzke, 2012; Budlender & Lund, 2011; Pucherova, 2011) and secondarily of a different religion, language, sexuality, gender (Stobie, 2003) and ethnicity (Higgs & Evans, 2008). These atrocities were sanctioned by law, unrecorded, and poorly and disproportionately documented (Breetzke, 2012; Ingram, 1999). The prevalence and extent of horrendous acts are indicative of the diminished value for the life and dignity of the other.

Merely papering over the appalling acts stemming from apartheid’s divisive prejudice practices would not suffice for healing from these acts as earmarked by the post-apartheid Constitution. Despicable crimes committed against humanity during apartheid had to be acknowledged and explored before the wounds could heal.

Subsumed under the Constitution's mission of according people dignity, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1996-1998) was guided by a broad goal of national unity through establishing a detailed record of the gross human rights violations, and the restoration of dignity, fate or whereabouts of victims while ensuring commiserate reparations (Gready, 2009). An institution given investigative powers by the Constitution, it was established to adjudicate the process from apartheid to the present political setup (Jones, 2006).

1.10.3 The Human Rights Commission

If apartheid South Africa destroyed people's dignity and pride, the post-apartheid government system is geared towards reversing this, through the reparation effort of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Hamber, 2000; Marschall, 2012). However, one needs to note that the reparative gesture by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had a limited lifespan (1996 to 1998) and focused on past human rights violations. Recommendations for symbolic, psychological and tangible reparations focused on finding value in what was previously destroyed while helping the victims to come to terms with their grief in a humanly dignified manner (Hamber, 2000; Marschall, 2012).

The new Constitution needed another mechanism to enshrine human dignity and pride in continuous relevance beyond time-limited gestures offered through reparations extended throughout people's lifetime. Guided by the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights that raises awareness about human rights abuse and violation globally (Sabourin, 2001), the South African Human Rights Commission was established under the new Constitution. A body with a constitutional mandate, the Human Rights Commission is tasked with investigating and monitoring present and future human rights abuse and violation in the country to ensure human dignity and equality (Berger, 2001; Durrheim, Quayle, Whitehead & Kriel, 2005; Malherbe, 2011).

However, this is not the only constitutionally established body doing this – the Commission for Gender Equality, the Public Protector, and the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities are some of the other structures that strive to pursue the Constitution's agenda

(Malherbe, 2011), although they lack the adjudicative powers to enforce their findings like the courts (Berger, 2001; Malherbe, 2011). The Human Rights Commission can be seen as an implementer of the United Nations' and South African Constitution's Human Rights Charter.

1.11 GAINS OF POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

When I first broached the subject of race and prejudice, I was told to be careful not to “drag us back into a space that would undermine the progress made so far and reverse the gains made in the country” and further reminded that the categorisation of people into black and white does not exist anymore as the government has made these racial titles irrelevant and obsolete.

Post-apartheid South Africa has repealed the laws that inhibited racial mixing, encouraging and enforcing racial tolerance, while intolerance and prejudice have become punishable by law. With the apartheid racial taboos (Pucherova, 2011) dismantled, one can begin to ask whether a topic on race and prejudice is still relevant and why it should even be considered, considering that the pejorative legal hierarchical ordering of races has been done away with and toleration of diversified expressions of being means that each is accorded a space to exist in dignity.

There are encouraging stories of post-apartheid South Africa's progress. Anderson (2012) relates a story of Grade 12 learners at Hudson Park School whose experiences depict an epitome of the ideal society of people no longer racially differentiated, making racial differentiation an unworthy criterion of social belonging. In the story, the teacher presents a picture of a multiracial school setting rarely found in apartheid South Africa, where pupils of different races interact harmoniously and tolerate their differentness to a point where one may easily forget his/her racial identity. However, South Africa remains racially profiled and obsessed with its distinctively labelled races, as shown in the next section.

1.12 STILL RACIALLY PROFILED

If apartheid South Africa suppressed equal assertion of dignity to all the races, hierarchically pitting them against each other, restricted and denied others human rights, post-apartheid South Africa has corrected this by ensuring respect for all

racess, while acknowledging differences of races that are distinctively unique. Whether harmonious coexistence and equal dignity among the races has been achieved as a national aspiration remains a contentious issue. Racial identification and labelling have not been eradicated (Hammett, 2010; Seekings, 2008). Although racial identification seems to be in line with the Constitution's objective of ensuring diversity, it may lead to increased distance and intolerance where identified groups insist on exclusivity that may mask avoidance of the other.

With racial intolerance of hierarchically superior and inferior races based on biology no longer supported by law or science, people may find new ways of masking their prejudice of the other. As the less insidious means, it is easy to resort to cultural difference to pursue separatist agendas (Forrest & Dunn, 2006; Lee & Rice, 2007).

Shiao, Tuan and Rienzi (2004, p. 2) show how, in 1972, the National Association of Black Social Workers in the USA resisted the interracial adoption of black children by white parents, calling such efforts "cultural genocide" and equating them to "colonial exploitation". They did this in a bid to retain pure black-American culture and pride.

Wanting to assert their blackness away from whiteness as the reference, black journalists under the banners of the Forum of Black Journalists organised a meeting in February 2008 to be addressed by Jacob Zuma, the president of the African National Congress, barring attendance by white journalists with an insistence that they have a "right to organise, assemble and associate with a guest of their choice" (Sesanti, 2008, p. 35).

Proof of present South African' obsession with racial identification is succinctly stated in the following quotation of Maré by Seekings (2008, p. 8):

to meet with the requirements of the Employment Equity Act, to gain admission to universities, to claim travel allowances, to play in sport teams, to provide information for tax purposes, to ask the National Research Foundation for funding, to register birth and so on, each requires a statement of race belonging.... There is no opportunity in these forms to avoid the issue. At every level there is an official, from the government minister responsible to the company personnel officer or employment equity manager, to monitor adherence or compliance or progress. No provision is made for alternatives to the basic 'four races' of apartheid South Africa, or to reject such classification. Leaving the space

blank, which remarkably few seem to do, means that someone is required to complete it to balance the books.

As is the case with contemporary European-American cultures' racial thinking (Mallon, 2013), it would be naive to assume that present-day South Africa has gone beyond viewing its people as distinct racial kinds. Schultz (2013) acknowledges that, in releasing its 2011 national census results, Statistics South Africa's report was informed by demographics based on race indicators of Indian/Asian, black, white and coloured, as are affirmative action programme headlines whose purpose is to redraw the racialised privilege imbalances incurred from the apartheid era (Adam, 2000; Guillebeau, 1999; Thompson, 2006).

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL AND LITERATURE REVIEW OF TERMS

2.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW

Having sketched, in Chapter 1, the conceptual, historical and socio-political context in which acts of racial (and same-race) prejudice emerge, in Chapter 2, I ask what exactly the object is toward which these acts are directed. The term 'race' (the ostensible target of racial prejudice) is freely used in popular and academic discourse, but what exactly is the term supposed to refer to?

In addition to unpacking the target of racial prejudice (i.e., those thought to belong to a particular 'race'), the chapter also seeks to unpack what the enactment of racial prejudice actually entails. How is the act of being racially prejudiced (or of showing or verbalising racial prejudice) distinct from other, presumably less problematic, forms of human interaction?

In the chapter, I illustrate, by means of examples and with reference to the academic literature, how any particular racial category is not a thing-in-itself, but exists in counterpoint to its perceived opposite. Racial categories are routinely asserted as real, objective entities, but in practice are held in place not by some authentic essence, but by individuals continually constructing themselves and others as having (or failing to have) a particular racial identity and identification as opposed to some other identity and identification. In negotiating racial identity and identification, people inscribe themselves (and are inscribed by others) as occupying varying degrees of prototypicality by drawing on class and gender stereotypes to appropriate or reject an imagined racial essence that is immutable and clearly distinct from its opposite.

Racial positioning is only secondarily concerned with the (positive or negative) characteristics of any particular race (and with attempts to, for example, affirm the value of blackness in the face of a history of white domination), but rather functions, in the first place, to solidify the notion of a racial essence and to re-inscribe the imperative of conforming to it. Thus, race can be seen as a kind of skilled performance, with those (black or white) who are lacking in the skill somehow being deserving of having same-race prejudice visited upon them.

The chapter seeks to ask and respond to the following questions: What is a race and how is it defined? What is the definition of the race of black? What is the definition of the race of white?

The task is carried out through a literature review of the following terms:

- categorisation (Baker, 2004; Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Fiske, 2005; Tochluk, 2010);
- labelling (Moncrieffe, 2007a, 2007b);
- stereotypes (Aspinall & Song, 2013; Eyben, 2007; Hansson et al., 2009; Hooks, 2009; Mallon, 2013; Sampson, 1999);
- prejudice (Brown, 1995; Eyben, 2007; Sampson, 1999); and
- essentialism (Mahalingam, 2007; Mallon, 2013; Morning, 2011; Wagner et al., 2010).

The abovementioned questions are also pursued through several tenets raised in the chapter and upheld throughout the thesis. These tenets are introduced by another question that asks whether it is possible to provide an answer to the questions in any way that is not essentialist, and are as follows:

- A definition of a race is made through categorisation-based thinking embedded in labelling stereotypes of what it is and what it is not to be outside and within the particular defined race.
- A definition of a race is made in a manner that is prototypical (Hornsey et al., 2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), authentic (Espiritu, 2004; Mahon, 2004; O'Connor et al., 2007; Ross, 2007; Tate, 2005), and compliant with norms and values, as opposed to a manner that is non-prototypical, inauthentic and noncompliant with norms and values.
- A race definition is made in comparison to its opposite. A race is not its opposite. It is what it is not; for instance black in comparison to and as not white, its opposite in terms of culture and life philosophy (Anderson, 1995; Baloyi, 2008;

Hountondji, 1997; Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994; Musopole, 1994), sexuality (Ross, 2007), and family life morals and values (Espiritu, 2004; Mahon, 2004).

- In distinction and opposition to the inferior and historically oppressed black, the white race signifies an embodiment of privilege (Brooks & Rada, 2002; Hartigan, 2010; Hooks, 2009; Lipsitz, 2006; Yancy, 2004).

The limited focus on the race of black and white, as adopted in this thesis, is made for the purpose of illustrating the existence of same-race prejudice, and not to undermine other racial identities whose names are not mentioned, and experiences are not explored, here, or to suggest that black and white are the only categories of racial identity and identification recognisable in the world (Degenaar, 1978; Forman et al., 2002; James, 2001; Rockquemore, 1998; Shiao et al., 2004). The binary black and white race distinction is limited by an obscured view to consider the varied prevailing other races that are the subjects of identity and identification.

2.2 CATEGORISATION AND LABELLING

As human beings, we are given to grouping ourselves and others into categories that are purported to be distinct from each other (Fiske, 2005; Moncrieffe, 2007a). As we do that, we also put labels that serve to mark the boundaries of our identity, separate from the distinctively different other. As we label them as other, we also label ourselves as unique from them. This is illustrated in the following quotation:

I want my daughters to be Filipino especially on sex. I always emphasise to them that they should not participate in sex if they are not married. We are also Catholic. We are raised so that we don't engage in going out with men while we are not married. And I don't like it to happen to my daughters as if they have no values. I do not like them to grow up that way, like the American girls (Filipino migrant worker, as quoted by Espiritu, 2004, p. 197).

Although the above quotation is about the aspirations a Filipino migrant worker holds regarding ideals for his daughters about being Filipino girls, it is also about what it is not to be a model Filipino girl. It indicates that, in defining who we are, we are forever trapped in the dichotomous dilemma of who we are not, as it leaves us being who we are not, the opposite of us. A race begins by being defined from its opposite, the other race. A race gains its identity from its opposite (Brooks & Rada, 2002; Hooks,

2009; Tate, 2005; Yancy, 2004). When we know how the other race looks, smells and acts, we can tell what the self is like.

However, this is not good enough. That which is not self-enough within the race and does not conform to the prescripts of the ideal race needs to be differentiated and discarded to arrive at a fine-tuned authentic (Ross, 2007), prototypical and normative race (Hornsey et al., 2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). Examples to the concept of the black-sheep effect and its resultant devaluation and rejection of those not conforming to norms (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) are the rejection of whites (Sibanda, 2012) whose poverty status marks them as deviant from conceptions of white economic privilege and self-sufficiency (Hartigan, 2010; Hooks, 2009; Lipsitz, 2006), the discriminative labelling of blacks who submit to education (Galletta & Cross, 2007; O'Connor et al., 2007), and perceptions by Filipinos of those who follow the culture of white America (Espiritu, 2004).

The process of labelling (Moncrieffe, 2007a) helps to facilitate the smooth handling of the inordinate amount of information that people have to deal with in order to regulate uncertainty in social interactions. To avoid being saturated with information, human beings resort to clustering information about themselves and others into groups, a process Fiske (2005) calls categorisation.

Fiske (2005, p. 37) quotes Gordon Allport as listing some of the following reasons why categorisation is an essential tool for orderliness in a life of discomfort caused by a large quantity of information that may be ambiguous:

1. It enables people to function in the world by using prior experiences to avoid treating each new person or experience as unique.
2. It allows for less effort in processing information efficiently. Broader categories are preferred over those that are finely grained, as broad categories take in more information and requires less effort than smaller categories would.
3. New information can be easily slotted into what is already known. Such a linking of information to what is already there means that categorisation aids in identification.

People may be seen as collectively sharing physically observable characteristics and identities, making them one of a kind with other assumed inherent properties which result from these (Aspinall & Song, 2013; Mallon, 2013). Although the study by Bonilla-Silva and Embrick (2001) on the racial views of black Detroiters is geared towards demystifying the held perspective of black people and white people holding different views on several life matters, it does carry the unintended message that black people's views on racial matters are qualitatively different, making them one of a categorised unique kind.

A challenge ensues from the above, as noted by James' (2001) differentiation of investigations that study race as a socially constructed phenomenon, compared to those that view race as fixed in their investigations. Bonilla-Silva and Embrick's (2001) research uses race as fixed by setting as its premise an investigation into the changing or constant distinctive racial views of black people in Detroit, as opposed to those of white people.

Although categorisation helps to reduce chaos and inefficiency (Moncrieffe, 2007a), it reduces people to being cognitive misers guided only by the mental maps held in their heads (Sampson, 1999). It leads to "miscategorisation" as a result of "overinclusion" (including an item that is not a member of a given category) and "overexclusion" (wrongly excluding an item from its category) (Kosic et al., 2012). It facilitates easy generalisation of information rather than focusing on each piece of information individually (Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998), which Eagly and Diekmann (2005) consider to be neglecting individuals for the broader category to which they are seen to belong.

2.3 STEREOTYPES AS MENTAL MAPS

Categorisation is aided by the thinking that certain people, things and events share more similar characteristics than others. These pictures that we carry in our heads about things, people and events are cognitive representations or mental maps that are not in conformity with the factual reality of the things as they are (Sampson, 1999).

Hooks (2009, p. 96) says the following about stereotypes:

Stereotypes, however inaccurate, are one form of representation. Like fictions, they are created to serve as substitutions, standing in for what is real. They are not there to tell it like it is but to invite and encourage pretense. They are a fantasy, a projection onto the other that makes them less threatening. Stereotypes abound when there is distance. They are an invention, a pretense that one knows when the steps that would make real knowing possible cannot be taken or are not allowed.

Unaided by stereotypes, we would not be able to place any new information in an orderly manner. Stereotypes are like the “mind-sets/frameworks which inform how we interpret and work within different contexts” (Eyben, 2007, p. 84). They are the assumptions that help us to categorise our living circumstances.

Having met one Filipino girl, one is likely to build in one’s mind a representation of the way other Filipino girls are likely to look and behave. This would reduce the risk and effort of painstakingly getting to know each Filipino girl as a unique individual, because one’s framework has already set the boundaries of what being a Filipino girl is and what it is not. It offers the comfort of knowing almost all the Filipino girls one can possibly meet before actually getting to meet and know them. It offers conceptions prior to confronting the actual reality; hence it is a preconception that is bound to be faulty and incongruent with the facts. This stereotype is based on the assumption that being a Filipino girl implies abstinence from sexual intercourse before marriage, as well as being a Catholic who lives by the prescribed and proscribed ideals. It also leads to holding the assumption that living a life deviant from such ideals means not being a Filipino girl.

2.4 FROM STEREOTYPES TO PREJUDICE

If human interaction could simply be reduced to the packaging of information into categories and attaching labels to the mental frameworks that we have, such an effortless activity would be applauded for its effectiveness in helping us expedite the process of managing ourselves and others. This may lead to easy counting in and counting out, and including and excluding as we categorise. Tying in with the example in the previous section of counting in and counting out to categorise what it is to be a Filipino girl and what it is not to be, the following quotation shows how stereotypes can complicate and not merely smooth human interaction: “People of

African descent are simply not capable of producing works of philosophy comparable to those of the European tradition” (Hord & Lee, 1995, p. 2).

As in the quotation about being a Filipino girl (see section 2.2), the above quotation carries with it an indication of how stereotypes are a foundational basis not only for categorisation and labelling, but also for prejudice, which, according to Gordon Allport (as cited by Sampson, 1999, p. 4), entails an “unjustified, usually negative attitude directed towards others because of their social category or group membership”, and a positive judgement or evaluation arrived at prior to accumulating sufficient information to factually test what we purport to know.

Prejudice is a stereotype reflected in both cognitive and behavioural attitudes, and a resistance to being reflective of the self in order not to objectify our perception of the world (Brown, 1995; Eyben, 2007). As “the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect, or the display of hostile or discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group on account of their membership of that group” (Brown, 1995, p. 8), prejudice is something everybody is predisposed to as it serves a fundamental cognitive purpose (Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Fiske, 2005).

Bowman-Kruhm and Wirths (1998) argue that it is not only obviously intolerant, unkind, unaccepting and narrow-minded individuals who hold rigid beliefs and assumptions about themselves and others, but even the supposedly well-meaning. We all prejudge, hold biases, and knowingly and unknowingly make sweeping statements and have opinions and attitudes toward ourselves and others, classing them and ourselves into categories of similarity and difference, while not allowing our judgement to be subjected to the test of factual verification. We make conclusive distinctions between ourselves and others, and form judgemental attitudes based on these distinctions prior to considering pertinent facts, or simply based on ignoring and distorting available facts (Akhtar, 2007; Brown, 1995; Parens, 2007).

Prejudice is more than the mere holding of stereotypes or mental frameworks, categorisation and labelling. It also includes a performance component in addition to cognitive and affective components. It is present in the preferential judgements we make. Although prejudice is not only malignant in nature, the demeaning, devaluing

and derogatory attitudes and behaviours dished out to members of the other groups indicate that it mostly reeks of discrimination (Akhtar, 2007; Brown, 1995; Parens, 2007). Because of the inherent human proclivity and need to categorise and hold stereotypes that support those categories, objectifying our experiences of the world while neglecting the individual for who he/she is and seeing him/her for the broader group category in which we place him/her, we demonise the other while sanctifying ourselves.

In addition to the belief that people of an African descent are incapable of producing philosophical work of a quality comparable to that produced by those of European descent, as quoted above, Lipsitz (2006) indicates that stigmatising labels will be attached to those of the former group by further subjecting them to exploitative and humiliating subordination of involuntary servitude, while reserving the glorified elevation of the latter, as was the case in the slave period.

2.5 THE ENTRAPMENT OF CATEGORICAL ESSENTIALISM

What may be a superstition is paraded as 'African religion', and the white world is expected to endorse that it is indeed a religion but an African religion. What in all cases is a mythology is paraded as 'African philosophy', and again the white culture is expected to endorse that it is indeed a philosophy but an African philosophy. What is in all cases a dictatorship is paraded as 'African democracy', and the white culture is again expected to endorse that it is so. And what is clearly a de-development or pseudo development is described as 'development', and again the white world is expected to endorse that it is development – but of course 'African development' (Hendry Odera, as quoted by Hountondji, 1997, p. 384).

Present in the above passage is the continued juxtaposing of the words white and white culture, and African and African culture, with African interchangeably replaced with black, as shown in the work of several authors (Adam, 2000; Anderson, 1995; Baloyi, 2008; Domínguez, 1986; Hord & Lee, 1995; Musopole, 1994; Teffo, 1999). One cannot read the above quotation without an overwhelming feeling of denying and mocking the categorisation of human existence while falling prey to categorising thinking at the same time. We need to acknowledge that this is both a gift and a curse. It is indicative of a need to unify and categorise simultaneously. A tendency of which one cannot rid oneself, categorisation has been and will remain a cognitive

skill that humans live by (Fiske, 2005; Sampson, 1999). We inevitably use it to name ourselves and others, and the experiences of both (Baker, 2004; Tochluk, 2010).

One reads of the concepts of African psychology (Baloyi, 2008), black psychology (Jones, 1980) and African Christianity (Musopole, 1994), secretly abhorring the elevation of an undignified black and black experience to openly championing the reinstatement of a black and black experience of pride and standing equal to, if not higher than, the other races. In whatever form, dignified or undignified, elevated or downtrodden, oppressed or oppressing, one hears of an existence of human races in their authenticity (Baker, 2004; Mahon, 2004; Tate, 2005) and prototypicality, for example in terms of religion (Anderson, 1995).

There seems to be a strongly held general perception that there is a pure way of being that is unique to black and blackness, which is juxtaposed to white and whiteness. For black and blackness, such a state of being is contaminated by western white influences of colonisation, slavery and capitalist thought. It carries with it a sense of self-sacrifice, togetherness and preservationist humility in coexistence with the other and the environment in which one takes abode.

The distinctively essential black virtues in their pure form of knowing no prejudice and stereotype as maintained in a harmonious life, are succinctly described by Louw (1995) and Paris (2004), and set forth by John Mbiti's seminal philosophical writings (Mbigi, 1997; Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980), as embodied in the widely cherished Ubuntu and African philosophy. Pitted against this is the notion of pure white that is the norm (Tochluk, 2010), rational, superior, personally responsible, having a strong work ethic, having self-effacement, having mastery over nature (Perry, 2004) and being the opposite of the "idleness, stealing, lying, profanity, debauchery, nastiness and intemperance" (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994, p. 4) of black. Being materially privileged, clean, godly and superior are virtues ascribed to being white (Wray, 2006).

Categorisation is linked to thinking about humans as essentialist beings who have immutable characteristics that are not interchangeable. Mahalingam (2007, p. 46) describes essentialism as:

the psychological belief that there are essential and immutable differences between social groups such as race, class, gender, sexuality, etc. and that members of a group are believed to share the essential characteristics/traits of the social group they belong to.

Essentialism is based on the premise of seeing people and things as sharing immutable fundamental traits that define them as essentially existing and different. These fundamental traits are essences that bring a particular individual in affinity with others in possession of similar traits – others of his/her kind (Mallon, 2013). In affinity with one's kind, the traits help to set one apart from those of the different kind. They are our fundamentally defining nature.

This results in making sweeping statements about us and them, and about our group and their group, as shown in the following quotation by Thomas Jefferson (as cited by Sarich & Miele, 2004, p. 1):

in memory they (black people) are equal to the white people; in reason much inferior, as I think one could scarcely be found capable of tracing and comprehending the investigations of Euclid; and that in imagination they are dull, tasteless and anomalous.

A stereotypical belief in the superiority of one's group and the inferiority of the other's group is a restricted view and belief in the shared essences or qualities that one's group has, different from those inheritable by the other group, to define our group and their group as distinct natural kinds (Morning, 2011).

Reflecting on racial essentialism, Mallon (2013, p. 80) quotes Anthony Appiah as saying that it causes one to:

divide human beings into a small number of groups, called 'races', in such a way that members of these groups share certain fundamental, heritable, physical, moral, intellectual and cultural characteristics with one another that they did not share with members of any other race.

It is perception that fixes reality. The price paid for us categorically essentialising humans is that we reify our thoughts of them as objects outside of us, and thus experience them as such. This may lead to not only holding certain ideas or maps about them and us (stereotypes), but may cement the type of attitudes that we develop about the images we hold, further guiding how we actually relate to them

and ourselves (prejudice). These are the deadly social consequences that Lipsitz (2006) talks about when he cautions about the socially constructed living arrangements that we tend to regard as naturally given.

We inadvertently imbue our culture with powerful magnetic influence and do not realise that, as a guide to how to conduct ourselves, it is also a tool created by us to serve particular time and history specific challenges and needs (Hartigan, 2010). The reified life becomes a rule-obeying reality seen as fixed and preexisting (James, 2001), never subjected to scrutiny and renegotiation.

Although Morning (2011) argues that social constructivism, that is, the belief in the purported immutable human traits that are a product of active social life, is seen from other quarters as the opposite of essentialism, I see it as serving to add a human performative element to that which would still be a stale existence. Because it believes in the existence of a differently constructed reality, however manmade, it may result in a reality that is also essentialised. Its defended difference from essentialism attests to its objectified nature.

When being black used to be held as being begrimed and defective, and being representational of darkness, dread, death, terror, horror, wickedness, mourning and defilement (Hood, 1994), and as being inferior to associate with (Durrheim & Mtose, 2006), one sees post-apartheid South Africa having ignited an interest in it as the arbiter of humane humanity (Teffo, 1999). The categories we hold cannot be ahistorical, as not to be reflective of the times and spaces we invade (Mahon, 2004; Morning, 2011).

2.6 RACE AS PERFORMED OR CARRIED

Human beings cannot evade being racially defined and racially defining. Even so, valued racial harmony and rainbow nation exhortations become hallowed appeals geared towards ridding society of racial definitions and categorisation. That we can be beyond racial classification is a myth (Potter, Conway & Bernard, 2010). Our racial sameness and differentness remain guiding boundary markers between us and them. We are given to thinking racially (Mallon, 2013) about ourselves as a racially similar kind, and them as a racially outwardly different, but similar within.

What is race? Is a person born with or within a particular race, as essentialist thought wants us to believe? Is it a socially lived experience as the social constructivist argues? The answer to these questions rests upon looking at race as a socially constructed or fixed reality. While I argue that seeing race as fixed ignores its socially constructed nature, as leaning on it being socially constructed ignores its fixed nature, both views are worth exploring here. The authors cited above and throughout do not subscribe to a singular descriptive view of race, mainly offering a balanced stance between the two contesting perspectives.

In thinking about race, both scientists and laypersons differentiate people according to observable physical body characteristics. In both, people seek bodily evidence for real differences and similarities between human types. The tangible human body becomes an immutable fact of nature, serving as evidence for individuals to categorise themselves and to be categorised by others (Bailey et al., 2013; James, 2001; Mayor, 2012; Neal & Wilson, 1989). This is the view that sees race as naturally fixed and biologically determined, shown by Rockquemore's (1998) exploration of the biracial identity of those whose physical differentness thrusts them in a fluid and in-between racial identity to provide further evidence that the physical human body is looked at for race definition.

The scientific study on the racial views of black Detroiters by Bonilla-Sailva and Embrick (2001) hinges on research participants whose race is naturally defined as fixed, as does the study by Steck et al. (2003) on the salience of racial identity between African-American and white students.

That race is socially constructed is shown in Shiao et al.'s (2004) example of white families who prefer adopting Korean children over black ones as a result of the slight visible physical resemblances between them and the Korean adoptees as opposed to the vast dissimilarities between them and the black children. In the same vein, the insistence by the National Association of Black Social Workers that transracial adoption of black children by white parents shall leave the former "in a cultural 'no man's land'" (Shiao et al., 2004, p. 2), speaks of the race identity ambivalence such children find themselves in.

Shifts in social status allow for proximity or distance to blackness or whiteness by either perceived or preferred difference or similarity. Bailey et al. (2013) talk of a “whitening” process, characterised by the accumulation of things high in monetary value, leading people to acquire status associated with whiteness, and distant from blackness. An example of this is Latin Americans who take on an identity of non-white (Forman et al., 2002) and whose black identity is shunned, distanced from for a preferred proximity to whiteness. This springs from the racial identity of those who find themselves initially classified as black reclassifying themselves differently due to the obvious physical differences between them and those allocated to the black race category (Forman et al., 2002).

The entrenched historical seat of United States black and white race classification (James, 2001) seems to be outwitted and contested against by emerging other classifications. The historical “one drop rule” (James, 2001; Rockquemore, 1998) is shaken by the emergence of alternative racial identities. The multi-racial category of mixed black and white parentage further defies the “one drop rule” with its resultant varied biracial identities (Rockquemore, 1998). Preference by the mothers of mixed-race children for their children to keep close affinity with whiteness for possible benefits incurred as opposed to associating with blackness (Rockquemore, 1998), inadvertently turns the children not only non-white, but “honorary white” (Forman et al., 2002; Shiao et al., 2004), remaining neither black nor white.

Distinctions between races or “kinds” is demeaning, inter alia because it is imprecise. It imputes far-reaching character differences based on the observable physical makeup of people and ignores the social foundations and political underpinnings of definitions of race, as argued in several critical race theory arguments (Bailey et al., 2013; Closson, 2010; Hartigan, 2010; Hawkesworth, 2010; Odattey-Wellington, 2011). The foundation of socially constructed race is thereby built upon.

Morning’s (2011, p. 18) assertion that “individuals do not carry race within them; instead, race is a label that is imposed on them (or a container into which they are put) depending on the society in which they find themselves,” is unpersuasive as Tochluk’s (2010, pp. 9-10) quotation of the American Anthropological Association’s statement on race reads as follows:

In the United States both scholars and the general public have been conditioned to viewing races as natural and separate divisions within the human species based on visible physical differences. With the vast expansion of scientific knowledge in this century, however it has become clear that human populations are not unambiguous, clearly demarcated, biologically distinct groups.... Historical research has shown that the idea of 'race' has always carried more meanings than mere physical differences; indeed, physical variations in the human species have no meaning except the social ones that humans put on them.

As in the attempt to resolve the questions above, there seems to be another line of categorical thinking inherent in the above quotations that does not serve well to settle the impasse. Any essentialist explanation, as espoused by physical anthropology, can be summarily dismissed for being rigid and not taking into consideration the historical, social and political lived experiences of race. However, a social constructivist assertion that sees itself as better than an essentialist one runs the risk of equally reifying its own dichotomous opinion, becoming a social constructivist lens that is essentialist.

Howard's (1985, p. 418) stark criticism against the scale tilted in favour of the white race when he says that, "if anthropology has indeed been handmaiden to colonial oppression in the past, psychology has provided one of its pernicious tools", appears to be objectifying a black race and its experience as not only of equal value and standing as the white race, but more pure. In exposing the historical inhumanity of the white race in the making of the black race, an ontologically redefined essential black race is put in place (Anderson, 1995).

Morning (2011) intimates that race is performative when she indicates that it is a power instrument serving to classify people in terms of groups of superiority and inferiority (Yancy, 2004), with the former allocated more life resources than the latter. Regarded as inferior and equal in status only to animals with their less evolved cultures, those of the black race were made to be subordinate to the British and the French (white people) (Wright & Schuhmann, 2007). Racial classification was then performed for the purpose of exploitation and stigmatisation of black people while privileging the white people (Lipsitz, 2006). Laws and policies were drawn to the advantage of the superior race, as was the case in the apartheid South Africa (Durrheim, Mtose & Brown, 2011).

The anthropologist Franz Boas bemoaned the historical superiority and inferiority distinction of people wherein their grouping is determined through heredity, to highlight how bound by time and situation the race definitions are according to which we come to classify people (Baker, 2010; Williams, 2006). This is with the realisation that skin pigmentation and other phenotype characteristics have been used to classify and rank-order people in societies (Wander, Martin & Nakayama, 1999), with consequences that have stayed detrimental to humanity, and have been taken for granted as a force created by nature (Lipsitz, 2006).

The insistence on a denouncement of the hereditary determinism of races was mounted against ideas that asserted race as a biological concept. People have always been predisposed to sorting each other. Illuminated physical differences between people have been used to categorise them into races. Their visible physical differences were regarded as essences immutably embodied in their biological makeup (Sarich & Miele, 2004). As an inborn human tendency that predates colonialism in the period from 700AD to 1400AD, Sarich and Miele (2004, pp. 1-2) note a comment by Thomas Jefferson that:

There is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I as such as any other man am in favour of having the superior position assigned to the white race.

People were seen as being naturally determined to be different and were further ascribed as being relatively superior or inferior to each other. Their identities were seen as naturally determined and no amount of social upliftment was seen as able to change this (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994). An allusion to this is made by Howitt and Owusu-Bempah (1994, p. 6) from Arthur Jensen's hypothesis that an attempt to improve the early school learning disadvantage of black children would amount to naught, that even the addition of resources would be a wasteful endeavour because it would ignore that "the problem lay in the inferiority of black genes which could not be dealt with by throwing money into their education".

Further compounding this, to the development of laws to engrave what is seen as biologically inscribed and naturally determined, Domínguez (1986) calls humanity the

foreman of a racial design whose architecture is put in place by nature. The design and implementation of apartheid South African laws, by humanity the foreman, served the political imperatives of that time (Degenaar, 1978).

Racial classification based on physical distinction has been performed to advance and support social inequality (Hartigan, 2010), failing to realise that it is an invention based on the ideas we have about biologically assumed characteristics (Sarich & Miele, 2004).

2.7 RACE AS CULTURAL DIFFERENCE

I am convinced that there is a black and nonblack view of human behaviour, growth and potential for development. All theoretical orientations must be examined and made viable within the phenomenological fields of black people's experiences (Jones, 1980, p. xi).

"African religion" and not "superstition", "African democracy" and not "dictatorship", "African philosophy" and not "mythology", "African development" and not "pseudo-development" (Hendry Odera, quoted by Hountondji, 1997). "African psychology" and "African psychotherapy" in addition to "western psychology" and "western psychotherapy" (Baloyi, 2008). "African Christianity" in addition to "western Christianity" (Musopole, 1994). Added to these are the concepts of "African psychology" (Williams, 1981), "African philosophy" of John Mbiti (Mbigi, 1997; Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980), and "black psychology" (Jones, 1980).

In these, I see a concerted exhortation for black people to find and reposition their Africanness from the throngs of marginalisation and insignificance into which they were rendered by westernisation and whiteness. I see an attempt to wrestle off the stereotypes of inferior subjugation that entrench blackness as being biologically inferior and hereditarily doomed to underdevelopment equal to animals (Wright & Schuhmann, 2007). I see an attempt to resist being classified as a depraved and atavist racial category that can only benefit from new cultural upliftment. I see a time-specific effort to shed the old as defined by others and to affirm the self with labels devoid of the colonial ravaging that sought to rescue black from its savage lifestyle of "superstition", "witchcraft", "laziness", "ignorance" and "promiscuity" (Baker, 2010).

Beckoning are calls for locating a pure Africanness uncontaminated by the West, an Africanness rooted in the experience of blackness and its culture.

It is in this argument that the dregs of racial categorisation are laid bare. In it is a contemplation of finding an authentic African imbued with true black experience – an argument that drips with entrapments of racial essentialism, although a cultural one. In the spirit and times of racial emancipation of the race of black as opposed to its colonial white domination, it is a racial re-classification of a particular political moment with its own specific economic and social benefits.

It is in this instance that I argue that the anthropologist Franz Boas's (Baker, 2010; Williams, 2006) affirmation of the African or black culture, although it is a big shift from the epistemology of inferior heredity, slides further into the thinking of racial categorisation.

This traps one in the paradoxical loop of definition. By trying to avoid the prejudice of identity in stereotypes by the other, one further stereotypes the self in a definition whose garb is in the opposite (positive and cultural), yet remains a stereotype. In resisting being defined by the other, one employs a definition that, although presumably affirming, is but its own opposite. We shall forever remain essentialised racial beings, in culture or biology. It is a view that stringently holds on to the belief in the existence of separate and uniquely distinctive human races of black and white.

In its train emerges an argument for an alternative explanation of black behaviour away from the deficiency model which sees black behaviour and experience as inferior, to one that insists on distinct African values, attitudes and customs that have a black valour, and away from a white reference that demonises black people (Jones, 1980). In the new, one sees the old rearing its head by believing in the existence of the separate races, further separating them, positioning them in competition and not in complement or unity, believing in the authentic existence of each and emphasising the cultural distinctiveness of each, as Nobles (1980, p. 19) states that "insofar as the African (Black) ethos is distinct from that of the prevailing white ethos (upon which traditional psychology is found) then a Black Psychology based upon the black ethos must also be uniquely different from white psychology".

Central to blackness are definable cultural characteristics importantly coined and encouraged by John Mbiti as referred to in Mbigi (1997) and Musopole (1994), while Nobles (1980, p. 19) defines them as underlined in “the understanding, attitude of mind, logic and perception behind the manner in which African people think, act or speak in different situations of life,” whose understanding would allow the easy grasping of black people’s essence of existence.

2.8 BLACK AND BLACKNESS DEFINED

As a race, like whiteness, blackness is described in terms of observable physical appearance (Forman et al., 2002; James, 2001; Neal & Wilson, 1989; Potter et al., 2010; Rockquemore, 1998). Carried in the physical body text (James, 2001), it is identified by having a dark skin colour, broad nose, thick lips, kinky hair and all physical features identified as the opposite of being white (Forman et al., 2002; James, 2001; Neal & Wilson, 1989; Rockquemore, 1998). Black and blackness used to be vague descriptions of colour with fluid connotations whose mythical associations were at times interchangeable with those of white and whiteness. Some African societies would conduct sacrificial offerings to their gods by slaughtering a white coloured animal at certain times or for certain incidents, while at other times, a black coloured animal was suitable for a godly sacrifice (Hood, 1994). The meaning attached to both black and white was made significant, not by the fixed colour itself, but by the importance of the event to which it was attached.

Mythical explanations about the colour black and white always held sway in different nature and proportions of imprecise form. These are given below by Hood (1994):

- Roughness and hardness were valued as indicators of male virility in Greek thought. A male’s darkened skin from working outside was preferred over a lighter or white skin which was considered a sign of vulnerability and femininity.
- The courage and skill of Ethiopian warriors was assumed from their dark skin.
- In classical Greek criminal trials, a white vote meant acquittal, while a black one meant a death sentence. A person’s inner feelings and traits could be imputed from their skin colour.
- Having a black heart was used as a metaphor of having warmth, as opposed to having a white heart, which implied being insensitive and cold-hearted.

Whiteness of internal organs was considered an abnormality, as in the image of a person having a white liver that signified them as being cowardly.

With the world inundated with sin, evil and famine, early Christian thought took hold by providing explanations for such calamities. Christianity provided the structural contours of black and blackness (Bennett, 2009). It sought to explain the occurrence of earthly suffering as the work of the personified devil that was presumed to be black (Hood, 1994). Black personified the devil with his evil and dark deeds, that were seen as working against God's divine plan. To be white was seen as being pure and immune from the devil's darkened deeds. Africa came to be viewed as the ancestral seat and progenitor of blackness, its people and cultures as predominantly black, held in the mythical connotations of darkness and evil (Hood, 1994). Its cultures and traditions were overlooked and at times scoffed at as substandard to the pure white creation God set forth. Africa came to represent black in the main, and therefore the devil's creation.

It followed that to be African was to be categorised as black, as being black was categorised as synonymous with being African. Those of African descent were categorised as being black (Hord & Lee, 1995). Considered to be substandard cultures practised by subhuman beings, Africa's black world views were targeted as unworthy of comparison with those of the other human races. Western Christianity was introduced to Africa to rescue her from her wayward black self (Musopole, 1994). Practice of and training in psychology and psychotherapy were conducted in such a way that the "essential" black and African experiences were erased and replaced with western experiences and world views (Baloyi, 2008; Williams, 1981).

2.8.1 Blackness and performative stereotypes that devalue

Steeped in perceptions entrenched in stereotypes about black and blackness, relations with black people were prejudiced, with their culture viewed as inferior, as indicated in the following statement by Nathan Southgate Shaler (as quoted by Baker, 2010, p. 21):

the negro is not as yet intellectually so far up the scale of development as he appears to be; in him the great virtues of superior race, though implanted, have not yet taken root, and are in need of constant tillage, lest

the old savage weed overcome the tender shoots of new and unnatural culture.

Such stereotypes describe being black and its culture as suspect and inferior. Its cultural lifestyle is seen as an impediment to Christian and western civilisation, entrapping its people as disgraced, dirty, wicked, ignorant and heathens (Baker, 2010; Tochluk, 2010). Blackness is characterised by innate laziness, barbarism, ignorance about the self, lack of inner drive and motivation to improve one's lot, suited to and content with a humiliating living standard of poor housing, disease and servitude (Durrheim et al., 2011; Hartigan, 2010; Lipsitz, 2006; Tochluk, 2010).

2.8.2 Blackness and stereotypes that affirm

Being black as being of African descent (Domínguez, 1986) is an existence described in physical terms of being dirty, soiled, ugly (Tochluk, 2010), having thick lips, tightly coiled woolly hair and broad noses (Sarich & Miele, 2004), and inspiring shame and dislike of the self (Durrheim & Mtose, 2006). It is on the basis of the abovementioned shame and dislike of the self that a deep-rooted exhortation is made enjoining those defined as black and of African descent to value that which has been scoffed at and ridiculed in their distinctive blackness.

Black people are encouraged to identify with their distilled heritage of blackness. A heightened consciousness of distinctive blackness in both culture and phenotypical makeup is made. One's culture and phenotype are used as identity markers of a boundary that sets the self and others apart. One overarching demarcation of the self and others is a belief in blackness being synonymous with and an embodiment of Ubuntu (Baloyi, 2008; Mbigi, 1997; Teffo, 1999).

Although historical studies of race point to a black race defined in imprecise physical terms by the socially, economically and politically powerful white, black people use the same physical traits to describe and affirm their distinctive race. Neal and Wilson (1989) show how America's civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s were characterised by slogans emphasising the liking, accentuation and adherence of beauty and self-identification according to hitherto despised black features.

Espiritu (2004) describes black American families as culturally virtuous, uncharacteristic of United States families with their lack of collective identity, family

tie strength and husband-and-wife norms. United States families are viewed as being distant, uncaring and selfish. So identified, blackness is affirmed from what it is not. It perpetuates the comparative binary description of race that is produced and enhanced in a relational context with the other defined race.

2.9 WHITENESS AS CARRIED

Hooks (2009) defines whiteness as all that represents being white as embodied in manners of speech, walk, dress, skin colour, etc. It is clearly marked by and retains its distinctiveness from what is not white and therefore black (Brooks & Rada, 2002; Durrheim et al., 2011; Galletta & Cross, 2007; Hood, 1994; Wright & Schuhmann, 2007). It is an identity and racial category carried in being of white European American descent (Degenaar, 1978; Hood, 1994; Sarich & Miele, 2004; Wander et al., 1999). It is an existential category whose contours are marked by representational images of being triumphant, innocent, joyful, pure, happy and beautiful (Hood, 1994), its boundary defended in images of what it is not, in other words, black.

A tenuous white intellectual superiority hinged on tenuous intellectual inferiority of those of the named black race, described by Franz Boas as an unfortunate myth that masquerades as hereditary what is socially and politically sanctioned (Anderson, 1995; Baker, 2010; Brooks & Rada, 2002; Williams, 2006). It is a myth that permeates both black and white thought, leading to an assumption that the big central nervous system of those of the fairer skin as compared to those of the darker skin is a justification of the former's advanced and highly developed intellectual functioning compared to the latter's primitive closer association to the lowest animals in advancement (Baker, 2010; Williams, 2006; Wright & Schuhmann, 2007).

Naturally given, socially and economically deserved superiority is exemplified in academia – a relational description that pits and derives essential identity from what it is not, in other words, black. Black children who excelled academically were defined as “acting white” and succumbing to a white American culture (O'Connor et al., 2007). White children were ordinarily assumed to be good students without having to prove it academically (Galletta & Cross, 2007; Morris, 2006). The criterion of differential valuation is applied to assess children's scholastic performance at the

same school. Rooted in the myth of white intellectual superiority and black intellectual inferiority, black teachers at a school interpreted black children's performance as average, while praising that of white children. White teachers at the same school disparaged white children's satisfactory performance equal to that of black children as disappointing (Morris, 2006).

In 1983, the crowning of the first black Miss America, Vanessa Williams, was chastised for subscribing to and upholding American white attributes of beauty (Neal & Wilson, 1989).

Whiteness is synonymous with intellectual astuteness and translatable to economic affluence. To be white and intellectually inferior is a paradox, as is an association of being white with being destitute, as the two associations are a defiance of a distinctively essential whiteness. In both, whiteness is not affirmed. Whiteness has the power not only to define and categorise others, but also itself. It looks at itself through a stereotype lens sifting through "what it is" and "what it is not", from the other and from itself.

"I suppose because I'm white, people feel I have a better chance or something. And that I haven't already stumbled onto that path just amazes them", enthused Sharon (as quoted by Moss, 2003, p. 56). She further added that (Moss, 2003, pp. 59-60):

because I'm white and "pretty" has not landed me a good job yet. It hasn't landed me one of those rich executive husbands. It hasn't even paid for a reliable car I can drive. I mean I try, you know, but I can't change who I am. I can't just be one of those suburban soccer moms who spend all day carting their kids around, shopping and cooking for dinner for their families. I'm on welfare, struggling to get through my life and raise my two girls. This whole idea that all White people are living a carefree life is ridiculous.

The highly guarded whiteness enjoyed protection against the threat of infusion with what would taint its pureness. In the belief of the natural superiority of whiteness, laws were developed to clear and guard its territory (Degenaar, 1978; Domínguez, 1986). Laws designed and pursuit during apartheid South Africa to discourage the intermingling of the races are a testimony to this (see section 1.9).

The frowning reaction against white children attending school with black children in a mostly black residential neighbourhood (Morris, 2006) and struggling poor white

people like Sharon mentioned above (Moss, 2003) give credence to the belief in “nature as the architect of racial distinctions” of white superiority and black inferiority, “and man simply as the foreman who interprets nature’s design” (Domínguez, 1986, p. 54), a distinction whose boundaries are not supposed to be crossed.

2.10 WHITENESS AS PERFORMED

The abovementioned beliefs in white superiority leave it with a forceful hegemonic tinge as an ideal for both those who have it and those who aspire to it. It unquestionably remains an ideal with staying power. The Latin Americanisation effect (Forman et al., 2002), the non-white biracial identity and the honorary white effect (Bailey et al., 2013; Forman et al., 2002; Rockquemore, 1998; Shiao et al., 2004), wherein identity is sought in proximity with white and distance from black, should be understood in this context. One person recalled the inner tormenting embarrassment of being thrown in the margins of whiteness and poverty, that “it was not the act of shopping at the second hand stores, but the assumption (by me and others) that we were poor that was at the core of the embarrassment” (Moss, 2003, p. 98).

A strong belief in setting apart authentic whiteness from disdained inauthentic whiteness is based on white stereotypes about itself and about blackness. It is a categorisation that sets whiteness apart from non-whiteness, a categorisation based on more than characterisation of skin pigmentation and other phenotype markers; it is based on practices rooted in stereotypes (Tochluk, 2010).

Baker (2010) reflects on Franz Boas’ fervent fight at the forefront of a campaign that stood against perceptions that not only saw being black as backward, but also sought to transform and assimilate it into the superior white culture.

The hegemonic appeal of whiteness pureness traps those who do not fit and conform to its defined category with an internalised negative perception of themselves, needing validation through whiteness while seeking and aspiring to be white (Durrheim & Mtose, 2006; Hooks, 2009).

Being white relates to holding categorisation stereotypes about the self as superior and others as inferior, which is an entrapping mind-set whose power even leads to

black people to adhere to the socialised belief in the fantasy of white goodness (Hooks, 2009). Some in South Africa stayed content with being called derogatory names (Durrheim et al., 2011) as was the case with the Ghanaian nurse Owusu-Bempah's experience of enduring subhuman treatment in Britain when "white staff and patients frequently referred to him as a 'monkey'" (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994, p. 2). Anyone and anything not sharing the stated disposition, worldviews and phenotype identities categorised as white (Perry, 2004), would be deemed subhuman, their race as undesirable and distasteful (Hood, 1994).

As an organising racial category in whose projected stereotypes other races are looked down upon, whiteness defined blackness as non-white, a lazy race that would not work unless made to (Hartigan, 2010), thereby subjecting it to the recorded history of presumed deserved exploitation, subhuman living conditions and servitude. Ushered in was the whiteness superior race, practising oppression, exclusion and enslavement of what is not white, therefore black (Anderson, 1995; Durrheim et al., 2011). Whiteness therefore became associated with and synonymous with damage to humanity (Anderson, 1995; Tochluk, 2010) by being prejudiced towards other races.

A retort by Rodney (1995, p. 187) that "white society is violent, white American society is particularly violent, white American society is especially violent towards blacks" emanates from an observation of whiteness reserving life's equities and amenities for all but non-white people, whose low life standards are seen as self-inflicted from innate unintelligence and laziness. A socially constructed racial supremacy (Frakenberg, 1993; Lipsitz, 2006; Morris, 2006; Tochluk, 2010; Wray, 2006) measured in lopsided advantages of entitlement to life privileges at the expense of other races, it is an ideological hegemonic system of dominance by the fair-skinned whose persuasive influence of assumed normalcy means a deluded lack of self-scrutiny (Frakenberg, 1993; Lipsitz, 2006; McIntyre, 1997; Morris, 2006; Yancy, 2004). Because of its historical majority position, whiteness embodies an unwillingness to consider and interrogate its socially and politically composed race, either due to lack of awareness or to protect the benefits it stands to benefit from it (Mayor, 2012; Steck et al., 2003).

Being white is being trapped in a self-serving “white talk” (Lipsitz, 2006; McIntyre, 1997; Tochluk, 2010; Yancy, 2004) that defines one’s race as the norm and the prime standard of measuring others, oblivious to the social political and economic moorings in which its normality is rooted. Assumed to be occasioned with hard work and material affluence, its ensuing superiority marks it off from poverty that is seen as a signifier of black cultural laziness and innate abhorrent mental underdevelopment. It is for this reason that poor white people stand to endure the brunt of incessant marginal existence of between-ness, akin to Du Bois’s coined African American’s drenching two-ness of being (Anderson, 1995; Hartigan, 2010; Mahon, 2004; Sampson, 1999) as they are derided for corrupting the esteemed white pureness (Morris, 2006; Moss, 2003; Wray, 2006).

To this end, the hypocrisy is laid bare of whiteness’s wishful erasure of its complicity in the subjugation of blackness that is deliberate. Being white is being in self-chosen oblivion of self, embedded delusional superiority, a two-ness of being and investment in the fair skin itself (Lipsitz, 2006), whose superiority has no biological or natural foundation but is socially constructed (Frakenberg, 1993; Lipsitz, 2006; McIntyre, 1997; Wray, 2006; Yancy, 2004), sustained in and supported by law (Degenaar, 1978; Domínguez, 1986; Durrheim et al., 2011). White people are called to relook at their insulated whiteness, their self-serving white talk, convenient colour evasiveness, power evasiveness and selective silence tripping them into entrenched prejudice that attributes nature and biology to what is socially tailored living arrangement serving white stereotypes about themselves and those who are marked as not fulfilling the white norm.

CHAPTER 3

INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL PHENOMENOLOGY

3.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW

Chapter 3 is the first of three chapters in which I consider what a phenomenological understanding of same-race prejudice would entail. The chapter starts with a discussion of essentialist understandings of racial identity and identification (i.e., as naturally existing and reducible to describable and quantifiable qualities), which leads to and sustains same-race prejudice against those of one's 'own' race who appear to be lacking in the necessary authenticity, prototypicality and normativity. Phenomenology is introduced as a counter to the naturalist attitude on which essentialist understandings are based. It does not seek to determine the presence or absence of objective racial qualities, but rather to elucidate how people actually experience such supposedly objective qualities, and what meanings they attach to them.

So, how then do people experience race and what meanings do they attach to it? Rather than taking phenomenological literature on race as my point of departure, I make a somewhat radical move in the chapter, namely to attend in the first place to what 'ordinary' people have to say about the matter. This is not intended as a formal empirical research project, but as a way of strategically finding a way into the spoken and written discourses about race 'from the bottom up'. The short excerpts from the conversations I had with people illustrate how ready all seem to be to work from the premise that, at some level, race does exist, however much each speaker might labour to project layers of complexity onto it. My conversation partners conjured up a veritable menagerie of more and less exotic racial types, always making sure to position themselves as knowledgeable and unbiased observers who understand the underlying dimensions that can bring clarity to the apparently confusing proliferation of races and racial characteristics.

Prominent among these imagined dimensions is an ongoing loss of essential and wholesome blackness through an admixture of whiteness. Blackness, in this ideation, started as a strong current of essential humanness, but has now split into innumerable tributaries and lost itself in the swamps of white-like self-centredness.

Similarly, whiteness is imagined not only as being different from blackness, but as somehow being estranged from a yet-to-be-realised, truer and more socially acceptable version of itself. In addition to the impromptu philosophies emerging from these informal conversations, I also weave in excerpts from some supposedly more carefully considered academic texts and find that, perhaps not so surprisingly, they draw on similar dynamics to construct a world in which races are not only differentiated from each other, but also from themselves.

Whatever the imagined surface manifestations and underlying principles of this racialised world, it is sustained by a naturalist attitude in which race exists objectively as an essential dimension of reality. In concluding the chapter, I therefore start the process of finding a path out of this self-referential world by appealing to a philosophical tradition, phenomenology, which explicitly eschews objective knowledge of a real world. I review the origins of phenomenology as a science of what happens inside of human consciousness rather than in outer spaces populated by concrete objects. Like naturalism, phenomenology is essentialist, but rather than wishing to ascribe essentialist characteristics to objects existing in objective space and time, it wishes instead to explore the essence of human experience. People are not imagined as existing in objective space and time, along with other objects, but as producing space and time – as being space and time. To round off the chapter, I consider some of the key principles involved in doing research from such a perspective.

Beginning with interview discussions, definitions and descriptions about the races of black and white situated in an essentialist lens, this chapter builds on the premise laid towards the end of the previous chapter regarding the naturalist attitude about race, racial identity and identification. It is founded on and responds to the essentialist pitfalls that emerge from naturalist thought and attitudes towards the definition of race, racial identity and identification, and how these contribute to the development and sustenance of same-race prejudice. Encompassed in the interview descriptions in this chapter and the literature definitions from the previous chapter, the pitfalls are stated next.

Humanity's racial identity and forms of racial identification exist in the form of mutually exclusive races whose characteristics are distinctive, objectively discernible

and unique to each. As separate forms of identity and identification, each race is separately quantifiable in terms of uninterchangeable characteristics that mark its pure nature as separate from what it is not. For the white race, these are positive associations with physical beauty, triumph, innocence, godliness (Hood, 1994), academic excellence (Galletta & Cross, 2007), material affluence and superiority, and cleanliness (Morris, 2006; Moss, 2003; Sibanda; 2012; Wray; 2006). These are differentiated from and not interchangeable with those unique to a black race encompassing a different kind of humanness (Louw, 1995; Mbigi, 1997), world-view and spirituality (Hountondji, 1997; Jones, 1980; Musopole, 1994; Nobles; 1980; Teffo, 1999).

Using black and blackness as examples, the idiosyncratic character and philosophy towards life of each race (Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980; Senghor, 1997) call for a unique form of appreciation (Baloyi, 2008; Clark, 1980; Howard, 1985; Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994). The assertion made in the chapter is that the view about race, racial identity and identification as objectively quantifiable offers an illusion of reliability and verifiability to certainly describe them (Spinelli, 1989, 2005) as entities that essentially have an independent and natural existence defined by the naturalist attitude, and as unperturbed by an experiencing conscious individual (Kockelmans, 1994; Roy, Petitot, Pachoud & Varela, 1999; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974).

This leads to the view that humanity, race, racial identity and identification are purely objective with measurable quantities, a view which is uncritically embraced (Kruger, 1988) while the thoughts about humanity, race, racial identity and identification are reified (Davis, 2005). In this, the primacy of conscious human experiential meaning-making, understanding and interpretation of race, racial identity and identification is ignored. Further ignored is the capacity of human beings for appreciative conscious awareness of what looks like objective racial identity and identification realities (Kockelmans, 1994; Roy et al., 1999; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983).

This view of humanity, racial identity and identification as naturally existing, reducible to describable and quantifiable qualities and virtues as separately black and white, leads to, contributes to and sustains same-race prejudices of the authenticity, prototypicality and normativity of black and white, as opposed to the inauthenticity, non-prototypicality and non-normativity of identity and identification within the races

of black and white. Each time we try to define, we get caught up in the objectivist, naturalist attitude, even when we seem to think that our new definitions are better than the ones before. We tend to view people, their existence in the world and their race as naturally given.

Founded on a naturalist attitude, the previous chapter situated and imbued the race definitions of black and white with essentialist, objective and naturally given natures. The present chapter, which is phenomenologically founded, is a counter-response to the previous one and the stated pitfalls of the naturalist attitude set out in this chapter by challenging the essentialist notions of race, racial identity and identification of blackness and whiteness as normal, objective, natural and existing independently from an experiencing individual (Jacobsen, 2007; Lavery, 2003; Tuohy, Cooney, Dowling, Murphy & Sixsmith, 2012). Interrogating the naturalist attitude upon which their physical, objective and quantifiable naturalness is founded (Murray, 2012), people's real existence is viewed as a reality only conferred upon by them through their conscious lived experience (Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Spiegelberg, 1965). This naturalist attitude is also viewed as not realising that these notions are only a shadow of the true reality of the phenomenon (Converse, 2012), being responsible for the generalised understanding that ignores people's lived experience (Greenfield & Jensen, 2012). The naturalist attitude behind the definition of these terms is slated for taking human experiences for granted (Kockelmans, 1994; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983) and not considering them as phenomena whose existence and appreciation are not only or always amenable to the natural laws of quantification (Zaner, 1970).

As "a philosophical perspective that helps researchers to explore and understand everyday experiences without pre-supposing knowledge of those experiences" (Converse, 2012, p. 28), the origin of phenomenology is spelled out in this chapter as being influenced by the assumption of the mind-body split (Dowling & Cooney, 2012), as opposed to medicine's naturalist and biological understanding of illness (Gergel, 2012). Phenomenology is a radical response to the traditional way of practising philosophy (Earle, 2010; Lavery, 2003) and is intended to explore the phenomena of human experience – lived experiences of an individual's life-world as

they appear in a person's consciousness and not the world as existing separate from the experiencing individual (Gergel, 2012; Kim, 2012; Tuohy et al., 2012).

This chapter serves to look at the description of the purpose or task of phenomenology. With its suspension of the naturalist attitude (Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 1969; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974), phenomenology is not concerned with the mere objective existence and the official definitions (Earle, 2010; Kim, 2012) of race, racial identity and racial identification (Gergel, 2012). Tasked with analysing people's conscious and internal experience, its research side (Flood, 2010) focuses on the conscious experience of what the supposed objective definition is and the meaning people attach to it (Roy et al., 1999; Shamsaei, Kermanshahi, Vanaki & Holtforth, 2013).

It is concerned with the essence and content of conscious human experience (Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Simonsen, 2013; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974), not with humanity's mere corporeality or the physical body of race, but with how people experience and make meaning of their corporeality, and the interpretive understanding of the effect the corporeality has on their understanding. It focuses on the conscious mental representation of corporeality and its contents (Murray, 2012; McDonald & Dickerson, 2013; Spiegelberg, 1965; Wagner, 1983). The chapter helps to look at phenomenology's core concepts of intentionality (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Flood, 2010; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012), phenomenon (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Earle, 2010) and consciousness (Greenfield & Jensen, 2012).

The chapter seeks to highlight that the racial definitions we make are based on stereotypes resulting from categorisation and prejudice masked in taken-for-granted notions of normativity, authenticity, prototypicality and objectivity, not only between the races of black and white, but also within the races themselves.

3.2 WHEN NATURALISM MATTERS

After accumulating literature definitions of the terms black, blackness, white, and whiteness, I found myself lacking a living picture of how people actually define the races of black and white, themselves and others, the strategies they use to do these, and whether they are aware of how they use such strategies. The literature

definitions felt impersonal, distant and lacking in an experientially conscious human element.

I came up with a schedule to randomly talk to people purposively selected to come up with the definitions. Coming mostly from organisations whose duties revolve around race, intolerance, segregation, justice, labour security and community service provision, these individuals were chosen on the basis of having a presumed understanding on matters relating to race, racial identity and racial identification. Although they were approached from specific organisations, their responses are not officially those of the organisations.

The interviewed individuals were based in Emalahleni (formerly known as Witbank) and consisted of the following:

- three black men from three mostly black national labour unions;
- a white woman and a white man from two mostly white national labour unions;
- a white woman from a national labour union;
- a white woman from a liberal national political organisation;
- a white man from a national extreme right political organisation;
- a black woman from a national government youth institution;
- a black woman from a government labour disputes institution; and
- a white male car guard.

The interviews were semi-structured, open-ended conversations whose appointments were not pre-scheduled, and were held at the interviewees' places of work. The interviews, which I conducted, focused on asking the interviewees to define black, blackness, white and whiteness. The interviewees were not asked to sign any participation consent forms, hence the anonymity of their responses here. They gave verbal consent to written notes of their responses being kept.

The dated responses from those conversations are given below.

A. 12/03/2012

There is no person who is black or white. Europeans are described as white although there is no proper definition of colour. African origin is a description of being black. The name African American is preferred over

black American for the benefit of being African and American at the same time. The name coloured is not preferred as it is considered an insult that robs one of being African.

Blacks stay in the townships, villages of traditional authority and urban areas. Whites stay in urban areas. They do not want us to call ourselves blacks for the benefits we get from blackness. We should be proud to be black. We did not choose to be black or white. Trade unions developed as racial revolts against being considered as not human beings.

B. 12/03/2012

Race speaks of skin colour. If my father is black so I shall be defined. Although we are residentially mixed there are few or no whites in the townships. I am defined as black through the language I speak and how I treat other people. Blacks are tolerant of having less and living in destitute circumstances.

Whites need special attention. Few of them live in poorer circumstances. They expect us to be incompetent but are surprised by our cooperative attitude. Unless you hold some respectable position, some blacks will disrespect you. Whites have no jealousy although they are competitive.

Blacks are given to thinking negatively before assisting you. They would want to know what it is that they stand to benefit. We are too selfish, hence the existing corruption. We are suspicious of each other. There are allegations and accusations of corruption among blacks. Blackness has changed to selfishness, animosity and competitiveness, to something it was never before. We used to live peacefully with those practising witchcraft without singling them out.

C. 12/03/2012

I treat people equally as set out by the preamble of our Constitution. Apartheid differentiated people according to skin colour as blacks or whites. Blacks who are now called Africans are of a darker skin. Employment equity gives definition of black.

The unequal distribution of resources was used to the advantage of whites. Since 1994, we can express ourselves the same way. The economic gap between black Africans and white Africans is still huge. People are defined in terms of colour and history of being advantaged or disadvantaged.

Chinas are being categorised as black although we know they are not. One's race is naturally determined. An albino is still black as their skin condition is considered an illness.

D. 13/03/2012

Blacks are non-whites. Their identity speaks for Africans, Indians, and coloureds even those who are not indigenous of Africa. Whites are those who were advantaged by the system of apartheid because of their skin colour. Their race defined them as such. These are the British, Europeans and Afrikaners. An African is someone whose origin is Africa.

E. 13/03/2012

I do not see colour anymore. People are classified mostly because of their skin colour although one may find a person whose skin colour is black yet is not classified as black, e.g. the Portuguese. Some coloured people are light in skin colour yet they are not white. Whites are defined by their colour. When you are Zulu you are automatically black.

F. 13/03/2012

Afrikaans is not equal to being white. A person can speak Afrikaans and not be white or Zulu while not being black. We are people. I would like everybody to be treated the same. We do not classify people according to race anymore. Colour is not equal to the person. We all live in South Africa.

G. 14/03/2012

I was never brought up with apartheid attitudes. I never brought up my children with apartheid attitudes. I have one black child that grew up with my children. My union has 67% of people of different skin colour. It is not just a white union.

It hurts me to see black members of the public that are racist. People I meet always accuse me of being white and racist. They do not want to reconcile. I was brought up politically correct, not distinguishing between the different races or knowing what is being black or white. Colour is a physical appearance. All people are the same. The government is encouraging black and white racist thinking. It says it is good to be black and wrong to be white. We are busy classifying each other according to skin colour, appearance and ways of talking.

H. 15/03/2012

We do not classify people according to race because Indians are classified as black. Blacks still classify each other ethnically by looking down at others. A race is defined according to origin, upbringing and culture, e.g. whites do not go to traditional schools. Blacks are known for greeting whether a person is known to them or not. Media influence and exposure to western cultures are eroding pure blackness of being supportive, homely and greeting others. Whites are known for being selfish, self-centred and concerned only with their immediate families. Depending on where a person was raised up, one can adopt white selfish manners while having a black skin colour.

I. 15/03/2012

I have lots of black people who treat me better than white people. I do not see people as black or white. The dying of people in road accidents is attended to as not a loss of a black or white life, but of human beings. A black person can have a black heart that is evil. A white person can be black and have a good heart.

J. 19/03/2012

You can be a black person who is brought up in the city, the modern way. People are culturally different, conduct funerals and weddings differently. Black people are culturally different. The difference between the English and Afrikaans cultures implies that white people are not the same. There is a traditional Afrikaans language that still excludes other races. I mix with other races.

K. 20/03/2012

We did not create ourselves. Our body DNA was not created by us. We cannot ignore that there are different cultures and nations. Going into the bible God separated people according to their different languages. One cannot cross pollinate an aloe with a palm tree as each performs different duties. It does not matter which nation one belongs to. Whether one is Zulu, German, Sotho or created with different skills, we can differ but belong together.

Repeatedly reading the above passages to understand the meanings embodied and conveyed through the conversations, I could not help but being gripped by the suggestion emerging and reverberating in them that to define a race is to label, categorise and judge it, therefore making an unclaimed race prejudice.

Each description implies that a race explicitly or implicitly exists. Each of the respondents described a discernible race – black or white. In the process, each was lulled into unquestionably upheld stereotypes of what it is to be and what it is not to be. Each instilled an understanding about the races of black and white as essentially existing and as distinctively mutually exclusive and dissimilar. They did this in various ways.

One indication is a decial of the multiplicity of blackness that has succumbed to whiteness and western influence that have rubbed off its Ubuntu. This is the blackness that is not liked, as seen to be an admixture of whiteness. Echoed here is a sentiment like *“blackness has changed to selfishness, animosity and competition, to something it was never before”* (B, 12/03/2012). Additionally, in Chapter 1, a statement by Phatekile Holomisa of the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (as cited by Baron, 2012) was given expressing a displeasure at black people who practise homosexuality against the prescripts of their culture. These examples depict a deviation from the core – the authentic, prototypical and normative blackness and its cultural prescripts. The deviational and non-conforming blackness is admonished to consider the core.

While there are multifaceted blacknesses instead of just one (Mahon, 2004), there is an unclaimed assertion that these are tributaries not similar to the core blackness. Musopole (1994) makes mention of this when he cries foul over an African Christianity that is not African because it has been tinged with western influences. He tells us indirectly of an Africanness that is not African. Pure blackness is not only set apart from pure whiteness (H, 15/03/2012), but also from what it is essentially different from – its authentic, prototypical and normative self from within (B, 12/03/2012). Blackness is seen as a race that exists purely and as the progenitor of the virtues of Ubuntu or humanness (Mbigi, 1997; Teffo, 1999). Blackness that lacks such virtues is written off because it is a mixture of itself and whiteness.

The title of the book *“Whiteness just isn’t what it used to be: White identity in a changing South Africa,”* by Steyn (2001), and her observation that there are multiple whitenesses and not just one, helps me to argue that the different whitenesses are held up by the core essential whiteness that holds sway.

Although the respondents in this chapter (E, 13/03/2012; F, 13/03/2012; G, 14/03/2012), as those interviewed by Steyn (2001), seem to describe a whiteness that has evolved as the preferred, I sense from them an unclaimed assertion of a whiteness that has not evolved to the present societal requirements and is therefore not the desired whiteness. This is summed up by J's (19/03/2012) mention of a traditional Afrikaans language that excludes other races.

It is here that I liken Steyn's work (2001) to depicting a whiteness identity that is evolving away from and around the core essential whiteness which is different from it; a whiteness that is not only distinct and mutually dissimilar from blackness, but also from itself. Here the peripheral white is compared to the core white that has evolved or seems to be evolving. Although there seems to be an implication in Steyn's work (2001) that whiteness is still evolving, this also implicitly implies the existence of a core definitional whiteness from or towards which the new evolves. Just like blackness, whiteness is essentialised. It is named as not black, as what is not black, but also as what it is not from itself.

3.2.1 Essentialised definitions to objective existence

Firstly, African ontology. Far back as one may go into his past, from the northern Sudanese to the southern Bantu, the African has always and everywhere presented a concept of the world which is diametrically opposed to the traditional philosophy of Europe. The latter is essentially static, objective, dichotomic; it is in fact, dualistic, in that it makes an absolute distinction between body and soul, matter and spirit. It is founded on separation and opposition; on analysis and conflict. The African, on the other hand, conceives the world, beyond the diversity of its forms, as a fundamentally mobile, yet unique, reality that seeks synthesis. This needs development (Senghor, 1997, pp. 631-632).

In describing and extolling one race for what it is, one glorifies it while demonising the other race which is seen as its opposite. A definition of the race rests on it being distinguished from the other, its opposite. The Africanness of the African and blackness of the black rest on the distinguished other of whiteness of the white and the European or West. The races are seen as essentially and objectively existing, and as differentially determined. Discernible criteria are used to define and set the races apart. Each race is quantifiably distinct and separate from the other as a

mutually exclusive category. A particular race is seen as a different other, as shown here by Senghor (1997).

An appeal to John Mbiti's thinking of African philosophy is the ground upon which many (Mbigi, 1997; Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980) base definitions of being black as being differently enriched instead of being differently depraved and deprived. A race becomes an existence reified in thought and definition. As an existential embodiment of quantifiable specific virtues, being African American and African can be distinguished from what they are not authentically (Paris, 2004). The virtues of forbearance, beneficence and practical wisdom inhere in the race of African and African American. Such virtues are deemed not applicable to being white and Western (Paris, 2004). Each becomes quantified and synonymous with the qualities that are used to define it.

Respondents K (20/03/2012) and J (19/03/2012) made an appeal to culture, skills and language as quantifiable virtues that help to differentiate people and nations. They saw these as naturally given, and opined that racial boundaries are predetermined by God and not meant to be crossed. To understand blackness, its African spirituality and cosmological worldview of unity of humanity and nature must be taken into consideration (Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980; Paris, 2004; Senghor, 1997). Ethnopsychology emphasises the reality of distinctively existing races by suggesting a need for psychology to be mindful of sensitivity by applying treatment interventions relevant to local cultures as opposed to imposing foreign and different philosophies on the locals (Howard, 1985). An inability and unwillingness to consider the objectively different races and their quantifiable constituents are argued to have set in the racism observed in psychology (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994) and physical anthropology (Baker, 2010).

One can understand the truth in the wider call to develop a psychology that is distinguishable for each race, and a Christianity that is respectful of African life experience as Clark (1980) and Musopole (1994) suggest. It only makes sense to have specific psychotherapy procedures for African life conditions as opposed to those whose dictates are predicated on Western understanding of cure and treatment (Baloyi, 2008; Williams, 1981).

3.2.2 Natural man, natural race

“One’s race is naturally determined” (C, 12/03/2012). *“We did not choose to be black or white”* A, 12/03/2012. *“Their races defined them as such”* (D, 13/03/2012). *“We did not create ourselves”* (K, 20/03/2012).

There is no greater comfort in a definition than the assurance of quantifiable qualities that combine to make a particular definition. This enables the definer to verify the veracity of his/her definition with that of other definers, and across various situations. Using the yardstick of a definable paragon, in other words, a quantifiable definition, it should be known whether what is seen by various observers and in those varied situations is the prototype (Merrick, 1999). That is the comfort that is taken from defining the ideal Filipino girl against its non-ideal (Chapter 2), as is the unparalleled certainty built upon the success of scientific explanations in a naturalist way to account for human behaviour and existence (Kockelmans, 1994; Roy et al., 1999; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983). It is the acquisition of this unparalleled certainty that makes one unwilling to question the meanings and foundations of the definitions one holds (Kockelmans, 1994).

In this particular instance, assumptions one holds about being or not being a Filipino girl are viewed as essentially real and translatable with a liveable Filipino or not Filipino life. A clear distinction of being a Filipino girl is made easy with quantifiable characteristics that can be observed in values such as not participating in sex prior to marriage and subservience to the Catholic religion (Espiritu, 2004). Rigorous training is suggested in the natural sciences to separate one’s subjectivity from the object of observation in order to objectively discern and differentiate what is real from what is not real (Spinelli, 1989, 2005).

Naturalism and the naturalist attitude derive pride from the allure of an ability to have access to testifiable objective information about reality, founded on verifiability and reliability (Spinelli, 1989, 2005). When subjectivity is considered a hindrance to what counts as knowledge, it is retorted that “we can speak with certainty about the true or objective nature of reality” (Spinelli, 2005, p. 132).

Naturalists argue for the objective reality of the world and the things in it whose existence is independent of and separate from peoples’ awareness of them (Spinelli,

1989). They inspire those who espouse this through considering our existence and that of the things around us as governed by natural laws that are external to us (Kruger, 1988). They encourage a distant attitude towards life and the world, an uncritical attitude dictating that life be lived naively and as pre-given. This leads to us turning our lives into pure objectified existence, whose solidified nature is unperturbed and uninfluenced by those who live it, to a reification of our thoughts about the world outside of our experience (Davis, 2005). It is as a result of the adoption of a naturalist attitude (Kockelmans, 1994; Kruger, 1988; Natanson, 1969; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983) that humanity and race are seen as naturally existing. The same attitude would make one view humanity's existence, race and other forms of identity and identification as variables of objective existence with measurable quantities.

Just as laboratory experiments are relied upon to yield information of an objectively known reality (Kruger, 1988) so ethnopsychology's cultural sensitivity for the locals (Howard, 1985) offers an assurance of a culturally relevant, race-specific description, as does behaviourism's reduction of human functioning to physically observable characteristics that are subjected to the laws of quantification (Spinelli, 1989, 2005; Wagner, 1983).

In their naturally existing form, people and race are reducible to describable qualities not only as separately black and white, but also as separately authentic or inauthentic, prototypical or non-prototypical, and normative or non-normative black, and separately authentic or inauthentic, prototypical or non-prototypical and normative or non-normative white.

To know objectively is to know presumably. What we purport to know becomes not only predefined, but also confined and constrained within its predefined knowledge territory. Belonging to races, in other words, whiteness and blackness, is robotically given and never doubted or questioned except for when it is seen to deviate from its predefined ideals. Even when the inauthentic, non-prototypical and non-normative other is acknowledged, it is because of the discomforting deviance that it brings against the authenticity, prototypicality and normativity of the race. It is acknowledged as not preferred, as another that is there but should not be there in pursuance of the race ideal. Naturally given and defined races can only breed reified

thoughts, stereotypes of what and how it is to be white and black, and of what and how it is not to be white and black.

3.3 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESPONSE

Based on the above, a phenomenological perspective is suggested as a response to a naturalist attitude and thought. This section is dedicated to discussing its history and the main elements of it as a preferred philosophical discipline in this thesis.

3.3.1 Origin of phenomenology

Whereas naturalism and the naturalist attitude hold objectivity as the sole route to facts about reality existing outside of human experience and existence, phenomenology argues that “we can never know the real world” (Spinelli, 2005, p. 132).

Its origin is credited to the thinking of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), who is considered as its founding father by several authors (Converse, 2012; Earle, 2010; Gergel, 2012; Kim, 2012). He is said to have pioneered the origin of a phenomenological science that is not loyal to traditional and cultural ways of knowing and thinking, calling for unlearning and abandoning the natural habits of knowing about humanity and its existence in the world (Kockelmans, 1994; Spiegelberg, 1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983).

Husserl is seen to have championed a war against all naturalist thoughts that fail to account for people’s propensity and ability to be cognisant creatures, for a science that accounts for human experience in the consciousness of people themselves (Davis, 2005; Kockelmans, 1994; Roy et al., 1999). He saw the need for a science that accounts for the thinking person in the study of human thinking, a science that is concerned with what happens inside of human consciousness and not merely with concrete objects themselves (Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 1969; Wagner, 1983).

As questioning scientism and the biological model of medicine which view and reduce an individual to a classificatory category of a definition of an illness (Gergel, 2012), Simonsen (2013, p. 23) introduces phenomenology’s critique of the naturalist attitude of distance and splitting of the mind and body through surmising Merleau-

Ponty's (Earle, 2010; Thomas, 2005) idea by saying that, "it was insufficient to describe the world's general structure without also attending to the way they are experienced from within."

Laverty (2003) laments psychology's application of natural science methods which lead to an ignorance to the fact that it deals with living subjects who have a capacity to constitute and be constituted by their living environments that do not solely determine their destiny without them making sense of and impacting it. Tuohy et al. (2012) view the naturalist attitude as leading to a submission to presuppositions about the world and a resistance to wondering about or questioning them, thereby causing people to take the world for granted as objectively and naturally existing.

For Converse (2012), the naturalist attitude impedes us from acknowledging that what is considered objective reality is actually a phenomenal reality and a shadow or representation of a phenomenon. The physical, objective and material are phenomenal (Kim, 2012), and their naturalness needs to be interrogated (Murray, 2012) as there is no real and objective existence outside of the subjective human mind (Dowling & Cooney, 2012).

Naturalism and the naturalist attitude are lamented for stifling and stunting the search for meaning in the world. Their yearning to belong to an empirical science and to be subservient to reductionism (Zaner, 1970) are seen to have limited what counts as knowledge to that which is quantifiable, verifiable, testable and objectively observable, and therefore governed by natural laws. They are lamented for having brought naivety in the search for meaning by having stopped wondering and being astonished to being merely satisfied with what is captured in appearance.

With true objective reality unknowable, Greenfield and Jensen (2012) say that what we can be sure of is our own subjective interpretation of the purported reality, and not its objective existence separate from our subjective perception and constitution of it. The inability to unreflectively know reality disengaged, leads them to doubt the objective existence of this reality.

3.3.2 Definition of phenomenology

“An interpretive, qualitative form of research that seeks to study phenomena that are perceived or experienced,” phenomenology “offers a means by which to identify the essence of the experience” (Flood, 2010, p. 13). As a radical and anti-traditional philosophy, Edmund Husserl wished to see it elevating philosophy to the status of a rigorous science (Earle, 2010) by a focus on human experience in pure consciousness, which he termed returning to “the things themselves” (Earle, 2010; Kim, 2012). It is a philosophy and research method about intimate and subjectively lived experiences, helping to make explicit their structures that lie implicit, taken for granted and ignored (Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Murray, 2012).

3.3.3 Intentionality, phenomenon and consciousness

Quoting Merleau-Ponty, Simonsen (2013 p. 16) says that “the body is not merely ‘in space’ or ‘in time’, but inhabits space and time: each living body is space and has its space: it produces itself in space and it also produces this space.”

People are meaning-making creatures who consciously interact with their environment by constituting and interpreting their experiences of it (Greenfield & Jensen, 2012), rather than passively reacting to its external stimuli (Lavery, 2003). Their environment is a living environment with meaning given to it and interpreted by the individual (Dybicz, 2013), intricately linking the person (subject) and the surrounding world (object) (Dowling & Cooney, 2012). This view about humanity, which differs from that adopted in the naturalist attitude, is made clear by looking at the following concepts:

Consciousness: Husserl defines consciousness as the constellation and flow of ideas, wishes, dreams, memories, feelings, etc., in a person’s mind (Greenfield & Jensen, 2012).

Intentionality: Greenfield and Jensen (2012, p. 419) define intentionality as “the process through which an individual’s consciousness is directed to a vast array of objects (surroundings) that constitute his or her reality.” It is the mind’s directed act at the world around us. It is the flow of ideas, wishes, etc., about the world. Consciousness never exists on its own, but is always about something. A dialogue

between the person (subject) and the world (object) (Flood, 2010; Lavery, 2003; Tuohy et al., 2012), consciousness is always oriented or intended towards something else (the world) (Simonsen, 2013). Its thoughts or memories are conscious thoughts or memories about an object (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012).

Phenomenon: A phenomenon is defined as what takes place in a person's consciousness rather than the objective reality (Converse, 2012; Earle, 2010). The lived experience, in acknowledgement that the world can only be known through people's mental representation of it, and that the former exists nowhere outside of a human mind (Dowling & Cooney, 2012), must have been the bedrock of Edmund Husserl's "back to the things themselves" dictum that puts emphasis on capturing whatever appears in a person's consciousness, in whatever form.

The only reality that we know is how we experience and interpret a phenomenon, an interpretation that is itself subject to a multiplicity of interpretations. We no longer have a reality that exists out there waiting for us to know it without that knowing being tempered with by our subjectivity, thereby transforming that which we seek to know (Jacobsen, 2007). We are left with an objective reality put in parenthesis. It is as a result of phenomenological doubt that the thinly drawn line between the object and subject of knowledge entangles the two (Natanson, 1969; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974). Our attempts to know, hence our interpretations, become approximations of the reality to which naturalism and the naturalist attitude assign objective existence, however tenuous, unknown and unknowable to us (Jacobsen, 2007; Spinelli, 1989, 2005).

3.3.4 Aims of phenomenology

Hinged on Sartre's observation that "ultimate reality is both unknowable, and 'uncapturable' in any essentialist sense" (Spinelli, 2005, p. 117), phenomenology lays it as its purpose "illuminating and disclosing the meaning structures of lived experiences" (Spinelli, 2005, p. 131), with the phenomenon structure consisting of detailed whatness and howness of that experience (Spinelli, 1989, 2005). It seeks to return humanity to the basic task of traditional philosophy as a critical science

(Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 1969; Spiegelberg, 1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974).

With the focus being on an individual's internal perception rather than categorising definitions that depend on objective quantification of measurement to describe being and its nature (Gergel, 2012), it seeks to tap into the core essence of intentional experience in consciousness and interpretations as lived (Flood, 2010; McDonald & Dickerson, 2013). Prioritising subjective meaning, understanding and the internal view of reality, the phenomenal nature of reality as opposed to the objective definition that portrays it as external to the person (Earle, 2010; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Murray, 2012), it seeks to describe pure internal experience by unravelling "what is this every day experience like? what is its meaning? how is it experienced by the individual?" (Shamsaei et al., 2013, p. 189).

Cognitive science is seen to be clouded by a naturalist attitude that disregards phenomenological data for biased attention towards observable behavioural data (Roy et al., 1999). Phenomenology is an intensely interested inquiry of the mystery of human experience and its attendant meanings, equally curious about how the inquirer knows as it is about how those inquired upon structure their knowing. It is a different kind of knowing that concerns itself with what happens inside consciousness, in people's awareness of their experience and less with the external world outside of people's conscious experience (Wagner, 1983). Until this is acknowledged, it is cautioned that we will remain trapped in seeing people as mere objects and types rather than as individuals with unique life circumstances that they constantly work towards making meaning of (Jacobsen, 2007; Wagner, 1983).

Not to treat people as incapable of transcending themselves and their lives (Wagner, 1983), phenomenology encourages us to seek an investigation of the phenomenon of human experience as described in consciousness (Natanson, 1969; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974). Being asked to listen and ask carefully in order to be able to describe, we are reminded to eschew the flaws of separatist explanations that only serve to not reveal their self-fulfilling assumptions.

3.3.4.1 *Philosophical wonder and phenomenological reduction*

The fact that the explanations we make are coloured with self-fulfilling assumptions challenges the notion that our experiences of the world are necessarily pre-given and obviously existing (Kockelmans, 1994). Concerned with what happens in consciousness and less with the objective world as it is, phenomenology is premised on unlearning and abandoning the ordinary way of knowing as prescribed by the naturalist attitude (Wagner, 1983).

It does not argue that there is no physical world, that there are no “objective races of black and white.” It does, however, raise the point that these do not immanently exist independent of those who define them (Natanson, 1969; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983). It points at how these are subjectively defined and how their defined natures form and perpetuate prejudice. Phenomenology informs us of how race definitions lay strict parameters of what it is to be, what it is not to be, what makes up the authentic, normative and prototypical race, and what makes up the inauthentic, non-normative and non-prototypical race, while declaring the territorial boundaries.

To rid itself of naturalist naivety, phenomenology is founded on a philosophical wonder and reduction of the very reality we purport to know (Natanson, 1969; Spiegelberg, 1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974). It is inspired by what are seen as the misgivings of naturalism and what the naturalist attitude failed to offer. It challenges the view that holds that racial identity and identification (blackness or whiteness) are a normal, natural and expected way of life never to be questioned and supposed to be highly cherished while taken for granted (Roy et al., 1999; Spiegelberg, 1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974).

Phenomenology alerts us to avert this scenario by being informed by a philosophical attitude. People are seen as philosophical when they begin to inquire about their existence in and amid their life circumstances, when they are driven by an insatiable curiosity for knowledge and wisdom, making them wonder about their knowledge about life and the objective world, and its source (Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 1969; Spiegelberg, 1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974), an attribute of which naturalism and the naturalist attitude have robbed them.

Just as those who uphold the naturalist attitude feel no need to question the meanings of black, white, blackness and whiteness (Kockelmans, 1994), growing up with assumptions of oneself surrounded by heathens not to be greeted with a handshake can make one live one's life robotically, invented from the outside as a pure natural existence.

Phenomenology carries its task by temporarily suspending its own and all suppositions about the world, bracketing any prior knowledge of it. All knowledge of what it is to be black or white, what it is not to be black and what it is not to be white shall be bracketed in the epoch, put into phenomenological doubt as their definitions are deemed to be loaded in prior knowledge of suppositions (Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 1969; Sokolowski, 2000; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983).

CHAPTER 4

CRITICAL RACE THEORY

4.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW

In this chapter, I extend the discussion of phenomenology as a counter to the naturalist attitude by considering ways in which it could draw on critical race theory. Critical race theory runs parallel to phenomenology in that it eschews the kind of naturalist thinking that depends on the idea of objectively fixed racial categories. Racism, as seen from a critical race theory perspective, is perpetuated by various interrelated fallacies, such as the legalistic fallacy, individualistic fallacy, tokenistic fallacy, and historical fallacy – each of which is an attempt to wish away the fact that racial prejudice remains tenaciously embedded in modern societies.

Critical race theory had its beginnings in the United States in the 1970s, a context in which racial discrimination had ostensibly been eliminated, but in practice continued unabated in the form of myriad ‘micro-aggressions’ visited on people in their daily lives. Critical race theory can, in its emphasis on the inhabited, intentional nature of racial experience, be seen as broadly phenomenological in orientation, even as it draws attention to the larger structural injustices within which these day-to-day enactments of race occur.

Race and racism flow not only from explicitly formulated legal and social categories, but from how people inhabit a racialised world, for example by championing ‘colour blindness’ in an attempt to make the problem of race disappear and thus slipping into the comfort zone of ‘dysconscious racism’.

These types of mechanisms, used to stratify society along racial lines precisely by claiming to have transcended race, can be easily recognised in political fantasies such as the ‘American dream’ or South Africa’s ‘rainbow nation’, but they work as effectively in many other contexts – the ‘mixed race’ societies of South America, Japanese Wajin racial identity, or the complexities of India’s caste system. I review these and other manifestations of ‘non-racial racism’ in the chapter, and demonstrate how critical race theory shifts from the naturalness of race to focus instead on its social nature and on the political and economic purposes it serves.

Critical race theory links with phenomenology not only in valorising the subjective experiences of people, but also in helping to bring same-race prejudice into visibility. Critical race theory denaturalises race and other forms of identity and identification by revealing their socially constituted and phenomenally experienced nature, in the process revealing the subtle contours of oppression that run not only between races, but also among those who are nominally of the same race – what it entails, for example, to be a Chilean who is considered to have a dark skin, or a white South African who is considered to be poor.

One framework for making sense of this type of multiply fractured and refracted oppression is that of intersectionality theory, which I review in the chapter as, in some ways, a further extension of critical race theory. I present some examples of how intersectionality can help us understand the lived realities of actual individuals, such as Bessie Head, who found herself to be not black enough, white enough or male enough to continue living in the land of her birth. I conclude the chapter with an assessment of critical race theory as providing a rich heritage of many decades of debate and analysis on race, racism and prejudice, a heritage which is not incompatible with, and could be used to inform, a phenomenological approach.

The chapter extends the argument made in Chapter 3 by phenomenological philosophy about the naturalist attitude's pitfalls regarding race, racial identity and identification with an introduction of critical race theory.

The chapter looks at the theory's critique of the naturalist attitude's concept of unquestionable essentialist and taken-for-granted racial identities and identification symbols as they cause and sustain the following:

1. **Racialisation** – a belief in and grouping of people into separate and distinct racial categories whose differentness is judged to be real (Ben-Eliezer, 2008; Paradies, 2006).
2. **Racism** – a belief that human behaviour, traits and characteristics are naturally fixed and biologically determined, and that they can be passed on from one generation to the other within a particular racial category, resulting in a hierarchical ordering of people whereby others are subordinated based on their believed naturally determined inferiority (Bakke, 2010; Belknap, 1990).

3. **Racial profiling** – the social stratification and ranking of people into positions of acceptability/unacceptability, authenticity/inauthenticity and prototypicality/non-prototypicality, whereby those considered non-conforming to normative standards of authenticity and prototypicality are called aliens or the “other” (Odartey-Wellington, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Romero, 2008).

The chapter borrows critical race theory’s critique against the persistent intransigence of habits of naturalisation amidst advanced human rights legal reform and pronouncements (Closson, 2010; Freeman, 2011; Odartey-Wellington, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010) to show how these contribute to the essentialist definition of race, racial identity and identification in a manner that causes intolerance and prejudice of the different within the races, contributing to the accentuation of notions of authenticity, normativity and prototypicality, while those non-confirming to these ideals are othered within the races.

Using critical race theory, the chapter asks and seeks to respond to the following questions:

- Who gets to define a particular race and racial identity?
- Who is included in a particular racial identity?
- Who is excluded by the racial identity?
- What are the consequences of race, racial identity and identification in the lives of people?
- Who benefits from upholding ideals of pure, normative, authentic and prototypical races and racial identities?
- Who is being disadvantaged by these?
- What human rights violations and injustices do the naturalist attitude’s concepts of race, racial identity and identification mask?

Answering the inquiry about poor scholastic performance among black American children, Howitt and Owusu-Bempah (1994, p. 6) reflects on the American educational psychologist Arthur Jensen, who asked, “how much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement?” and further said that “the problem lay in the inferiority of black genes which could not be dealt with by throwing money into their education.” This reflects the problem of naturalist thinking and its consequences, depicted by

Desmond and Emirbayer (2013) as the suppression of alternative ways of thinking. It discourages further inquiry and doubt about custom, and instills conformity to the usual while intolerance becomes the norm for how the unfamiliar is treated. The inflexible knowledge base of naturalist thinking about the world becomes impenetrable to further scrutiny, making everything else awkward (Desmond & Emirbayer, 2013).

Critical race theory offers a respite to the usual ways of conceptualising the world. It evokes critical sensitivity towards conformity about the monolithic definitions of race and other concepts of identity (Cappiccie, Chadha, Lin & Snyder, 2012; Schieble, 2012). It helps to expose the prejudice that comes from intolerance of the unfamiliar and the alternatives that defy popular knowledge with its esteemed criteria of general acceptance. It revokes the un-negotiated racial definitions informed by a naturalist attitude of distance and objectivity.

Using the focal point of same-race prejudice, the tenets of critical race theory, positioned as equally echoed by phenomenological philosophy, are discussed to understand the discriminating consequences of race definitions and actions on people's lives within their races. These are a challenge to ideology, sensitivity to people's subjectivity, intersectionality and the social construction of race. The factors that prompted the origin of critical race theory are also discussed. This is done in a way that draws the theory's main argument as a parallel to a phenomenological philosophy (discussed in Chapter 3). The convergence of the two is made to dispel the general myth of naturally existing categories of racial identity and identification, and to reposition the consequences of a race definition as resulting in prejudice of sameness and difference within itself.

4.2 DEFINITION OF RACISM

Racialisation is a process of not only dividing, but also judging, oneself and others as belonging to separate racial categories (Ben-Eliezer, 2008; Paradies, 2006). People do this often and with ease, as shown by Howitt and Owusu-Bempah's (1994) quotation of Arthur Jensen in the previous section, as well as in the discussions about the descriptions of the black and white races in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. This happens against retorts that ask for people to get over racial identification

(Peters, 2012; Potter et al., 2010; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011). As a result of its judgemental attitude, racialisation becomes a precursor to one of race's pernicious prejudices, racism (Ben-Eliezer, 2008; Paradies, 2006).

Emanating from an ideology that views race as biologically determined with innate human characteristics, traits and abilities whose fixed nature can be bequeathed from one generation to the other within a particular racial category (Bakke, 2010), racism is considered to be a heart-wrenching prejudice of power leading to the hierarchical subordination of other groups because of their assumed or obvious differentness (Bakke, 2010; Belknap, 1990). It is a form of prejudice towards others based on preconceived opinions held about them and their defined racial category membership (Hoyt, 2012). It instils a desire to dominate them and a refusal to consider them as equals, while supporting institutional arrangements upholding stratification that puts them in a hierarchically subordinate position based on their racial difference (Hardie & Tyson, 2013; Headley, 2000). As a system of disadvantage and exploitation of those who are subordinated (Bryan, 2012), it leads to a denial of human rights and needs, and an unequal allocation of services (Kyriakides, 2008). Intended to dominate others and assign them to lower strata in society (Bakke, 2010), the beliefs and attitudes of racism lead to acts of exclusion and discrimination against the other, who are considered inferior according to their assumed or obvious biologically determined racial category (Ben-Eliezer, 2008).

For Desmond and Emirbayer (2013), racism is assisted by fallacies that not only sustain racial inequalities but also refuse to acknowledge its far-reaching impact on people's lives. These fallacies, which are embedded in society's structures, are discussed below.

4.2.1 Legalistic fallacy

The legalistic fallacy rests on an assumption that the abolishment of race discrimination laws and their replacement by democratic legal principles automatically bring equality to the lives of individuals and their groups. This is contrary to and overlooks the significance of unchecked widespread covert and inadvertent racial profiling and stratification in people's daily lives (Arudou, 2013; Barandiarán, 2012; Möschel, 2011; Odartey-Wellington, 2011).

4.2.2 Individualistic fallacy

Refusing to acknowledge the embeddedness of inequality in society's structures, the individualistic fallacy leads to assumptions that racial discrimination is an affliction of character aberration located in sick personalities (Möschel, 2011). It leads to a refusal to take a systematic and collective effort to eradicate intolerance and inequality.

4.2.3 Tokenistic fallacy

When a few individuals work hard and surpass the untold obstacles that discourage majority of their fellow marginalised group members, the result of their effort is mistaken for an indication that racial equality exists. As post-apartheid South Africa has had presidents from the previously oppressed black racial group, a cursory assumption can be made that the country has reached racial equality.

4.2.4 Historical fallacy

For societies that pride themselves on basing progress and success on merit and effort, the experiences of whose quality of life is determined by race is made insignificant and silenced. They are convinced to see their failing quality of life as a result of their lack of effort, not as related to a history of racial inequality. They are exhorted to see racial inequality as irrelevant to their contemporary predicament. Expressions that assume that society is past racial stratification do not embody the daily frustrations that individuals face. Linked with individualistic fallacy, these cause people to believe that the hindrances they face in life are due to their lack of motivation. Under this, programmes that are meant to redress previous racial imbalance, such as affirmative action, are seen as causing more racial rifts and therefore as unnecessary. People are enjoined to swiftly move over from being preoccupied with divisive racial labels (Peters, 2012; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011).

4.2.5 Fixed fallacy

Racial inequality can only be understood by the oppressed, through their own subjective experiences, and not by the use of general official criteria that tend to

quantify it. For those who are oppressed, what is important is being faced with an unrelenting reality of inequality, not whether the inequality is greater or lesser.

4.3 RACIAL PROFILING AND PREJUDICE

Acknowledging the intention to dominate and ill-treat those racially classified as different, Kevin Johnson's comment reflects this sentiment (as quoted by Ortiz & Jani, 2010, p. 178 and by Romero, 2008, p. 28) by stating that:

fabricated out of whole cloth, the "alien" represents a body of rules passed by Congress and reinforced by popular culture. It is society, with the assistance of the law, that defines who is an "alien", an institutionalized "other", and who is not. It is society, through Congress and the courts, that determines which rights to afford "aliens".... Like the social construction of race, which helps to legitimize racial subordination, the construction of the "alien" has helped justify the limitation of non-citizen rights imposed by our legal system.

Scripted into law to assist the policing of essentialised human bodies, racial differentiation is practised through authenticity screening of people for inclusion in and exclusion from a particular society. With the body used as a certification commodity, racialisation, as a body scrutiny mechanism, serves to sustain the restriction of people's freedoms while it accords privilege and power to others. It serves to prescribe who benefits from what and to dictate who does not.

The law renders the demeaning treatment meted out to those profiled as racially different justifiable. The regular stop-and-search procedures that ensure the capturing of foreign nationals find support in local law prescripts of population control (Matsinhe, 2011; Odartey-Wellington, 2011; Romero, 2008). All this is against an observation of Winant (as quoted by Comeaux, 2010, p. 394), that:

race is not only real, but also illusory. Not only is it common sense; it is also common nonsense. Not only does it establish identity; it also denies us our identity. Not only does it allocate resources, power, privilege; it also provides means for challenging that allocation. Race not only naturalizes, but also socializes.

It is against this background of malleable and unstable racial identities that critical race theory took root.

4.4 ORIGIN OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY

Freeman (2011) recounts developments in American society from the 1970s which are marked by an uneven increase in school segregation against black people, a growing rate of black incarceration in tandem with an increased effort in the war against drugs, and widening income inequality between black people and white people. These and other developments ignited a sense of awareness about how race and racism continue to pervade and entrench themselves within every aspect of the American society (Bush & Bush, 2013).

Critical race theory emerged between the 1970s and 1980s as a critique of persisting racism and oppression in America. An activist upshot of unity between legal and feminist studies (Brown, 2008), critical race theory drew its impetus from the slow pace and lack of far-reaching civil rights progress, which were seen to cause the subordination of people on the basis of aspects such as race, religion, ability, gender and health (Cappiccie et al., 2012). This was assisted by the lacklustre liberal approach in the legal system with its race and racism ideologies of purported neutrality and objectivity that were written in a way which favoured white society and its interests (Comeaux, 2010; Möschel, 2011; Powers, 2007; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011).

Its aim was to analyse and challenge the racialised power relations in the society, as they lead to inequality and subordination, supported by law (Arudou, 2013), and to highlight how post-civil rights achievements are dwarfed by the entrenched marginalisation of people according to race (Odarthey-Wellington, 2011). Embodied in the society's democratic laws and sustained by its colour-blind ideologies, prejudice against people based on their racial identities manifests mainly through practices, called micro-aggressions, that are less obvious and therefore resistant to modification and challenge (Cappiccie et al., 2012; Closson, 2010; Kohli, 2012; Ortiz & Jani, 2010).

Micro-aggressions are covert transgressions against people's dignity that undermine their human rights based on their different identity. These may be exemplified by a continuing dwindling enrolment of black people at particular institutions of learning, whose cause appears to be racial motivation, yet cannot be so justified because exclusion of people on the basis of race is not permissible by law in a democratic

society. Their unofficial and covert nature makes them immune and resistant to intentional notice and eradication by state institutions.

4.5 CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

This section looks at the assumptions that underpin critical race theory and from which its convergence with phenomenology is seen.

Murray (2012) critiques crisis rescue operations within biomedicine whose premise rests on a human being as a physiological entity which is externally attacked and thus requires external assistance. He sees such efforts as giving little consideration to the human element of agency, reducing the person to a soulless existence. Guided by its strict adherence to a procedural repertoire of extricating an injured body from danger, Simonsen (2013) uses Merleau-Ponty's thinking to see such crisis intervention efforts as failing to appreciate the body as able to speak, be spoken about, feel and be felt. They are efforts directed at rescuing endangered and trapped bodies, not individuals in endangering and entrapping lived circumstances.

Simonsen (2013) and Gergel (2012) offer an answer to this critique in the form of Merleau-Ponty's account of a human being as having the capacity to inhabit his/her space and time, rather than merely existing physiologically, as imbued with a capacity to phenomenally exist, and as having an appreciation of his/her attacked body as a lived body experience. This reiterates phenomenology's notions of human consciousness and intentionality, to a person's performative and experiential capacity. It not only reawakens its stance of human subjectivity, but also emphasises the disquiet with general labels we use to define ourselves and others (Greenfield & Jensen, 2012).

As an ontological discipline, phenomenology (Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Dybicz, 2013; Earle, 2010) converges with critical race theory through its concepts by disavowing the tendency to equate people to mere racial and ethnic labels and codes. They both cross over to the human being inhabiting the labels as experiential phenomena, from their general differential appeal. They move to the unique experiential interpretations of the human being behind the labels. Critical race theory embraces the view of preferring individual experience of race labels over their

general inherent appeal independent of human subjectivity by advancing the concepts discussed below.

4.5.1 Challenge to colour-blindness

Based on equality and oneness of the nation (Möschel, 2011), colour-blindness is the ideology of a belief in everyone having an equal chance to compete and succeed as determined by the effort, ability and merit of their actions, and not the colour of their skin (Closson, 2010; Comeaux, 2010; Neville, Poteat, Lewis & Spanierman, 2014). Colour-blindness views failure to achieve equal status as a result of a person's lack of motivation and effort in a society that has evened its playing field (Riley & Ettlinger, 2011; Sonn & Quayle, 2013).

Anderson's (2012) discussion of multicultural school environments as an example of the progress made by post-apartheid South Africa to afford its people equal access to opportunities in, for example, employment and sport, allows people like Peters (2012) to assert that talking about race is no longer necessary as it is divisive (Riley & Ettlinger, 2011). However, Neville et al. (2014) and Riley and Ettlinger (2011) pour scorn over such adventures for leading to acquiescence with pre-existing structures of domination and subordination and the masked inequalities that they encourage.

Colour-blindness and its belief in the objective assessment and recognition of individual effort is seen as leading to the erasure of race from discourses of inequality, while allowing racism to continue unnoticed and unchallenged (Neville et al., 2014; Odartey-Wellington, 2011; Powers, 2007; Sonn & Quayle, 2013). It is seen as the cause of what King (as quoted by Comeaux, 2010, p. 395) calls "dysconscious racism", which he defines as the mental attitude of uncritically accepting things as naturally given, resulting in a tendency to support and appreciate inequality and oppression as the natural order of life, for example the hierarchical organisation of society in India into castes that determine the allocation of differential, power, roles and status to individuals (Sabir, 2003).

With phenomenology encouraging a resistance against the naturalist attitude and habit of taking for granted that the world has a natural and objective existence independent of people, who have the capacity to constitute it, critical race theory critiques the reality of naturally governed laws of social organisation. It looks at the

ideologies that embody the myth of colour-blind equality, meritocracy, objectivity and neutrality as bandied around in the notions of South Africa's rainbow nation and the American dream rhetoric. It explores the myth of objectivity in hiring people in what appear to be equalised opportunities to show how these are socially arranged to inequitably benefit certain sections of society (Hawkesworth, 2010).

Colour-blindness not only justifies, but also sustains racial inequality through a refusal to recognise and acknowledge its existence and salience, leaving it untouched and uncriticised (Comeaux, 2010; Neville et al., 2014; Odartey-Wellington, 2011; Riley & Ettlinger, 2010; Sonn & Quayle, 2013). Through it, white hegemony and dominance are perpetuated over black marginalisation and subordination in retorts of pursuing the nation's dream that has transcended race and its labels (Anderson, 2012). It constitutes an uncritical subservience to suppressive ideologies that masquerade as the nation's laws upheld in nature for the nation's interest (Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011).

What Lee and Rice (2007) see as the intractable and mutating nature of racism echoes with King's (Comeaux, 2010) dysconscious racism whose covert and contemporary nature of neutrality belies the sectional interests it serves (Brown, 2008; Hawkesworth, 2010; Powers, 2007; Schieble, 2012).

4.5.2 Socially constructed race

"A social construction without inherent physiological or biological meaning" (Arudou, 2013, p. 156), race is a tenuous and diffuse identifier of people and groups, amenable to distortion and manipulation, whose definitions are legally defended (Freeman, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011).

Critical race theorists believe that racism, intolerance and other kinds of prejudice against differently categorised others are a normal component of both pre- and post-civil rights strife societies. They are mechanisms employed by societies for their daily functioning. Critiquing the individual fallacy, critical race theorists insist that they can be better understood, not as an individual aberration displayed by and located in sick individual personalities, but as deeply entrenched within societies' structure and institutions (Bush & Bush, 2013; Closson, 2010; Freeman, 2011; Möschel, 2011; Odartey-Wellington, 2011). An example of this is shown by Barandiarán (2012) in

dispelling the myth of a racially homogeneous Chilean society. The myth masks how Chilean access to wealth, power, education and conditions of association are determined by race, with custom determining that those with a brighter phenotype are most privileged at all times. Societies, through people's actions, invent and manipulate race through laws that "frame, codify, and legitimise how people will be treated" (Arudou, 2013, p. 157), for purposes of hierarchical organisation into positions of unequal allocation of power and resources. They use race to decide who is a member and who is not.

Racial definitions, which are unstable identity organising concepts, are made according to contested criteria that change relative to time and place, between and within societies. They are a concept of identity messages relayed and sustained in systems of social stratification determining the unequal distribution of resources (material and symbolic), status and privileges, where some people and groups get more at the expense of others (Ferguson, 2013; Weber, 2013).

The experience in Latin America of mixed black and white identity, where individuals re-draw their racial boundaries as being white while resisting being classified as black (Forman et al., 2002), indicates the contestation of identity by phenotype and ancestry. Using the same criteria differently, American civil rights proponents used phenotype (physical features) and affinity to certain ancestry (history and lineage) as identity markers to instil black identity and pride in the black population (Shiao et al., 2004) while, for some, the same criteria were used in apartheid South Africa to deny them access to life amenities from both black and white quarters equally (Higgs & Evans, 2008; Pucherova, 2011).

Socially invented racial identities become mechanisms through which practising prejudice is officially justifiable as objective criteria for the unequal access to power and resources, and as natural markers of differentiation between people. In Japan, this is further entrenched through law that legitimises the definition of a Japanese Wajin racial identity, and the rights and privileges that must accrue to those of the identity, while authorising keeping those defined outside the Wajin identity in strict and constant surveillance to determine the authentic national Japanese identity (Arudou, 2013).

The deportation and refusal of access of Suaad Hagi Mohamud into her official country, Canada, was legally defensible and coded in fear of terrorism, while its motive was adjudged to be racial prejudice (Odartey-Wellington, 2011), as are the search and deportation of African foreign nationals in South Africa and the border patrols of illegal aliens in the US that are based on population control policy (Matsinhe, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010). The law and other structures of society, masking suspicion of the other, are used to perpetuate racial inequality, domination and prejudice according to race and other identity markers, and to deny the other authenticity for belonging, while serving the interests of those in power and entrenching the status quo.

Racial moment (Spickard, 2005) or racialisation (Ben-Eliezer, 2008; Paradies, 2006), both defined as the process of seeing ourselves and others as differentiated by racial criteria which make us fundamentally mutually exclusive and dissimilar, hinges on a fallacy that assumes race as biologically and naturally fixed (Desmond & Emirbayer, 2013; Weber, 2013). India's caste system differentiates the Dalits as those of the lower rank, made to perform demeaning duties and looked down upon by the rest of the society (Sabir, 2003). Racial prejudice is assisted by an adherence to a colour-blind ideology whose tenets and fallacies shield the practice of disadvantage to which others are subjected and by making people believe in a description of racism in the overtly rough way only, while ignoring its persistence in subtle forms, its micro-aggressions (Closson, 2010; Freeman, 2011).

From the furore over Brett Murray's painting of Zuma (see Chapter 1) emerged contrasting descriptions of blackness and whiteness with their respective proponents defending their views, with Brett Murray and the Goodman Gallery seen as representing white people while their objectors represented black people. Regarding this, Mmila (2012, p. 2) commented that "neither the Goodman Gallery nor Jacob Zuma can generally claim to represent all whites and blacks respectively." This should be considered out of an inquiry that seeks to find out: who lays claim to represent blackness or whiteness, with what consequences?

Shifting from the naturalness of race, critical race theory focuses on its social nature. It looks at the political and economic purposes served through the socially supported practices. It inquires about the arrived-at evidence that is used to describe and

differentiate us from them, and the hidden beliefs served by this (Hawkesworth, 2010). It challenges people's common-sense and normative descriptions to expose racial identification as a mechanism of hierarchical ordering of people into positions of domination and subordination, as serving the purpose of unequal power and resource allocation.

Race is a socially manipulated factor used to determine who is a member and who is not, who gets what and who does not (Arudou, 2013; Closson, 2010; Comeaux, 2010; Hawkesworth, 2010; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011). It relies on essentialist thoughts of being that see people's identities not only as having naturally quantifiable essences but also as qualitatively separating them from others who have less of the essence.

Rooted in the belief that true and enduring naturally determined essences can be found through thorough inspection (Crawley, Foley & Shehan, 2013), essentialism fixes racial identity into an unchanging monolithic category. It simplifies a complex sense of being into a flat category that results in intolerance of alternatives between and within (Desmond & Emirbayer, 2013). As reductionist (Sanders, 2007), it denies individuals the capacity to see their race as a multiply-existing defined identity. It reduces those falling outside the master category as irrelevant at best and as non-being at the worst. Those adjudged to have enough of the race's essence are welcome into its category (Wagner et al., 2010), while the rest are cast aside for ignoring the natural order of biologically existing and determined races. The significance of intolerance for those differentially marked is poignantly shown through the rejection, designation as non-beings and denial of privileged resources towards hybrids (Pucherova, 2011; Wagner et al., 2010), while laws are instituted to strengthen existing distinctions of belonging and punishing their transgression (Barandiarán, 2012; Sabir, 2003).

Critical race theory denaturalises race, families, nations and other concepts of identity that describe it as monolithic, homogeneous, uncontested and natural. It sees them as not natural, but as socially created, legally defended and ideologically sustained by humanity (Cappiccie et al., 2012; Hawkesworth, 2010; Schieble, 2012), and acknowledges the consequences they have on the lives of people (Crawley et al., 2013). Critiquing their assumed given nature and their essentialist character, the

theory helps to unpack the naive and distant definitions and appreciation of identity as the natural order of things as portrayed by the conversations in Chapter 3.

4.5.3 Subjective experiences of people

Prizing human subjectivity, phenomenology has introduced the concepts of human intentionality, consciousness and phenomenal experience to counter the naturalist attitude that renders human beings as naively responding to a life that objectively exists. It warns against tendencies to objectify and essentialise experience into the rigid categorisation of people.

It is against this background that an emphasis on the phenomenology of black experience was honed as a response to what is generally seen to be a rigid prejudice-prone perception of others based on their perceived race category. Notions raised by proponents of black phenomenological experience (Baloyi, 2008; Hountondji, 1997; Jones, 1980; Mbigi, 1997; Musopole, 1994) seek to respond to those of rigid existential essentialism that render black experience insignificant, as mentioned by Thomas Jefferson (Sarich & Miele, 2004). However, like the essentialist Thomas Jefferson, proponents of black phenomenological life experience stop their phenomenological quest midstream and fall into a similar essentialist categorisation of people and their existence. By emphasising black experience as enshrined in a certain unified philosophy of life, they too are trapped in universalist descriptions of identity, assuming to speak for a general population. Mmila's (2012) reflection that neither Zuma nor the Goodman gallery should assume to represent all black people or all white people respectively becomes relevant.

In this lies the critique, inquiry and answer of critical race theory. It begins with enquiring: what lies behind the name? Can and should we rely on generalist titles of identity which assume homogeneity? It seeks to understand what lies hidden behind the universal titles which assume to describe people's homogeneous experience. It challenges the hidden ideologies behind such descriptions and their attendant practices (Cappiccie et al., 2012). It is curious about the "ours and us" descriptions in whose practices the assumptions and biases of dominant voices are not revealed (Brown, 2008). It wants to find out: whose descriptions of race and identity are

these? Whose needs and purpose are being served by such definitions and at whose cost?

It is here that critical race theory and phenomenology converge. As a vanguard of subjectivity, critical race theory seeks to talk to the individuals themselves, to capture their marginalised voices against the dominant voices of triumph that exclude their pain of being downtrodden (Freeman, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010). It expresses cynicism about notions of multiculturalism and national unity whose ideology erase diversity of race, ethnicity, gender, ability, etc., from their discourse (Cappiccie et al., 2012), and distort people's experience, if not excluding them altogether (Weber, 2013). Like phenomenology, it explores our identity descriptions that are taken for granted as facts of being equal, united, peaceful and tolerant, by inquiring about the customs and practices of hierarchy and domination from within (Brown, 2008; Cappiccie et al., 2012). As a theory critiquing ideologies of oppression over marginalised racial groups, for example black people, it carries its mission through an incorporation of their subjective descriptions of oppressive experiences as sustained by colour-blind ideologies that encourage subservience to existing laws and practices, to consider them as the natural order governing life and requiring docile submission.

The theory challenges socially constructed identities, their customs and ideologies that carry assumptions of people being equal in a society governed by egalitarian principles. In a society like South Africa, whose Constitution outlaws overt signs of prejudice and is guided by United Nations principles on humanity, the theory should help to show that the country's general multicultural ideals of one united nation erase and "mis-specify" other possible identities from its main discourse (Brown, 2008. p. 54), and how these are rendered insignificant because they do not fit within the general discourse of an ideal South African identity. It critiques how the rating of people according to the same standards of ability, ethnicity, race, etc., essentialises and flattens their experience while ignoring their subjectivity (Freeman, 2011).

Freeman (2011) notes how unique individual experiences may be side-lined in favour of general descriptions that purport to represent us all. It is here that the voices of the racially marginalised become important for a clear understanding of the nature and extent of racial prejudice that they endure. It is only through their

subjective experiences, and by exposing the use of myths of general description that essentialise and assume a race as naturally given, that the existence and nature of micro-aggressions can be appreciated.

Critical race theory links with phenomenology not only through a concentration on subjective experiences of people, but also with a focus on same-race prejudice (as argued for in this thesis). It is a theory that denaturalises race and other forms of identity by revealing their socially constituted and phenomenally experienced nature (Hawkesworth, 2010), dispelling the myth of them being natural identities. Its critical conversation about (Schieble, 2012) and oppositional scrutiny of (Cappiccie et al., 2012) ideologies that pattern our social life and naturalise our identities bring a sense of doubt and curiosity about the titles we carry, the myth behind them and the ideologies of hierarchy and prejudice serving parochial interests, not the interests of all subsumed under them. It helps to highlight how identity concepts do not unilaterally shape people's destinies, as well as how people experience and interpret them. It looks beyond how racial identities are imposed on and determine the direction of people's lives, to shed some light on people's interpretive capacity to make sense of such identities.

Research on the experiences of white people and poverty shows how whiteness is a racial identity that describes and is enjoyed by certain white people only (Moss, 2003; Sibanda, 2012). This reveals how, for the poor, their racial identity is not static and does not offer secure certainty, but is reminiscent of navigation between various life domains. It reflects multiple negotiations between access to privilege and destituteness, and affinity to ancestry of superiority and dwindling life opportunities. An insistence on white narratives of self-sufficiency renders them and their experiences un-white and a non-being racial category. The experiences of the individuals in the research show how, through their interpretive capacity, racial identity is constantly negotiated and constituted just as it patterns their daily lives.

Honour for an essentialist African philosophy evokes notions of a distinctively existing African lifestyle embodied in various domains, such as family and religion, and practices such as parenting and sexuality. One's blackness is socially carved within the various domains of existence to give others the authority to rule out on the

authenticity of existence to be black. A reliance on monolithic descriptions of being may discount certain racial beings as unfamiliar, non-being, un-white or un-black.

4.5.4 Intersectionality

Ferguson (2013) describes intersectionality as a theoretical perspective that orientates one to sensitivity for multiple definitions of race, moving with time and changing with place. It is a fluid concept steeped in not one but multiple woven fallacies and ideologies.

Racial identity is never static or homogeneous. It defies the generalised terms we use to describe it. It is made up of converging variables that render its character complex and unsuitable for narrow generalisation that assumes it to be constant and determined by nature. Its socially constructed character renders its definition constantly contested (Freeman, 2011; Schieble, 2012).

While names like black, white and South African are generally used as definitions of identity and differentiation in society, critical race theory has already brought a sense of wonder about whose purpose and needs they serve and at whose cost. These are terms of identity description whose titles are too general to be able to capture the finer intricacies of overlapping variables known only by the individual. Their one-size-fits-all descriptions (Schieble, 2012) make them too convenient, broad and ignorant of the varied factors that make up racial identity (Riley & Ettlinger, 2011). They embody hidden intolerance and prejudice coloured in an intricate web embedded in the wider institutional social fabric, shrouded in invisible micro-aggressions whose exploration can only be fully captured through people's subjective experiences of them.

The theory brings wariness about uncritical perceptions of a person's identity and sees it as being broader than the essentialised, naturalised and objectified race whose ever-changing social construction is ignored. It critiques politicised social requirements of conformity and assimilation into generalised and essentialised racial definitions that bring a murky sense of identity of a straddle in shame, non-being and non-belonging, yet fail to adequately capture what it is to be individually either black, white or South African (Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Pucherova, 2010; Riley & Ettlinger, 2011;

Wagner et al., 2010), while being paraded in homogeneity that mask discrimination and prejudice (Barandiarán, 2012).

Laced in veiled stereotypes of racial being intersecting with gender and sex, Pucherova (2011) shows how essentialised imaginations of race by both black and white sections during apartheid South Africa left someone like Bessie Head with an unwelcome predicament in the society as not black-enough, white-enough or male-enough, forcing her to emigrate.

Made up of interlocking factors, being white is depicted as a conflation of socially held perception, skin pigmentation, individual ambition, subjectivity, material possessions and wealth (Frakenberg, 1993; Lipsitz, 2006; Moss, 2003; Sibanda, 2012). The intersection of race with class, privilege and hierarchy renders explanations of homogeneity not only obsolete but incongruent with the experiences of individuals.

Similarly, intolerance and prejudice are neither singular nor unidirectional. They are covert and overt, individualistic and societal, impinging on more than just one aspect of an individual. Similar to Pucherova (2011), Higgs and Evans (2008) depict an experience within Bophuthatswana of multiple, splitting yet interlocking intolerances for not being legally South African and not being culturally Tswana, being hunted down by state security forces and refused educational and health facilities, to show how multiple interlocking factors sustain racial identity and discrimination.

While most of critical race theory's effort is spent on critiquing ideological organs in their production and dissemination of information, and politics through censoring of policies and laws, as the main drivers of inequality, Weber (2013) shows how their eventual success rests on being interwoven with economic players that siphon valued resources and services to the identified few. Therefore, every aspect of society becomes unilaterally and collectively arranged so that race is designed and manipulated to produce and sustain inequality. Neville et al. (2014) recommend an approach of multi-level programmes to deal with the many angles of racial intolerance and discrimination that are embedded in the society's structure, instead of standalone programmes whose efforts will fail.

Critical race theory brings an expanded view of the many races within the race and categories within the category, all upheld in law and custom of hierarchy and prejudice, decreeing privilege on some and disadvantage on others (Arudou, 2013; Sabir, 2003). This cautious and irreverent perspective of looking at race through the lens of critical race theory will help to expose the ideology-driven explanations that encourage veneration and mask discontent within. Its move away from reductionist explanations of monolithic and flattened experience converges with a sense of curiosity that inquires about same-race prejudice. It values and incorporates alternative concepts of identity within the main narratives that are customarily ignored.

CHAPTER 5

PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

5.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW

The research on which this thesis is based was not structured according to the usual conventions of an empirical study. Instead, I attempted to draw in a flexible manner on both theoretical and empirical sources in order to iteratively move toward a richer understanding of same-race prejudice. However, the current chapter reports on the design and execution of the major empirical enquiry of the overall study.

I undertook this enquiry, the design of which I explain here, to unravel the unsaid, taken-for-granted experiential meanings of being prejudiced within one's race, and to solicit subjectively lived accounts of race, racial identity and racial identification and how these are played out and sustained in taken-for-granted categorisations, labelling, intolerance and prejudice within one's race. I did this to arrive at a psychological structure of the essence of the phenomenon of same-race prejudice.

To do this, I selected a purposive sample of eight co-researchers from Emalahleni. The selection criteria for the sample were race, as either black or white; economic status, as determined by economic affluence or less economic affluence and by the nature of one's work and responsibilities; and gender, as either male or female.

I collected information for this research in the form of two open-ended, conversational, face-to-face interviews with each co-researcher, held four months apart. All co-researchers except for one were interviewed at their places of work, after the logistics of data recording, storage, benefits from the research, what the research is focused on and their rights to participate or terminate participation, were discussed and they had signed participation consent forms. Information from each interview was separately audio-recorded with written notes kept by me. I later transcribed the interviews.

Not directly mentioning the word prejudice, I introduced the purpose of the research as the exploration of the nature of interactional life influences of a black person on a black person and by a black person; and of a white person on a white person and by a white person. To do this, the first interviews centred around answering the overall

question, “how do you think people of your race are treating you now and how do you think they have been treating you before?” It was hoped that this would help to solicit subjectively lived experiences of practised same-race categorisation and prejudice.

Four months later, the second interviews were conducted. These were aimed at debriefing the co-researchers regarding the experiential issues discussed in the first interviews and to offer them time for clarity on the latter by answering the overall question, “do you have anything to add to the responses you gave in the first interview, have any thoughts or questions to ask or ideas evoked by the discussion from the first interview?”, to assess their ability to reflect about and critique their own race, and their reflections about these reflections.

I analysed the information from both interviews for each co-researcher using interpretive phenomenological analysis, aimed at extracting each co-researcher’s experiential themes of same-race prejudice, and an overall interpreted structure of black on black prejudice, and white on white prejudice. This was done, not to make generalisable findings, but for a rich subjectively lived interpretive understanding of the phenomenon of same-race prejudice. This last point is clarified by looking at the expanded phenomenological philosophy behind this research design.

Firstly, the role and position of those to be researched upon (co-researchers) is clarified in this chapter. Based on phenomenology’s principle of considering a human as a conscious being, the research method mentioned in the chapter and to be applied in the thesis’s research adopts an interpretive and qualitative style seeking to speak to the co-researchers’ subjectively lived and experienced phenomenon of the races of black and white instead of these as the taken for granted corporeal markers of objective racial identity and racial identification. The co-researchers are considered as the experts who are able to describe their subjectively lived experiences of the phenomenon of the races of black and white. The use of open-ended questions and conversational interviews was meant to allow the co-researchers to tell the experiential understanding of their racial identity and racial identification.

Secondly, the role and position of the researcher is articulated as not separable from those one conducts research on. Through my own intentionality and consciousness as the researcher, I did not have the privilege to make objective, value-free and generalised statements of knowing and understanding, but considered mine to be particular, unstable and in constant involvement with those of the co-researchers. I regarded myself as a key instrument of the research, intent on exploring the co-researchers' experiences, to explicate the structure of the phenomenon of the black and white race, and give the phenomenon of race a psychological interpretive meaning to understand the phenomenon of same-race prejudice.

Thirdly, the purpose of the research is to explore and describe the co-researchers' unique and subjectively lived experiences of the phenomenon of a black and white same-race prejudice and not their factual details.

Fourthly, I discuss in the chapter how focus is on human behaviour observed or inquired upon, that is, the subjective experience of the phenomenon of same-race prejudice, in the natural setting where the co-researchers live instead of a laboratory experiment to determine behavioural cause and effect.

Finally, the validity and reliability of research results are redefined. The method offers a counter-perspective to the naturalist attitude's view of the world and the experience of it as being independent from the experiencing individual. Race, racial identity, racial identification, validity and reliability are considered to be experiences and interpretations whose objectivity is tinged with the subjectivity of the experiencing human element. Validity and reliability of research data are gauged in terms of the ability of the research results to reveal the intricate nature through which they allow dialogue about the narrowing or enlargement of the distance and proximity with the co-researchers' original text, and not by the use of detached bracketing or the discerning of constant phenomenon data that are rated by objective standards.

Several critical race theory authors (Arudou, 2013; Closson, 2010; Freeman, 2011; Hawkesworth, 2010; Ortiz & Jani, 2010) criticise the naturalist attitude's naturalisation of race, as well as its forms of identity and identification, as being socially constructed and sustained by colour-blind ideologies that have economic, social and political consequences on people's lives (Closson, 2010; Comeaux, 2010; Freeman, 2011; Odartey-Wellington, 2011; Powers, 2007). Phenomenological philosophy also criticises the naturalisation of race for ignoring human experience (Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 1969; Spiegelberg, 1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974). Both critical race theory and phenomenology put primacy on people's subjective experiences, firstly by critical race theory's critique of embedded subordination and discrimination of people assisted by race-neutral laws (Brown, 2008; Cappiccie et al., 2012; Freeman, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Weber, 2013) and second by phenomenology's importance of human innate interpretive subjectivity about corporeality and the lived world (Converse, 2012; Gergel, 2012; Lavery, 2003; Simonsen, 2013; Tuohy et al., 2012). Given the above, this chapter rests on the following:

- A phenomenological tenet that considers race not merely as an objective symbol of identity and identification separate from an experiencing human subject, and unperturbed and uninfluenced by those who live it (Davis, 2005; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Jacobsen, 2007; Lavery, 2003).
- The adoption of a phenomenological research method which considers a human as a conscious being (Greenfield & Jensen, 2012) and humanity's racial identity and identification as phenomena (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Earle, 2010; Kim, 2012). The chapter presents an interpretive and qualitative phenomenological research method that seeks to study and inquire about racial phenomena as perceived and experienced by the human subject and not as objective signifiers of identity and identification, with an intention to make explicit their subjectively lived innuendos that are implicit and taken for granted (Flood, 2010; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Murray, 2012; Spinelli, 2005).

As this study presents a phenomenological window into the conscious and subjectively lived experiences of being black and white (Earle, 2010; Flood, 2010; Kim, 2012), this chapter presents the following:

- The type of research best suited to tapping into people's experiences of race as subjectively and consciously lived, rather than as objective standards of identity and identification (Dybicz, 2013; Flood, 2010; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Lavery, 2003). This is explored through a discussion of the two types of phenomenological research and the preference for a qualitative rather than a quantitative research method.
- Selection and allocation of research participants (Krahn & Putnam, 2003; Polkinghorne, 1989; Smith, Flowers & Larkin, 2009).
- The type of research data that was collected (Creswell, 1998; Giorgi, 1994; Leedy, 1996; Merriam, 2009; Wertz, 1985) and what specifically was looked for (Creswell, 1998; Giorgi, 1994; Leedy, 1996; Merriam, 2009; Wertz, 1985).
- The nature of the relationship between the researcher and the research participants (Creswell, 1998; Krahn & Putnam, 2003; Leedy, 1996; Von Eckartsberg, 1998a, 1998b). This is explored through a discussion on the ethical considerations of the study.
- The validity and reliability of the research (Churchill, Lowery, McNally & Rao, 1998; Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Jacobsen, 2007; Polkinghorne, 1998).

5.2 THE TWO TRENDS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

A distinction is made between a descriptive phenomenology as represented by Edmund Husserl and interpretive phenomenology as represented by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Lavery, 2003; Tuohy et al., 2012). The two trends of phenomenology share the same aims and are both motivated by a desire to reclaim and extricate philosophy from the naturalist attitude by asserting that reality is not merely out there, but that it is in human meaning and experience. As qualitative research approaches, both are concerned with the articulation of the internal experience of human subjects who are in interaction with their environments and who are not seen as passive reactors to external stimuli (Lavery, 2003). However, they differ markedly on several points discussed below.

For descriptive phenomenology, Husserl's method offers hope that the subjective phenomenal meaning of the lived world and its true essence can be accessed. According to descriptive phenomenology, a phenomenologist can reveal the true essence of a phenomenon as it is. What is revealed from consciousness is therefore considered a pure description of the phenomenal reality (Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Earle, 2010; Kim, 2012; Lavery, 2003). Descriptive phenomenology promises access to true meaning as existing separately from the inquirer and the experiencing individual, its discovery made possible through the use of unbiased techniques and humanity as the one who knows or is supposed to know or discover true meaning (Lavery, 2003). The use of phenomenological reduction, as well as bracketing or suspension of the naturalist attitude and preconceptions, help to reveal the true meaning of the experience (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Earle, 2010).

Participants in interpretive phenomenological research are considered as experts with valuable inside understanding of the experience of the phenomenon of investigation and not as the passive objects experimental research would require of them. They are therefore called co-researchers (Polkinghorne, 1989; Von Eckartsberg, 1998a). For interpretive phenomenology, continuous dynamic interaction between the researcher and co-researchers (Tebbet & Kennedy, 2012) implies that complete bracketing and reduction of one's pre-understanding is not possible (Dowling & Cooney, 2012) as meaning is circularly created by and between the two (Flood, 2010).

True and finite meaning of reality existing independent of humanity cannot be seized or discovered as what we purport to know is an interpreted reality resulting not in one reality but many, along with their interpretations. It remains what humans do and do not discover, with the rejection of bracketing making value-free knowledge a fallacy (Converse, 2012; Lavery, 2003). Complete extrication from pre-conceptions by bracketing as promised by descriptive phenomenology is rendered impossible by an indissoluble unity between humanity and its object of knowledge (Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Lavery, 2003). Every act of understanding mirrors interpretation linked to presuppositions (Converse, 2012; Lavery, 2003; Tuohy et al., 2012). Interpretive phenomenology makes no suggestion for a value-free, accessible understanding of unchangeable essences rooted in human consciousness and intentionality (Lavery,

2003). Caught in a continuous intricate connectedness to the research object, researchers cannot step outside of their cultural and political preconceptions of understanding. As passionate and subjective participants of the research process, their role extends beyond mere description to include interpretation, from mere revelation of what is hidden in consciousness to digging beyond taken for granted meanings (Kim, 2012; Lavery, 2003).

Simonsen (2013) encapsulates this idea with a reference to Merleau-Ponty's argument of a human being not as a restrained object studying constant objects, but as a phenomenal being who is in constant conversation with and constitution of and by his/her world, enabling him/her to cast a position of inhabiting space and place through understanding that is informed by interpretation.

As casting aside simplistic bracketing and centralising interpretation, Kim (2012, p. 644) reflects on the thinking of Van Manen that portrays a phenomenological research as embodying the need to "question the way we explain the world, and, more specifically to know the world in which we live as human beings, to understand what it is to be a human being." A renewed appreciation of bracketing and the phenomenological attitude sheds new light on the position of the researcher in interpretive phenomenological research. "Situatedness" (Earle, 2010) implies that the researcher's intentionality and consciousness are among those that he/she conducts research on and with. Informed by his/her pre-understanding instead of discarding it, the researcher becomes inseparable from his/her process of understanding as guided by an interpretive repertoire. It brings to the centre the experiential reality of the researcher just as it prioritises that of those being researched upon. When descriptive phenomenology would suggest the uncontested eliciting of pure and unbiased essence of the phenomenon, research through interpretive phenomenology tells of interpretations informed by the researcher's assumptions and preconceptions (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Gergel, 2012; Tuohy et al., 2012).

This leads to a different kind of bracketing informed by reflection and not objective cutting off from pre-knowledge (Tuohy et al., 2012), guided by time- and space-sensitive embodied experience that moves away from making objective and general statements (Converse, 2012; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012). One's constant personal

involvement implies that one's knowing is particular and unstable, not based on objective and generalisable understanding, but through ever-evolving interpretation (Converse, 2012).

5.3 A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SAME-RACE PREJUDICE

As a philosophical discipline, phenomenology is also seen as a research method founded on and guided by its very much defined philosophy (Kockelmans, 1994). When naturalism and the naturalist attitude would want us to venerate our races, their identities and forms of racial identification, and to see them as essentially and objectively existing, phenomenology ventures the unimaginable. Enshrined in the philosophy of wonder and doubt about what we should naturally know, it calls for a research method that seeks to describe the phenomenon's meaning as consciously experienced, locating its validity in the human life-world rather than in experimental measurements as espoused by the naturalist attitude, to explain its silent, invisible and taken-for-granted nature based on interpretations (Von Eckartsberg, 1983). When the races of black and white are considered untouchable and normal, phenomenology looks at them with suspicion to begin suggesting the existence of prejudice within them.

Phenomenology is a research method whose character is descriptive and interpretive rather than merely explanatory. Guided by the imperative of reduction, it would aim to describe the interpreted experiential meaning(s) attached to the race phenomenon (black or white), while temporarily suspending and continuously acknowledging a tendency to be influenced by assumptions, prior to one's tendency to categorise and label that which comes to consciousness. It is a research method used to explicate the structure of the races of black and white as subjectively experienced along with the dimension of prejudice within, rather than as concrete realities (Kruger, 1988). The research study aims at exploring the unique lived white and black experiences of same-race prejudice. It is aimed at understanding what it entails to experience the phenomenon, its textual description (what it is) and its structural description (the condition and situation of the experience) (Creswell, 1998).

Such a reliance on subjective description of the experience is geared towards exposing the finer details of the phenomenon that are usually taken for granted in the

objective assumptions of generalisation. The naturalist assumption about the races of black and white as identity and identification markers with unity and similarity within them is interrogated by the research method. This is done by considering people to be capable of transcending their naturally given races, and able to make affective, emotional and psychological interpretation of the experiences and impact the assumed natural races have on them (Merriam, 2009).

Considered as a research method “well suited to studying affective, emotional and often intense human experiences” (Merriam, 2009, p. 26), phenomenology should help the researcher attempt to “gain a better understanding of the meaning an experience has for others, as well as for themselves” (Leedy, 1996, p. 161). While a naturalist view would serve to reify, mask and take the race phenomenon for granted as essentially existing, a phenomenological view would describe, explore and interpret the race identity and identification challenges of those who experience it, rather than solely relying on the researcher’s expert description (Krahn & Putnam, 2003; Leedy, 1996).

So premised, a phenomenological stance would help the researcher assume that to live up to the ideals of being black and being white is to ignore a person’s constitutive ability to reflect, interpret and make sense of his/her lived experiences, is to assume that people’s existence is merely given, and not interrogated and constantly negotiated by those who live it. It is to ignore the meaningfulness or lack of it, of those who go through and constitute, and whose experiences are constituted by it.

Taking a qualitative form as consistent with a phenomenological philosophy and approach, the method employed here was meant to assist in getting to the core interpreted essence of the lived experience of the phenomenon of black on black and white on white prejudice (VanderStoep & Johnston, 2009).

5.4 QUALITATIVE STUDY

A qualitative research method is characterised by its focus on human behaviour and experiential meaning-making in the natural setting where people live, instead of laboratory experiments’ measurement of the sequence of cause and effect in behaviour to determine the nature and direction of the relationship between the two

or how the cause sequentially precedes the effect of the behaviour (Creswell, 1998; Hayes, 1997). Reliant on experiential description of the phenomenon being researched (Kruger, 1988), the researcher as the key instrument allows those researched upon to tell their stories with a less limiting interactional style (Creswell, 1998; Hayes, 1997).

Because the aim is “understanding why people respond as they did, the context in which they responded, and their deeper thoughts and behaviours that governed their response” (Creswell, 1998, p. 40) to the phenomenon of concern (same-race prejudice), it would be unfitting to adhere to a strict quantification of their experiences and responses rather than exploring them, and to establish and confirm hypotheses rather than asking questions in an interactive manner (Krahn & Putnam, 2003). With less emphasis put on cause and effect, predicting and explaining the prevalence (Merriam, 2009) of black on black, and white on white prejudice, I attempted to explore the phenomenon, in other words, how black and white “people interpret their experiences, construct their worlds, what meaning they attribute to their experiences” (Merriam, 2009, p. 5), and how these come to impact on their lives.

Such an explorative endeavour would have proven fruitless without an employ of open-ended and semi-structured questions asked in an in-depth interview in a dialogue or conversational style (Smith et al., 2009) where the researcher’s non-expert position relies on cues from the co-researchers themselves (Creswell, 1998; Leedy, 1996). It was hoped that the semi-structured and open-ended nature of these questions would help in exploring the nature and essence of the silenced experiences of same-race prejudice while laying bare the taken for granted complexities of being black and being white in South Africa.

5.5 SAMPLING AND SAMPLE SELECTION

The research was conducted by me in Emalahleni in the Mpumalanga province, South Africa. The selection criteria for the sample were economic status as determined by a person’s nature of work, that is, where they work and the nature of their work activities and responsibilities, and race as classified into black and white.

Four black people and four white people were selected, both consisting of two men and two women whose ages ranged from twenty-five years and upwards. The

sample from each race group was subdivided into one economically affluent man and woman, and one economically not affluent man and woman, as purposively selected and allocated. This was based on the assumption that a person's economic status has a bearing on how he/she considers and defines him-/herself and others, and how others view and define him/her.

Differentiated by me as such, a person's skin pigmentation and other visible physical features were used as defining criteria to determine whether a co-researcher was black or white, as stated in the work of several authors (Domínguez, 1986; Forman et al., 2002; Rockquemore, 1998; Tochluk, 2010; Wander et al., 1999). A black person was differentiated as someone with a darker skin pigmentation and other physical appearances, for example hair form, dissimilar to those of a person defined as white (James, 2001; Neal & Wilson, 1989; Sarich & Miele, 2004; Tate, 2005). In accordance with objectivist thought and the naturalist attitude, these criteria are similar to the definitions provided in the literature review of Chapter 2 and the interview descriptions in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

All the co-researchers were approached individually with a request to include them in the research. They were provided with an explanation of their expected role in it, how the research would benefit or not benefit them, my role as the researcher and student, as well as the recording and storage of the research and interview, as suggested by several authors (Flowers, Duncan & Knussen, 2003; Johnson, 1998; Lauver, 2010; Ray & Vanstone, 2009; Singleton & Furber, 2014). The language used in recruiting the co-researchers was mostly English, with a mixture of Afrikaans, Sepedi or Zulu used with those who struggled to properly converse in English.

A date, time and venue suitable to the prospective co-researcher were set for the interview after the prospective co-researcher had agreed to take part in the research. In most cases, the interview was held at their place of work, at lunch time or before or after work, with only one participant (Ranko) interviewed at his home. The research participation consent form, which was written in English, was signed only after each co-researcher had individually agreed to take part in the research, on the day of and before the first interview, as discussed in the work of several authors (Eatough & Smith, 2006a; Johnson, 1998; Lauver, 2010; Ray & Vanstone, 2009; Spichiger, 2009).

It is not clear whether willingness or declining to participate in this research was as a result of or lack of interest in the activity, knowledge about my occupation and study level, or any other impression-forming factors. In recruiting co-researchers to take part in the research, I told them about my occupation (clinical psychology) and study level (doctoral study in psychology).

A plan to compensate the co-researchers for their participation in the research (Flowers et al., 2003) with R 100.00 each at the end of each interview was rescinded for the three marked as economically affluent after one (Stephans) declined it and I felt that I had offended him. I gave it to them after the second interview, with an explanation as to why it had not been given the first time. The rest of those who received the compensation at the end of the first interview appeared to appreciate it.

There was no hope for a participating sample representative of the population demographics in both Emalahleni or the whole of South Africa, because external validity and generalisability of findings are not the bedrock of this research as would be expected in a naturalist inquiry of a quantitative nature. Centred on the unravelling of unsaid, silenced, taken-for-granted and unique experiential meanings of same-race prejudice, seeking to generalise the research findings would be counter to tapping into those unvoiced moments.

It was with a concern for this aspect of the research that the randomisation of sample selection and allocation fell away (Krahn & Putnam, 2003; Smith et al., 2009). Each of the interviews was meant to explore experiences of same-race prejudice, how categorisation within one's race plays out and is sustained, and people's ability to reflect about and critique their own race. The co-researchers were purposively selected and allocated to the different groups on the sole criterion of hopefully having the potential to lead one into a rich interpretive description of the experience of black on black and white on white prejudice and not on a pre-empted understanding of what the experience should be like (Polkinghorne, 1989; Smith et al., 2009).

Although Polkinghorne (1989) points to the qualifying criteria stipulated by Van Kaam as the ability to express oneself linguistically, to express inner feelings, and to sense and express organic experiences accompanying their feelings, having experienced

the phenomenon most recently, I did not strictly adhere to this list as it may serve to quantify and preferentially treat experiences.

5.6 DATA GATHERING

Although the interviews were held in English, the co-researchers were allowed to use whichever language they were comfortable with in between. They infrequently used Afrikaans, Sepedi or Zulu. These were semi-structured conversations whose details were audiotaped and kept in written notes for later transcription. Information from each interview was audio-taped. I later converted this information verbatim into written and readable notes while intensely listening to each interview. This process resulted in having the information stored twice, the audio as the original and lived conversation, as well as the verbatim written notes of these audio conversations. Two individual interviews were held with each of the eight persons sampled, with the second as a debriefing four months after the first.

To ethically safeguard the co-researchers' identities (Smith et al., 2009), information that may make them individually identifiable, such as their names or those of others, was erased and discussed with each. Each individual was given a pseudonym for the purpose of this research. Details about their age, gender, race, nature of work and story events were kept unaltered.

The first interviews were held from 13 April 2013 to 5 May 2013. Because of the conversational structure of the interviews, some took longer than the presumed one hour and the one hour initially allocated for each of the interviews was therefore not strictly adhered to. Using interjecting prompting questions, these open-ended conversational interviews were based on answering an overall question, "how do you think people of your race have been treating you previously, and how do you think they are treating you now?"

The second interviews were conducted from 12 September 2013 to 4 October 2013. These conversations revolved around finding out whether the co-researchers thought of anything to add to the responses they had given in the first interviews, if they thought of any questions to ask, or if any ideas had been evoked by the discussions in the first interviews. Responses to this inquiry can be summed up in comments like, "nothing to add, ask or change." Each interview was shorter than the

30 minutes initially arranged. I conducted, audiotaped and transcribed both the first and second interviews. The second interviews were designed for an inquiry about the co-researchers' ability to reflect and critique their own understanding of their race, and the practices of same-race prejudice. These interviews were ethically arranged to fit the nature of the study, as asking participants to reflect on their years of growing up and the psychosocial moorings thereof was expected to be emotionally provocative. Expecting that this intensity of emotion was not likely to be felt by the participants at the time of the first interview, but that the reality of the introspection may sink in with time after, the second interviews were ethically meant to serve not only as a data gathering tool but also to debrief the co-researchers.

5.7 DATA EXPLICATION

I used explication to work with the interview data and to identify the themes. This process is explained here. What is called analysis in the natural sciences, is termed explication within the phenomenological research methodology (Von Eckartsberg, 1998a). It is described as the process of working with collected data to reveal the universal characterisation of its meaning, as well as the form and structure of the phenomenon of inquiry. Although the word is not used explicitly by Spinelli (1989), he sees it as a process of stripping bare the varied data gathered to arrive at a more adequate approximation of the phenomenal meaning. Through the use of explication guiding questions (Von Eckartsberg, 1998a), the researcher adopts a reflective interrogative conversation with the data in pursuit of the experiential moment of the phenomenon revealing itself from the fundamental descriptions as carried in the data.

By fundamental description, reference is made to the inherent essential character of the phenomenal experiences as captured in co-researchers' first-hand reporting. The fundamental description is revealed on a phenomenal level, while the fundamental structure, as revealed on the phenomenological level, is on a second-order explication of the data. Although the fundamental structure comes about as the fundamental description is explored and interrogated further, one is always wary of the former whose form and nature are devoid of the co-researchers' experiences in the latter, as explained in Colaizzi's assertion (as cited by Von Eckartsberg, 1998a, p. 30) that:

the structure of an experiential phenomenon need not coincide with a description of that same phenomenon as it is experienced by a subject, because the former is largely implicit and the latter is of a more explicit nature. After all just as the description of a particular essence is not identical to the essence of a particular description, FS and FD of a single experiential phenomenon are not identical.

Mindful of this, of Edmund Husserl's imperative to stay in the operative fold mood of "back to the things themselves" (Kim, 2012; Smith et al., 2009; Spinelli, 1989; Von Eckartsberg, 1998b), and of narrowing the gap between the fundamental description and the fundamental structure, the following phenomenology specific rules were followed as depicted to be invaluable to the explication process (Jacobsen, 2007; Spinelli, 1989):

1. The rule of the epoch

Through phenomenological reduction, one has to temporarily, not completely bracket and suspend, but put in phenomenological doubt, all pre-assumptive knowledge, theoretical understanding and explanation temptation. This is done in order to employ intense interest and immersion into the primary data to discern the fundamental description of the phenomenon – in this case, black on black and white on white prejudice.

2. The rule of description

As one slows down and patiently refrains from explaining (Polkinghorne, 1989; Von Eckartsberg, 1998a), one becomes able to describe the phenomenal essence behind which co-researchers' lived experiences and meanings are embedded, as embodied in the data.

3. The rule of horizontalisation

With concentrated focus, and disciplined and concerted fascination with the data while emphatically dwelling on the described situation (Churchill et al., 1998; Von Eckartsberg, 1998a), the importance of every information proffered can be seen for its amplified significance without rushing to any preferential hierarchical ordering of it. In line with the temporary bracketing of one's pre-conceived assumptions, through the endeavour of moving from concentration with factual details to experiential meanings, one hopes to expose the approximate structural

characterisation the phenomenon (black on black and white on white prejudice, in this case), its nature, what it means, what it is, and how it manifests itself for the co-researchers.

The stage thus set, the explication of the data gathered from the interviews was aimed at describing, thematising and translating (interpreting) the phenomenal experience of black on black and white on white prejudice rather than counting its frequency (Giorgi, 1994). It was aimed at discovering and describing the meaning units of such prejudice as experienced by the co-researchers themselves (Leedy, 1996), recording these in a way not only coloured by the researcher's prior specifications.

To bracket and reduce my own assumptions of scepticism, the following actions were implemented (Creswell, 1998; Eatough & Smith, 2008; Giorgi, 1994; Merriam, 2009; Wertz, 1985):

- Information from each interview was separately stored and emphatically attended to. Detailed descriptions, recorded in a way that refrained from increasing or reducing its reported characteristics, were used to capture the detailed dimension of the phenomenon.
- No attempt was made to preferentially judge any detail as relevant or irrelevant. Acknowledging the laborious nature of the act and the extended period to conduct this kind of research, Giorgi (1994) suggests that one should spend a considerable time with the interview data, neither reading nor categorising its meaning quickly.
- The interview information in audio form from each interview was transcribed to be sequentially arranged in a manner that told a meaningful story as meant by the co-researcher. Priority was given to each co-researcher's description and revelation rather than the researcher's prior conception and explanations (Giorgi, 1994; Wertz, 1985). This was followed by ordering the information from each interview separately according to its emergent themes and interrelatedness of these without altering its intended meaning (Wertz, 1985).

While the above activities were guided by a commitment to distil a thick description of the phenomenon of black on black and white on white prejudice as experienced by the co-researchers themselves, the step to follow was a critical interrogation of the individual interview information, which added a psychological description of the themes far removed from the psychologically opaque descriptions offered by the co-researchers themselves (Eatough & Smith, 2008). This added an interpretive element to the process of a detached experiential description of themes.

From each individual interview, an individual psychological structure of the phenomenon was derived by distilling individual phenomenon descriptions and appropriating themes that revealed the invariant characteristics or essences of the phenomenon of black on black or white on white prejudice, depending on whether the co-researcher was black or white. This is seen as the purported purpose of phenomenological research and data explication/analysis (Creswell, 1998; Eatough & Smith, 2008; Giorgi, 1994; Merriam, 2009; Wertz, 1985).

When all eight individual interviews were run through and the individual psychological structures of the phenomenon had been allowed to emerge, I moved to a stage where a general psychological structure of the phenomenon was interrogated to emerge from the divergent and convergent themes in the individual psychological structures.

Information gathered from a good phenomenological study should allow extrapolation and transferability to other similar societal circumstances, thereby contributing to and aiding with the healthy upkeep of humankind (Wertz, 1985). From detailed individual fundamental descriptions, descriptive structures, fundamental structures, individual psychological structures to general psychological structures, a meaningful extrapolation into societal black on black and white on white prejudice could be made, however tenuous and interpretive in nature.

5.8 PHENOMENOLOGICAL VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

“Back to the things themselves! Back to the life-world! Back to the validity of personal experience!” (Von Eckartsberg, 1983, p. 200). So goes the naturalist view of validity and reliability turned on its head. Our experiential observations and descriptions of

others' experiences remain interpretations whose objectivity is tinged with the subjectivity of the human element (Spinelli, 1989).

A rejection of a world independent of the involved individual, and the object-subject dichotomy (Kruger, 1988; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974), implies an inclusion of an observing human element, requiring that we cement what we know and the acquired knowledge in continuous interrogation as "the world is not just there – not without us" (Jacobsen, 2007, p. 3).

The naturalist foundation of knowledge would want one to assume one's research findings to be valid to the extent to which they are true, and to be reliable when their core essences can be replicated, when they can withstand the test of verifiability and constancy under different circumstances and by different investigators (Merrick, 1999; Spinelli, 1989). Phenomenologically, there is a sobering moment of humility in being confronted with the question of whether the general psychological structure tallies with the individual psychological structure, and whether the fundamental structure reflects the descriptive structure (Polkinghorne, 1989; Von Eckartsberg, 1998a).

Reliability and validity may be seen as tenuously and movingly implicated by the extent to which there is a correspondence between the descriptive structure in the first-hand experience and the fundamental structure in the analyst's explication and thematisation of the collected data, however approximate this may be.

This brings into focus a critique of the researcher's interpretive skills, acumen and perfection in execution. It lays bare how one has emphatically dwelled with the data, and how much one has bracketed one's pre-assumptive theoretical inclinations or allowed them to help one arrive at a refined approximation of the essential characterisation of the phenomenological structure of the phenomenon. One needs to reflect on how well the distance or proximity between the original text and the interpretation has been narrowed, considering that co-researchers' descriptions are naive, although original, without the researcher's psychological characteristic interpretation of his/her human element. In their revelatory endeavour, the researcher's specific descriptive questions can leave so much unrevealed.

A reliable and valid phenomenological finding is so judged for its ability to reveal the intricate nature through which it allows a dialogue about how it managed (or failed) to narrow the distance or proximity with the original text, and not how it shies away or persuades its audience to believe in its objective facts. It is not judged on the basis of using personally detached bracketing and discerning constant phenomenal data that can be rated according to objective standards.

It should serve as a medium of interlocking interpretive avenues from the captured data/text to the researcher and the audience, none of whom can evade the subjective interpretive nature of human experience and existence (Converse, 2012; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Tuohy et al., 2012). According to Churchill et al. (1998, p. 83), “the value of the findings depends on their ability to help others gain insight into the ever mysterious realities of human life,” in other words, the frailties of human subjectivity and not revelation of unquestionable objective facts.

A review of any phenomenological finding is itself phenomenologically an interpretive human exercise. As Jacobsen (2007) argues, the world is not without us. “No narrative description can in practice embrace the ‘whole’ phenomenon” (Churchill et al., 1998, p. 83). The naturalist’s attitude should be forgiven for not knowing this, for not realising the interpretive capacity and intentionality of human consciousness, for sticking with a static view of reality, and for failing to account for the human cognitive element that forever wants to make sense of reality and not be naively subservient to it.

5.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Brinkmann and Kvale (2008, p. 265) quote the American Psychological Association preamble to ethical principles for psychology as stating that “the decision to undertake research rests upon a considered judgement by the individual psychologist about how best to contribute to psychological science and human welfare.” Flowing from this, it is elaborated that it is necessary to reflect upon why this particular research inquiry is deemed valuable to be pursued, and what benefits it holds for the co-researchers involved or the public at large (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008).

The chosen co-researchers for this project shall not individually benefit from taking part in it. However, I anticipate that, in their approximation of reality, the results from this research will shed invaluable insight into our challenges of interrelation and serve as a bridge between what is presently known about human prejudice and the void that is there about same-race prejudice. In this way, the co-researchers too will indirectly benefit.

To avoid harming them and violating the co-researchers' human rights (Smith et al., 2009), I had to further be mindful of the responsible ways of conducting the research in such a way that their participation was not coerced. Each co-researcher's consent to take part in the research was sought individually by explaining to him/her what the purpose was, what role he/she was expected to play, the time needed to conduct the interview, the tentative format and the recording and storage of the information.

Smith et al. (2009, p. 53) note that "to say that something is 'confidential' is to say that no one else will see it, and this is not the case." There was a promoter overseeing this project. The results of this research have been documented for public consumption and human knowledge contribution. Smith et al. (2009) therefore advise that the word anonymity should be used. Information that would make the co-researchers individually identifiable was removed from both the interview records and the final report results. Each co-researcher was given a pseudonym to make it impossible to individually identify him/her with the events and the reported story, both in the data recording and in this thesis.

The nature of the research and the content of the phenomenon inquired upon implied that the co-researchers' privacy would be invaded. They were implicitly required to share private experiences they had not shared with anyone or even thought of sharing at all. Although one could not certainly know what these were specifically, I anticipated an emotional toll to be left on them due to this. The second interview served not only as a data gathering technique, but also as debriefing, by asking the co-researchers to indirectly but actively reflect about the reflections they proffered in the first interviews.

The nature of the phenomenon of inquiry makes the research itself contaminated by demand characteristics, that is, co-researchers attempting to influence the outcome

of the research by providing answers led by their own private agendas (Banister, Burman, Parker, Taylor & Tindall, 1994). To balance the possibility for this not to happen and avoidance of complete deception, the purpose of the research was explained as an inquiry into the nature of interactional life influences of a black person on a black person and by a black person; and of a white person on a white person and by a white person. This was deemed appropriate to an exploration of the experiential interpretations of the phenomenon of black on black and white on white prejudice, although differently worded. This is in line with the wording in the interview questions themselves where no specific emphasis and reference was made of the word prejudice.

The conversational mode of the interview made it possible that the hierarchical position of power between the researcher and the co-researchers be diffused.

CHAPTER 6

RESEARCH INTERVIEW RESULTS

6.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW

The present chapter is made up of interview conversations between myself and eight co-researchers in Emalahleni. Its intended purpose is to expose the flawed, rigid and essentialist definitions of race that objectify it, to prepare one to appreciate how such definitions are lived through experiences laced with prejudice within the race. Pursuit of this task was assisted by asking and attempting to respond to the following questions:

- What are the subjective experiences of being black?
- How does it feel to be black?
- What are the subjective experiences of being white?
- How does it feel to be white?
- What are the subjective experiences of living up to the normative, authentic and prototypical ideals of a black race?
- What are the subjective experiences of not living up to the normative, authentic and prototypical ideals of a black race?
- What are the subjective experiences of living up to the normative, authentic and prototypical ideals of a white race?
- What are the subjective experiences of not living up to the normative, authentic and prototypical ideals of a white race?
- How does it feel to not live up to any of the above ideals?

To avoid contamination of information gathered by command characteristics, no direct mention was made in the interviews of same-race prejudice or any of the abovementioned reflective questions (Banister et al., 1994; Smith et al., 2009). However, the questions asked and the interview schedule adopted (Eatough & Smith, 2006b, 2008; Smith et al., 2009) allowed the phenomenon of same-race prejudice to be explored.

In this chapter, the discussion of the interviews is preceded by a restatement of how a phenomenological attitude is helpful to allowing for a tapping into the lived human experience of racial identity and identification as they did.

Next, themes extracted from the interviews are presented, supported by and interspersed with verbatim expressions of the co-researchers during the interview conversations (Johnson, 1998; Polkinghorne, 1989; Reid, Flowers & Larkin, 2005; Robson, 2002; Singleton & Furber, 2014). The co-researchers' responses revolved around answering the main question of "how do you think people of your race have been treating you in the past and are treating you now?", the intention of which was to gain an exploratory description of the experience of the phenomenon (Chung, 2010; Lauver, 2010; McManus, Peerbhoy, Larkin & Clark, 2010; Singleton & Furber, 2014) behind the racial labels of blackness and whiteness. This anchoring question was used to explore same-race prejudice, and how it emerges and is played out or done.

The chapter ends with an explication act (Von Eckartsberg, 1998a), which is my reflection of what the themes extracted from the co-researchers' interviews are understood to be with regard to same-race prejudice. This also serves as an introduction to the next chapter.

My initial assumption was that a person's economic status would correlate with the nature of work that they do, hence their work would determine whether they are economically affluent or not. This could be determined by where they worked and the nature of the work they did. As can be seen later in this chapter, this was challenged in some of the interviews held – see the interviews with Mokgopo, Stephans, Ranko and Belinda.

While I use the chapter to serve as an attempt to move away from the naturalist attitude embedded in the taken-for-granted self and other definitions regarding the races of black and white in both Chapters 2 and 3, I still consider the interview themes gleaned in the research as essentialist and objectivist.

I consider the chapter to be an example of descriptive phenomenological research based on the following two points. First, the co-researchers' description of their interactions with others are a reflection of an uncontested objective reality of same-

race prejudice quantifiable in dichotomies of acceptability against unacceptability, normativity against non-normativity, authenticity against inauthenticity and prototypicality against non-prototypicality of a race. This is shown by not reflectively critiquing one's assertions about experiences whose reality is naively taken for granted as true.

Additionally, I consider the researcher's systematic use of bracketing pre-suppositions and prior knowledge to give hope for a possible access by the researcher to an uncontested core essence of the phenomenon of same-race prejudice. The use of bracketing portrays the researcher's role as a neutral expert objectively having access to and reporting on uncontested truths. Although these themes are about experiential definitions, the experience of same-race prejudice is rendered by the two different but complementary positions and roles by myself and the co-researchers as merely out there, as what is reported on and done by others to them. As not including the selves of both myself and co-researchers in the moment and act of defining, offering a critique that does not critique the critiquing self, the same-race prejudice themes and race definition themes offered from interviews are marked in essentialist normalisation tendencies.

6.2 PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE INTERVIEWS

In pondering about the research matter, I had to confront my own race definition stereotypes as couched in and subsumed under general assumptions of social perception (literature definitions in Chapter 2 and interview descriptions in Chapter 3 of this thesis). This included defining the races of black and white in distinct observable physical terms. My perception was not unique from the general perception, as it too was essentialist and reducible to quantifiable characteristics. I had to rely on a naturalist lens which was blinded from and unknown to the phenomenological attitude, which is less concerned with the observable functional qualities of things (Ryba, 1991).

Necessarily, I needed to begin with a naturalist stand in order to begin to shift from the glorified cultural and ethnic essentialisation of the races, to their subjectively lived experiential definitions. This is a view guided by Franz Bretano's (1838-1917) sage phenomenology (Converse, 2012; Dowling, 2007; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Laverty,

2003), which indicates the need to view race and racial being as phenomena whose nature goes beyond the observable physical, to their descriptions and definitions as they appear in subjective human experiences (Spiegelberg, 1965).

Durrheim et al. (2011), Tochluk (2010) and the conversation descriptions reflected upon in Chapter 3 of this thesis show that, in South Africa and elsewhere, race distinctions still run supreme. People's living spaces are an objectified race-dominated existence where the objective race serves as a definer and marker of belonging. This racial thinking of seeking identity in the physical body (James, 2001; Mallon, 2013; Matsinhe, 2011) not only obscures but also ignores personalised experiences beyond the observable, robbing existence of its human experience (Converse, 2012; Earle, 2010; Flood, 2010; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Lavery, 2003).

Years after South Africa's apartheid race laws have been officially repealed, the races of black and white still exist in clear distinction from each other (Hammett, 2010; Malefane, 2012; Meintjies, 2012; Seekings, 2008; Sesanti, 2008). They still regard each other with suspicion, and conflict and threat loom eminently between them (Durrheim et al., 2011). The outlawing of racial discrimination did not make their distinctions insignificant (Tochluk, 2010). Being white is likened to being differently and relatively advantaged in life (Bonilla-Silva & Embrick, 2001; Lipsitz, 2006; Mayor, 2002; Steck et al., 2003; Tochluk, 2010), as is shown by the race definitions in Chapter 3 and in this chapter's interview conversations. Blackness has not shed its historical relative inferior social standing, involuntary subordination and servitude to whiteness (Brooks & Rada, 2002; James, 2001; Lipsitz, 2006; Tate, 2005; Yancy, 2004).

Even laws that are intended to reverse apartheid South Africa's disadvantages of racial distinctions (Du Toit, 2006; Gready, 2009; Jones, 2006; Malherbe, 2011; Small & Grant, 2005) serve to solidify the distinctions between black and white, and blackness as inherently different from whiteness (Sesanti, 2008).

We set ourselves up traps of racial distinctions because we hope that the best course of action is to get rid of the distinctions (Anderson, 2012; Peters, 2012). Race has not shifted from its history of not only determining opportunities that accrue to

people, but also how we define ourselves and others (Desmond & Emirbayer, 2013; Weber, 2013). While it is not my intention in this thesis to comment about the merits or demerits of political, economic and social arrangements of the apartheid and present political era in South Africa, previously white people benefitted from a system that affirmed their whiteness at the expense of black people (Budlender & Lund, 2011; Guillebeau, 1999; Jarmon, 2010; Pillay & Karlsson, 2013). The present setup is such that black people are affirmed to benefit from their blackness at the expense of white people (Guillebeau, 1999; Thompson, 2006).

The perception of racialised bodies crept into my curiosity as I thought about the selection of co-researchers for this research. The mere allocation of people into black and white, and economically affluent and not affluent, made me realise how trapped I am in the naturalist attitude. Even the venerable Franz Boas, with his epoch-making propositions of countering physical anthropological race perceptions (Baker, 2010; Williams, 2006), was not left unscathed by racial profiling. A proponent of a thinking that does not see black and white as biologically superior or inferior to each other, his tenet of black and white as culturally dissimilar and all worthy of recognition in the space of human existence, was different from other thinking, but entrenched the races as distinctively dissimilar. In the same way, the pro-black, pro-African-American supporter Du Bois said that, “that there are differences between the White and Black races is certain, but just what those differences are is known to none with an approach to accuracy” (Williams, 2006, p. 36). This led to a clubbing together of each race in a way that insulates it from and denies it self-scrutiny (Frakenberg, 1993).

With a belief in people’s multiple and varied understanding, life backgrounds and contesting definitions of their living circumstances, suppressed or overtly known, I was inspired to encourage the conversational interviews to unfold in the manner that they appeared. Their nature and content are meant to dispel the notion of a simplistic objective race that is quantifiable, to an illuminated race experience as a phenomenon of a subjectively lived human encounter. Challenging my assumptions and those of the co-researchers about blackness and whiteness, to be deduced from the conversations and reflections on the conversations, is the introduction of a notion that our objective and obviously existing races are a phenomenon whose physical

naturalness exists only as conferred by humans in experience (Johnson, 1998; Kockelmans, 1994; Natanson, 1969; Ray & Vanstone, 2009; Spichiger, 2009).

The debate in Chapter 1 of this thesis about Brett Murray, the painting of Jacob Zuma and the counter-reactions to them, the philosophical views of black and blackness (Anderson, 1995; Baloyi, 2008; Hountondji, 1997; Musopole, 1994; Senghor, 1997), as well as the observation by the National Association of Black Social Workers about white families adopting black children (Shiao et al., 2004), are all popular voices (Eatough & Smith, 2006a) about and against a particular defined race. The popular voices encapsulate the tendency not to see their singular and partial form, thereby instilling and perpetuating the stereotypes of being, as well as prejudice not only between, but also within each particular race. It is in challenging these popular voices, as I do throughout the thesis, that a phenomenological stance alerts one of the flawed and limiting frameworks of understanding and description of race, to being oriented to race being a nuanced experiential and lived reality (Eatough & Smith, 2006a, 2006b).

A study by Spichiger (2009) indicates how terminally ill patients can equate an ordinary stay in hospital with being in prison or heaven. It shows how being terminally ill in hospital goes beyond being carried in the physical body as unitary, singular and uniform, to being multi-faceted in lived experiences. This understanding shall never be accessed if we only concentrate on the popular debates of describing existence in titles that give credence only to names reliant on objective distinctions (Brown, 2008; Cappiccie et al., 2012; Freeman, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010).

Phenomenological understanding, as a guide behind the interviews in this chapter, argues for a race that is not only what is there (Dusi, Girelli, Tacconi & Sità, 2011), as “not an object that stands before one” and as “not something that runs its course behind one” (Johnson, 1998, p. 200). It allows one to not only be concerned with the name of a particular race, but also to appreciate and empathise with the feeling and experiencing human being (Johnson, 1998). Always concerned with the race phenomenon of human meaning, it is oriented to the inner life, to living and being identified with a particular race.

Black people's existential struggle of betweenness in being (Anderson, 1995; Biko, 1978; Hartigan, 2010; Mahon, 2004; Pucherova, 2011; Sampson, 1999), being formally defined as black, self-classifying and re-aligning their race contours as a "whitened black" (Bailey et al., 2013), yet as non-white, show the multiplicity of racial experience that goes beyond the quantifiable features of the physical in the popular voices. Viewing racial being as a lived phenomenon, the interview conversations should lay the ground for realising that how we distinguish blackness from whiteness, and the self from the other, is similar to how blackness, whiteness, the self or the other defines itself within.

Guided by a phenomenological lens of prioritising people's experiences, the themes arising from the semi-structured interview conversations with each of the eight co-researchers highlight the importance of temporarily bracketing one's theoretical understandings (Eatough & Smith, 2008; Merriam, 2009; Polkinghorne, 1989; Robson, 2002; Wertz, 1985) to appreciate peoples' inside understanding in what is termed "letting the data speak for itself" (McManus et al., 2010; Ray & Vanstone, 2009; Reid et al., 2005; Singleton & Furber, 2014; Spichiger, 2009). The verbatim recording of the interviews is meant for unravelling and understanding the lived (Eatough & Smith, 2006b) phenomenon of prejudice within the black and the white races.

6.3 THE FORMAL INTERVIEWS

Deduced from the formal interviews, same-race prejudice is made up of objectivist, essentialist and quantifiable virtues of the phenomenon of race. Guided by a naturalist attitude, it is displayed through notions that define a race in objective and quantifiable virtues of acceptability against unacceptability, authenticity against inauthenticity, normativity against non-normativity and prototypicality against non-prototypicality of identity and identification within the race. Those assumed to have none or less of the authentic, normative, prototypical and acceptable virtues are categorised as different, judged and labelled as inauthentic, non-normative, non-prototypical and unacceptable to the race.

For white and whiteness, the looks of the physical body, nature of work, how much one earns at work, educational qualifications, interpersonal manners, work

experience and material possessions are the virtues that serve as a yardstick for categorisation and differential treatment. Intolerant quick assumptions were made about Danie's lack of the required looks and about Belinda doing a less respectable job. Magda considered disrespectful white people to be odd. Danie was aware of his lack of the qualifying virtues for a normative, authentic and prototypical white, hence his use of self-isolation. Belinda's use of the qualifying comment that "it is by all the car guard, but there is actually no work out there" indicated her awareness of her lack of whiteness's preferred virtues. Stephans and Magda portrayed themselves as having the virtues of an authentic, normative and prototypical white racial identity and identification. For Stephans, these were the requisite trade qualification and work experience, while for Magda, her interpersonal manners, and work and educational qualifications indicated these virtues.

For black and blackness, such qualifying virtues are material possessions, employment and economic affluence. Those with less or none of these are treated with intolerance, categorised and labelled as non-prototypical, non-normative, inauthentic and unacceptable to blackness. They become subjects of negative social judgement and grading for not being materially affluent, for example Mokgopo, whose friend was called "mahlalela" (loafer); Ranko, whose colleagues isolated him; and Simangele, who was deserted after losing her job. Thulisile, Mokgopo, Ranko and Simangele were all aware of how being differentially graded set the boundaries between them and others within the race and disqualified them from acceptable, normative, authentic and prototypical racial identity and identification. Thulisile mentioned the stereotypes people have about work and nature of work, and the possession of clothes and accessories. For Mokgopo, it was the stereotypes about cars, clothes and houses people have that contribute to the labelling and othering of people. With a sense of pride and positive social judgement, Simangele spoke of how her newly found employment brought people back into her social sphere, as now being acceptable, authentic, normative and prototypical. Better than those peers who dropped early from school, Ranko considered himself "an advanced man".

Each interview is discussed separately below.

6.3.1 Belinda: *“It is all by the car guards”*

Belinda was a 52-year-old white female car guard at an open car parking lot surrounding several shopping outlets. I classified her as not being economically affluent. The interview was held on 13 April 2013 at her place of work.

As if not concerned with what was happening, Belinda did not ask any questions. She merely responded to the questions asked, personally detached from the story, as if talking about someone else, and with no personal connectedness to the detail. It was not easy to draw any personal feelings from her regarding whether she was pleased with these events or not. The themes extracted from the interview with Belinda are presented below.

6.3.1.1 *Justification*

Although none of the questions raised with her asked why she was living the life that she did, Belinda offered answers that came mainly in the form of justifications why she was doing the kind of work she did. This made me wonder about the possibility that she could be judged every day, required to be on the defensive for her kind of occupation. When asked how being treated in this way made her feel, she responded, *“bad. But I work long enough here to manage all that, the good ones and the bad ones”*.

She indicated that she relied upon her religion, saying:

I work more nine years. Ups and downs. It is life. You cannot say it is that person's fault not to go further. You must believe in God that you will make the best of every day. Go to work every day with faith.

Regarding why she thought that those who said she should go look for another job that is better were wrong, she said:

but there are no jobs really. I did this job for nine years. Some people are good, some are bad. But we handle it because it is our work. But it is the position you are in that says you must come and do this work. They think you can make better money by other places. But work is work in my eyes, because in financial quotes there are people without food at night. There are people who do not want to work for R2000 or R3000 a month, saying

that is not money. For me if you have a piece of bread at night, you have enough food to eat.

She made a comparison between herself and those who are homeless and jobless:

So many people out there who look into dustbins for something to eat. I have got a job. Not a big one. Roof over my head, bed. I am willing to work, whether I make R50 or R100 a day. It is work.

On her style of using money, she said that, *“if I were to answer, I say I am successful because I have everything I want. Not many to spend every day, but have the necessary things, clothes, bed, roof, food. That is enough in life.”* She added that it is enough to be able to *“pay all your expenses every month, put away R100 or R200, because today’s life is expensive.”*

6.3.1.2 *Normalising bad treatment*

Not questioning how she and other car guards are treated, Belinda resigned to saying that:

all car guard are treated like that. Some people are good, some are bad, but we handle it because it is our work. The other people also complain about that. But it is by the car guards, all at Checkers, at Game.

6.3.1.3 *Differentially categorised and looked down upon*

Belinda noticed that people have a tendency to categorise others and that for them as car guards, being categorised as different resulted in being looked down upon. Trying to play it down, she said:

but there is a few bad people who look at you and say, no thank you. Not bad in a way.... They think they are better than the people who look after the cars. It is really bad. I think they are rich, that is why they are, or they do not like.... Say go look for a better job.

She used the same differentiation and categorisation of people: *“The regular people behave like regular people, but people who are rich look down on you.”*

The boundary between them as car guards and the other people is marked by assumptions about the kind of work one does:

We think they are rich because they drive larney cars, come out with lots of groceries. They think they got some money. Where I stay people know me as a person, not by the work I do. There is no better or bad ones. It is just here at work. Maybe white people look down at car guards because they say go get a better job, you are not supposed to be here.

On a first reading of her account of events, the temptation is to identify her as someone who was making simple justifications of doing a car guard's work. Further dwelling on her story reveals the extent of "differentness" she endured in her daily work, making her justifications necessary.

She seemed surprised at the different treatment between what she called regular people, who understood her situation, and rich people, who were judgemental of it. She was aware of how differently car guards are treated, that their chosen work is not in conformity with expected work ideals, and how they are treated as outsiders because of this. She saw that she was subject to irregular and surprising treatment, which she had to endure for survival purposes, "*only here at work*".

Her justification and normalisation responses appear to be an attempt to either minimise the regularity at which the treatment occurred or to deem it insignificant. While she was viewed and treated in a prejudiced way for her car guard status and as living un-white, her reaction to this appears to regard the treatment as uncharacteristic of being white. This view is discriminatory of a view that discriminates against her, based on a stereotyping way of perceiving and expecting how one should be. Either as their view of her or her view of their view about her, each perceives itself as a prototypical (Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) white way of being, refusing to consider itself as an alternative among many.

6.3.2 Stephans: "*I have earned my respect*"

Stephans was a 33-year-old white male butchery manager. Before this interview, I assumed him to not be economically affluent. I later re-classified him as being economically affluent. This interview was held at his place of work, the butchery, on 15 April 2013.

Not asking any questions, but merely responding to those asked, he presented himself as satisfied with the details of the story, the things he related. It seemed like

a story of normal and deserved events for him and others. The themes extracted from the interview with Stephans are presented below.

6.3.2.1 *Hard work earns high status*

Stephans opined that one's progress in life is only made certain through a specific attitude towards life by those who can specifically work hard, and by implication not idle wishful thinking. Hard work earns one a better and higher life status: *"Like I said, it was hard in the beginning. That is exactly the reason why I am here today."*

6.3.2.2 *Educational qualification and work trade experience*

Considering that working hard to acquire a requisite educational qualification and acquiring enough work experience should make navigating life spaces with ease, Stephans said: *"I have been in this trade for 14 years now. I have qualifications in this trade. Was hard when I was at the bottom, struggling, learning the job. Never easy."*

6.3.2.3 *A trade or educational qualification is a commodity*

Stephans saw people's worth as measured in terms of their educational or trade qualification: *"Especially in our culture. If you do not have a qualification behind your name, you are considered a nothing."* To be respected, one needs an educational qualification. It is a yardstick that indicates that a person is worth taking seriously. *"A trade or qualification comes first. That is what makes a person these days. Everybody respects you for your qualification."* A qualification is a commodity that *"nobody can take away from you"*, that can be used in one's favour.

6.3.2.4 *Educational qualification, work experience and respect*

If a qualification is a commodity that can be wielded in one's favour, being less qualified leads to receiving unfair treatment. Educational and work qualification boost confidence and pride in social circles, as indicated in Stephans' statement:

Where I stay they treat me well. Everybody has their own trade. I cannot tell a miner how to do his job, that is what he is trained for, that is his industry. Likewise I am in the butchery industry, people cannot tell me

what to do. Respect is always good if you respect people for their trade, then they will respect you for your own trade.

6.3.2.5 Trade experience, educational qualification and confidence

According to Stephans, without hard work, a person will not reap the rewards of a high life status that an educational qualification brings with hard work and dedication. This will not allow one to get the better work experience that such a life offers. Without these, one will not benefit from the respect accorded by others, and one's confidence will amount to naught. He said: *"If I was out of work, still living with my parents, I would not have any confidence."*

To be deduced from the above themes is an essentialist whiteness defined in specific virtues (Frakenberg, 1993; Hartigan, 2010; Lipsitz, 2006; Tochluk, 2010; Yancy, 2004) in which Stephans took pride. Although he seemed to be aware of a differently defined whiteness, that of idleness and not pursuing higher educational qualifications, its core values seem to be less preferred and more discouraged (Morris, 2006; Moss, 2003; Sibanda, 2012; Wray, 2006).

Gunning for higher educational qualifications, working hard and having more work experience appeared to be Stephans' ideal. He seemed to be complacently unquestioning of a whiteness defined as such. He saw being treated badly as a springboard for one to working hard and bettering oneself: *"When somebody is hard on you, it is for your own benefit. It motivates you as a person, to have more. It is worth living. The harder you work, the more you will accomplish."*

His defined whiteness normalises the unfavourable treatment given to the less qualified, making it an expected social norm, a required motivation for people to strive for more. It raises the problem of inadvertently blaming those less educationally qualified, and those holding lower positions at work and everywhere, for being treated unfavourably.

The interview with Stephans displays a partial whiteness encompassed in its defined virtues in whose extolling alternative whiteness is ignored or suppressed. The alternative whiteness becomes eschewed for being non-conforming to the preferred ideal whiteness.

6.3.3 Danie: “Just give me a chance”

Danie was a 40-year-old white man without permanent employment, whom I classified as not being economically affluent. He was interviewed on 16 April 2013 at the place where I found him doing temporary work.

Continuously engaging the interview, he expressed personal relatedness to his story. He recounted unhappiness with life events as related, viewing himself as more of a victim and appealing for fairness. The themes extracted from the interview with Danie are presented below.

6.3.3.1 *Isolated for being different*

His lack of the “looks” and not adhering to the expected dress code made Danie to be differently marked, as shown in his statement that:

If I can't go to the casino, not having enough money to be in their group, not having the looks, they classify you. They say you are not a VIP, you are a poor guy, you have got nothing we are interested in.

The isolation permeated even in the private territory where he lived, with the described comfort seeming to be one-sided, only serving the other: “Where we stay we try to make it as comfortable as we can and live with each other. We do not sit in one kitchen and eat. It is just hello, goodbye.”

6.3.3.2 *Preferential treatment*

Public space like the shopping area illuminated Danie's differentness:

If you go to town you have to be pretty fine. I am from work now. If you go to the shop they do not treat you well like when you come there dressed neat... Ja... You can see the attitude changes totally from the customer that was in front of you, that is neat and tidy, wallet with money.

6.3.3.3 *Feeling pushed away and restricted*

Being marked and treated as different filled him with feelings of being pushed aside and restricted in showing what he was capable of. The feelings were summed up in appeals for equal recognition and appreciation:

I know I can be of better use to someone, just give me a chance. It pushes us back from doing what we love to do, because they look at how you dress and say you are not part of them. Push you away. Judge you.

Pushed away as different caused him to wonder about belonging, as when he said: *"makes me pushed away because I am also a South African. I am born here. I do not have the finances to live overseas like everyone."*

6.3.3.4 Rushed judgement

People easily judged him, not considering him as one of their kind and calling him names. They judged him by where he stayed, and how he looked and dressed, and would say *"this is a hobo or whatever even if I come from work. They...."*

6.3.3.5 Avoided

People's judgement of him and those of his kind, make others *"not bother if you are lying next to the road busy dying."*

6.3.3.6 Isolation

He deliberately isolated himself and steered clear of situations that would expose him to further social ridicule and humiliation: *"Me too I also do not go to that guy because I will be treated the same way."*

6.3.3.7 Material possessions as social markers of inclusion/exclusion

In combination with physical looks and dress code, what one possesses or does not possess serves as a yardstick for one's inclusion or exclusion in social engagements. These are used as visible markers of judging others and making sweeping statements about them. These are markers of their differentness from the rest, used to exclude those who do not have them.

The more material possessions one has, the higher the social status one is accorded. Danie said: *"They treat you in terms of what you have, status. The way, your appearance, what you have. If you do not have a brand new Mercedes or a motorbike, you are not welcome in this."* In these words are laid bare the excruciating experiences meted out by the status-driven whiteness that uses outward looks as

yardstick for inclusion or exclusion, a whiteness whose demeanour isolates and judges those who are not smartly dressed or not materially affluent.

Danie was baffled at this uncharacteristic whiteness, wondering whether it is handmaiden from the new South Africa or whether he was too young to notice it before:

It is worse now than it was before. Because everybody says each for himself and God for his own. People do not care for each other. I do not know if it is going over from apartheid into the new era, white people saying, with an attitude, well carry on, I do not worry about the next person.

The tendency to dismember, isolate and disown his uncharacteristic whiteness by other white people caused him discomfort because it is not in line with his expected ideals of whiteness. To disown and name them uncharacteristic of whiteness is to perpetuate stereotypes that name, isolate, exclude and socially other, although Danie seemed to wonder whether that is authentic whiteness.

6.3.4 Thulisile: “Doing domestic like work”

Thulisile was a black woman who did not disclose her age, working as a cleaner outside a shopping complex. I categorised her as not being economically affluent. This interview was conducted at her place of work, the car parking area, on 16 April 2013.

A victim of those around her, with evilness and unfairness directed at her, Thulisile expressed a personally involving story as someone who was unhappy and dealt a heavy blow. Although not happy with the events in the story, she presented it as the truth by not asking any questions. Providing a free-flowing account of the events, she did not need much probing to give details. The themes from the interview with Thulisile are presented below.

6.3.4.1 Preconceptions, rumours and attitudes

People can easily develop preconceived ideas about others, and are fond of making rumours about them based on these ideas, thereby making it easy to develop

attitudes about them due to those unfounded conceptions, as Thulisile indicated in the following statement:

People would just have an attitude towards you without knowing you, especially women. Women can be evil. Competing with you can cause you to kill yourself. They talk and act. There were bad rumours about me fed into people. It was horrible for people to accuse me of things I did not do. I told myself that it is only God who knows what I did. Continued to live my life even if it was not enjoyable. They got the influence from my aunt. She thought it better to spread the bad rumours about me.

6.3.4.2 Being undermined

Because of people's preconceived ideas about other people, their attitudes towards others will be of an undermining nature. Thulisile said:

Even the job that I do causes one to be undermined. If people see you do work like domestic work, they think of themselves as being better than you. They take you for a stupid for doing a domestic like work.

They categorise themselves and others based on outward looks, thereby developing judgements of disregard for the other:

Because they regard you as doing a useless job compared to what they are doing, even if our pay is the same, just because they look more presentable than you. Maybe them working in the shade, me in the open sun, me working with garbage.

Being lowly regarded makes one feel disrespected. Preoccupying one's mind with it can take your focus off important life tasks: *"Sometimes you can stay with it the rest of your life. I can see that had I been taking these seriously, I was going to reach that decision because Witbank is not right."*

6.3.4.3 Materialistic competition

Thulisile considered that having the outward looks of being better helps one to gain a sense of respect and positive regard. This makes people to want to live an impressive life *"with the clothes they wear, food they eat, accessories, necklaces that are up to a standard of the rich though the person is poor. At the end impressing people on the street at the expense of those at home."* The need to be positively

regarded leads to spending *“what we cannot financially afford, to be seen to belong and not to be undermined because of our low status jobs.”*

6.3.4.4 Materialism as being better

Thulisile opined that a better life is defined as being materially well off. Most people want to associate with this assumed better life. They show off more than they have, and are driven by a mind to be rich because of the negative stereotypes about looking poor and being pitied:

The mind-set to want to be rich, to be rich in a short spell of time, in a miracle, even if they do not afford it at that time. At the end you have to borrow money from loan sharks.

No one wants to be associated with the stereotype of being black and poor: *“Wanting to be seen. Wanting to look to be affording even when not. Mostly people are stereotype. They want to be seen. Possible for a person staying in a shack wanting to behave like someone staying in town.”*

6.3.5 Mokgopo: “It is showing off and wanting fame”

Mokgopo, a 30-year-old black male petrol attendant, was interviewed on 18 April 2013 at his place of employment. Although I have, for the purpose of this research, classified him here as not being economically affluent, his definition of himself and his situation differed from my classification. He seemed to consider his situation as economically affluent.

Mokgopo talked about himself but only as aloof and immune to the events around due to his working status and economic affluence. Merely giving an account of events happening out there to others by others, he mostly did not see himself as implicated in the events mentioned, either as a victim or as victimising others. The themes extracted from the interview with Mokgopo are described below.

6.3.5.1 Competing definitions of blackness

Mokgopo described being black in an essentialist and quantifiable way (Mahalingam, 2007; Mallon, 2013; Morning, 2011; Wagner et al., 2010). For him, blackness is what it is not supposed to be, yet it is what and how it is. It is characterised by ways of

being that are deemed uncharacteristic of it. He alluded to an exclusionary blackness that he excluded in his definition of the preferred blackness:

We are competing as black people. We do not want others to achieve things before us. We always want to be the ones on top. It is not well. It makes you feel bad and think of bad things, and these are family people.

People will pull one down from progressing, are preferentially and conditionally respectful of others, and are inclined to bragging and being competitively displaying of their material possessions. He attributed this to wanting fame, showing off and being after status. Because “*we always want to be the one on top,*” black people compete among each other. Their materialistically driven lives search for success that is defined in terms of cars, clothes and houses.

From this, I sense the materially affluent black that engages with the not materially affluent black in a demeaning way, seeing it as unrepresentative of its race. The latter would endure being disregarded for being unrepresentative of the authentic blackness. However, as Mokgopo indicated, the materially bragging black people are viewed by the less materially affluent as being after fame. The latter view the former’s nature as uncharacteristic of the authentic blackness.

While challenging the materialistic definition of a successful living, he seemed to be secretly pursuing that ideal for the benefits it brings one, as seen in the statement that “*they treat me well now that I am working.*” His unstated blackness is but the opposite of the blackness that he sees.

6.3.5.2 *Not being respected*

Working and being in gainful employment is equated with having enough material belongings to be taken seriously. “*Even when you speak, they just let you on, not seriously considering what you say,*” said Mokgopo of those without work and with less materially. Respect is earned by having accumulated material possessions that one can show off.

6.3.5.3 *Changing graded positions*

According to Mokgopo, as one’s material standing changes, so does the type of treatment and attention one gets from others. Respect and social standing are

commensurate with material standing. Like being sifted through, one's social standing is a graded one: *"They treat me well now that I am working. They used to treat me so bad. They did not respect me."*

6.3.5.4 Name calling

Mokgopo indicated that being called degrading names, given differential treatment, and socially graded according to what one materially possesses and whether one is in gainful employment or not, happens in the family and on the street:

I know it from my own experience. They disregard you, but they are your family, friends, people on the street. They tell you without a blink of an eye that you are 'umahlalela' (loafer). I know of a friend. They do not respect or treat him well where he stays. They call him names and say that his peers are working while he is loitering around.

6.3.5.5 Bragging about material possessions

According to Mokgopo, one's status in society is determined by one's material possessions – the more one has, the higher the status. Status is actively sought by displaying what one has, to be taken seriously. It is generally acknowledged that the clothes one puts on, the house one lives in and the car one drives earn one status. People end up competing to accumulate more of these relative to what others have: *"Clothes, house, car. How they live life at home, comparing and assuming that they are better, live better and that those with less than them cannot tell them anything."*

6.3.5.6 Competitive jealousy

Mokgopo indicated that, while it seems that the more one has the better, it may also make one suffer the brunt of jealousy from those around you. Material possessions are competitively sought for and everybody seeks to be the one to get more and better first:

Here at work, this person got a driver's license. In life we are not similar. People have different aspirations and plans in life. If you beat them at what they hoped to achieve, they would not like it. We were the last ones to arrive here at work, which makes them unhappy. If you study or acquire a driver's license they would not like it that way. They would open you office cases.

6.3.5.7 *Definitions by others and by ourselves*

Mokgopo made a distinction of appraisal of people's situations by themselves and by others. How we are defined by others is often loaded in unfavourable, negative, inaccurate and less preferred appraisals. Examples are when people are called derogatory names and not respected. Just as he could not understand the attitude meted at him before finding work, so he was baffled at how his unemployed friend was being called names.

6.3.6 **Simangele: “Back on my feet again”**

A 44-year-old black female project director, Simangele was interviewed at her place of employment on 30 April 2013. I categorised her as being economically affluent.

Merely responding to questions asked, Simangele told a story of personal pride. With a few moments of mistreatment having befallen her, the incidents of segregation she talked about seemed to be mostly about others, as either done or endured. As if making a statement that economic affluence buffers against mistreatment or tendency to acting unfairly, she gave a personally detached story. The themes extracted from the interview with Simangele are discussed below.

6.3.6.1 *Social standing, material possessions and recognition*

Simangele described that people's social standing correlates with the state of their material possessions. When they gain material possessions, which she termed being “up”, they are also better regarded in society. Their social connections increase. When they lose material possessions, they become socially isolated as everyone who associated with them cuts them off:

When you have something or are something, people will treat you differently than a person who does not have anything. Everyone would want to be part of your life. If today I am in a higher position, I will definitely have more friends. If tomorrow I lose that position, I will lose the friends also.

6.3.6.2 *Materially conditioned social life*

In Simangele's view, people are judged and valued in terms of what they have. They are driven to acquire more, due to being socially pressured or wanting to use it as a

buffer against the unfavourable attention given when they have less. Materially defined success is pursuit in terms of what can be quantifiable: *“Other people define success by having lots of money, maybe having a degree, having a better job... Yes, better position”*.

6.3.6.3 *More is better*

For Simangele, having more than others is regarded as better. The more one has, the more people would be around one and the merrier:

People expect something out of a relationship or whatever. If you are not in a position to can give out... then.... I have a friend who lost everything. She lost a car. In that process she lost her friends also. Now she is up. She has got a tender. She is back on her feet and people are back again in her life.

Portrayed in this is a juxtaposition of a life that is materially driven and the ideal life that one wishes for. The materially lived life is contrary to her espoused virtues of a decent life. Although she realised that people congregate around each other based on material possessions, this did not form the core of her ideal human living. As if puzzled by it, although using the same material distinctions of being up and not being up, she said that:

I was once in a position of power. When I lost that position, people left. I became alone. Now again I got another higher position in this company. You will find that you have more people in your life. Those who disappeared came back. Even the ones who left would find their way back.

She separated herself from the very distinctions that she made. She did not realise that she found meaning in the very values she eschewed by the distinctions she made. One does not realise that, by wishing to wipe off the materially driven values as toxic to blackness, one denies what is meaningfully continuous with itself and driving it to be what it is. It is to exclude that which is not only in the self, but is the self. Making distinctions within disembowels the wholeness of blackness. By pronouncing her preferred characteristic black life as opposed to the practised, she set boundaries of what it is to be and is not to be.

She resorted to religious explanations to minimise the effect of material striving on her: *"I am a child of God. I accept. I do not have a problem with it. My friends who left in those days are still my friends."*

6.3.7 Magda: *"It is the odd people"*

Magda, a 50-year-old white female store manager, was interviewed at her place of work on 2 May 2013. I classified her as being economically affluent.

Magda recounted a distant story of life unfolding out there with little relevance to her. Seeing herself as a perfect, balanced and prejudice-free individual, she portrayed herself as being buffered from discriminating and being discriminated against, with a few exceptions. The themes extracted from the interview with Magda are described below.

6.3.7.1 *The odd people, materialism and snobbishness*

As if materialism and snobbishness are not allowed, Magda described these as uncharacteristic displays by people she categorised as not fitting into her definition of being decent. Although she found these people to be few and far between, and considered that they should not be taken seriously, she found that they remain a reality:

You get your odd people who actually do not have manners, respect and then I just ignore them. Odd people. You get people who do not know how to handle people, but then I handle them in the way I would like to be handled, in a decent way.

Odd people and their lack of decency are seen through the snobbish way that they conduct themselves. This is shown in her response to the question, "do you think the position that people hold in society makes a difference in terms of how others treat them?":

I would say there are, especially in Witbank. There is lots of them. People who just think they are better than other people, in terms of their living, in terms of their cars, in terms of their whole outlook. They just think they are better. No, they have got money. They can buy all those big cars, big houses, all the children.

She acknowledged that materialistic snobbishness causes people to neglect certain aspects of their lives: *"But once again, there is too much money in the family, there is actually no life because no support for the children."* She decried how people are so enamoured with the positions they hold and what they can materially show that nothing else counts, regarding which she said:

if people think they are snob or think they are better than you, good for them. Let them be. Money is not everything in life. Money is definitely not everything. Respect people around you. If you want to be better than your next door neighbour, good for you. Do it, just leave me alone.

6.3.7.2 Quick assumptions we make

Positioning herself as not implicated in doing this, Magda noted that people are given to easily making quick assumptions about others before actually spending more time to know them, with attitudes towards them being informed by these assumptions that are so easily arrived at. However, she indicated that these assumptions are changed when spending time with them: *"They change the whole attitude completely. They become more decent, talk to you in a decent way and decent manner. Ja...."*

She depicted a kind of whiteness that is manifested by odd white people, in their odd white characteristics, qualifying them as few and rarely occurring. She said that, *"I would say still the same. I cannot actually see any difference,"* as an answer to how she thought other white people were treating her, then and earlier. The rarity of the "odd people" and their behaviour came through again in her answer to the question, "have you seen any other people who have been treated favourably or unfavourably?", to which she mentioned one person and said, *"so this is basically the only experience I have."*

She indicated a kind of whiteness that, despite its discontinuity with her generally upheld ideals of authentic whiteness, is still white. It may lack the decency of treating others with respect, *"to greet you properly, to look you in the eyes when they talk to you,"* yet it is still whiteness.

6.3.7.3 Work experience, educational qualification and respect

Magda further indicated that work experience and educational qualifications make it easy to earn respect. They buffer one against the misgivings of disrespect and ill-treatment. The more work experience one has and the higher one's educational qualifications, the less likely one is to be negatively treated:

People of my age are treating me on the same level. People younger than me are treating me with respect. What I have achieved for now with my background, qualifications and everything, I am successful. I am a very loyal person. I was working for the new government from 1994 to 2000. I was a private secretary/personal assistant for the minister, director general.

One's background in life insulates one from ill-treatment. It is a window through which one comes to look at life or is exposed to it. It is an enabling and limiting window into the world, whose perspective is part of the many in the whole. It serves here to discount odd characteristics displayed by white people as un-white, as unfitting to the normative, prototypical and authentic whiteness that is known. Challenging the odd people's values of bragging and lack of respect, she cast them as insignificant, lacking the background and family influence she had. Regarding people lacking her behavioural repertoire, she said that those who *"do not like me, it is fine, they can maar just carry on. This is fine with me."*

This portrays the oddity within as non-existent or minimally of value, a character that plays little part in explaining whiteness. Their fewness and rarity of influence implies that snobbishness and materialism are un-white. She continued to other the self-other that she considered not self-enough. The despairing parts are pitted in contest, each laying majority claim to the normativity, prototypicality and authenticity of whiteness, although the scale appears to be stacked against the odd whose whiteness is questioned.

In dividing the indecent from the decent, the disrespectful from the respectful, one is not aware that the indecent is part of the decent, as is the latter part of the indecent, each rooted to its stereotyped corner prejudicing the other.

6.3.8 Ranko: “An advanced man”

Ranko, a 60-year-old black male professional nurse working for a state-owned enterprise institution, was interviewed at his home on 5 May 2013. He is classified here as being economically affluent.

Through an unemotional story of personal sadness recounted with pride about life and no questions asked, Ranko portrayed himself as not capable of discriminating others. His sense of personal pride and emotional detachment from the story, even when discriminated against, allowed him to be easily forthcoming with information. The themes extracted from the interview with Ranko are presented below.

6.3.8.1 Comparative categorised living

In Ranko’s view, people are seen as belonging to different categories whose unequal positioning are comparatively arranged. How they define themselves is dependent on their relative comparison with the other, each belonging to the same or different category. Definition of oneself derives from this comparative living as made by the self and others:

People of my race, people around me. I would say that out of my own experience, they regard me as a respectable man, man with integrity. They think I am advanced, sort of living a fully-fledged developed life. I see myself to be successful, though it came through the hard way, even if it is in a mediocre way.

Ranko’s social standing was not only judged or rated by others, comparing him with others, but also by him comparing himself with others. He showed this by saying that:

I think it is because they know from my childhood, where I grew up because I am born and bred here. Taking into consideration my childhood, my parents, how they struggled from a disadvantaged position to be where I am today.

This understanding is facilitated by comparative juxtaposition of the self against the other that serves as the background mirror. In this case, the other is those who have not achieved what the self has. The other is the many who:

are considered in a different way. Many that we reject because of their level of education, their status – they are not educated. Sort of putting a blame on them that they deliberately made it not to happen for them not to go to school.

6.3.8.2 Isolation and exclusion

Ranko indicated that those who are deemed as deliberately having not made it are blamed and treated in an inferior way. Made to feel inferior, they also isolate themselves and relate with you at a distance, to avoid further embarrassment:

They look at you, compare themselves with you, and say they were with you at school. They keep the distance to associate with you. In their distance, they imagine you thinking that you view yourself as better than them.

6.3.8.3 Social grading of categories within categories

According to Ranko, living arrangements are depicted in marked graded positioning: “Jaa... social grading is marked. I would say even among family members. Ehe... you are not in my class therefore I would not associate with you.”

Sub-categories are differentiated within delineated categories. As there are differentiations within families, so finer grading is done among those seen to be in the same class, making each other feel that their levels are dissimilar:

Even my colleagues who are on a higher strata like doctors, managers and so on. They regard you as being on a lower class. Though they associate with you, they feel somehow you are inferior. Though you were with them at school, they consider themselves as being above you.

6.3.8.4 Impermeable boundaries

Ranko indicated that there are markers of difference to be crossed at one's peril. He said the following about an acquaintance:

Even if he relates with you and encourages you to pay him a visit, he would still make you feel that your lower status should be kept clearly marked. He would want you to visit them while they keep the distance by not visiting you themselves.

He further said that it makes one feel bad, *“hence you end up not visiting them, dissociating yourself from those people and prefer to be with those of your own level. Those that are accepting you.”*

6.3.8.5 Materially marked boundaries

When asked what these classing boundaries are based on, Ranko responded: *“I say economics, economically. Like you cannot buy the same car they are buying. When they drive a Mercedes you shall be driving an Aveo.”* It is based on educational qualifications or lack thereof and what one has achieved or not achieved materially. As a social grading by the self and others, Ranko also rated himself as successful based on tangible comparison with others in his living environment. He acknowledged the contesting sides of blackness and did not explicitly oppose or support either, although subtly living to the ideals of success, being *“advanced and progressive.”* He did not seem to realise how his cherished values are in line with and perpetuation of the materialistic whose blackness he at times laid in doubt. He did this by not realising that materialism is not in contravention of the authentic blackness. It does not negate being black. It is at the core of blackness, which sees it as a peripheral characteristic. The excluding, categorising and materialistic blackness is part of the assumed authentic, normative and prototypical blackness that wants to exclude and categorise it as another.

6.4 A FURTHER EXPLICATION OF THE INTERVIEWS

This is a deliberate, critical and thorough interrogation of the interview data aimed at distilling a general structure, a thick psychological description (Eatough & Smith, 2008; Giorgi, 1994; Wertz, 1985) of the phenomenon of black on black and white on white prejudice. The results may often not tally with the co-researchers' descriptions (Polkinghorne, 1989; Von Eckartsberg, 1998a), whose stories may be psychologically opaque (Eatough & Smith, 2008), and may not even make mention of the phenomenon of same-race prejudice.

6.4.1 Prejudice unnamed

None of the co-researchers mentioned same-race prejudice, intolerance or categorisation. If they did, they called these by different names. No one explicitly

claimed that these occurred in their lives. I make inference here from the references they made using different names.

Being undermined and disrespected. This was repeatedly mentioned by both Mokgopo and Thulisile through feelings and experiences of being categorised and treated as a different other due to one's economic status. They called this a competitive materialistic mentality. Unlike these two, Magda's story was of her categorising people as different and other.

Being judged and avoided. Danie and Ranko mentioned the experience of being categorised as different and non-conforming, as well as the resultant intolerant treatment of avoidance to which people are subjected. They were being judged according to material possessions or lack thereof, for example, cars, clothes and houses. The avoidance results from and causes being undermined.

6.4.2 Respect is a double-edged sword

Exemplified in stories by Ranko, Simangele, Stephans and Mokgopo, respect and the resultant pride are not guaranteed virtues. It is given to and acquired by some and at some times, and denied and inaccessible to others and at other times, mostly dependent on changing material conditions. Those with less endure intolerable treatment and prejudice, for example few favourable social engagements.

6.4.3 A natural arrangement

Encouraged by a naturalist attitude, people are given to viewing something of the natural arrangement as being beyond their questioning and rearrangement. The categorisation of people as different and the resultant intolerance and prejudice are assigned to natural makeup, not to people's deliberate doing. This inspires acquiescence and rule-following. That discrimination is understandably a prevalent natural norm is attested in comments by Thulisile, Belinda, Ranko, Magda, Mokgopo and Stephans. For them, intolerant practices are a general occurrence and one can do better by just sitting idle and accept. It is likened to a prototypically predetermined arrangement. They made reference to it as an acceptable cultural norm.

6.4.4 They are doing it to me

The idea that “they are doing it to me” is a conception that all the co-researchers expressed generally without realising it. It manifests in non-self-reflective conduct. It hinders their ability to look at the confluence of material possessions and commodities, and how they treat themselves and others. It is indicative of an inability to notice one’s complicity in the interactions about which one complains.

It is *“the rich people, with more groceries and driving larney cars,”* according to Belinda. *“The odd people who do not know how to handle people,”* according to Magda.

None of the co-researchers reflected upon on how their views about themselves and others impact on their interactions, hindering how one looks at the self in relation to those they consider different. Ranko spoke of *“doctors, managers and those able to take their kids to better private schools,”* yet was unable to realise that he also viewed himself as *“as a respectable man, man with integrity, advanced, sort of living a fully-fledged developed life,”* different from his peers who he reckoned dropped out of school early.

Mokgopo talked about the others who are after status, cars, clothes and houses, yet did not realise or interrogate how his employment status and the acquisition of a new phone changed his outlook on life about himself and others. Simangele talked about a friend who *“lost everything, lost a car, lost friends,”* and *“now she is up, she has got a tender, she is back on her feet again and people are back again in her life.”*

This reluctance to be self-aware and reflect is implicated in the inability to notice the ploy of the hypothesised same-race prejudice. It leads to a prejudice that is made invisible. In something resonating with revenge, Ranko said that, *“you end up not visiting them, dissociating yourself from those people, and prefer to be with those of your own level, those that are accepting you.”* Danie said that, *“me too I also do not go to that guy because I will be treated the same way.”* Dismissively, Magda said that, *“people who do not like me it is fine, they can maar just carry on.”*

6.4.5 It does not matter

Although the interview question did not directly mention same-race prejudice, firstly to allow the interviews to be conversational and exploratory (Chung, 2010; Golsworthy & Coyle, 2001; Smith et al., 2009) and secondly to allow the co-researchers to freely tell their stories (Eatough & Smith, 2006b; McManus et al., 2010; Singleton & Furber, 2014), the co-researchers did not fully employ the interview's flexibility and open-ended nature (Eatough & Smith, 2008; Kim, 2012; McManus et al., 2010; Plexico & Burrus, 2012).

In their stories, same-race prejudice was not only indirectly referred to, unnamed, called other names, or not mentioned, but was mainly invisible and invisibilised. It was invisible in that it was not explicitly mentioned and noticed by an outside observer (the researcher). It was invisibilised because it was actively, albeit unconsciously and inadmittedly, rendered insignificant and invisible by the co-researchers. In the many retorts considering it a normal part of the natural arrangement of life, it is swept under the carpet, while other means are employed to avoid it. By not being actively attended to, spoken about and named, and by being ignored, it however becomes perpetuated.

The second interviews lasted less than the anticipated 30 minutes, generally being characterised by the dismissing comments, such as, *"I am neutral, no questions,"* by Stephans, and *"no questions nothing to add,"* by Magda. Belinda had *"nothing to add, ask or change,"* and Simangele was *"having nothing much to say,"* when asked for a comment. That same-race prejudice is not considered, was attested to by Danie when he said that, *"people don't think about it, don't make work about it."* Thulisile, whose first interview was long and winding, declined to take part in the second interview.

As was the case most of the time in the interviews, the co-researchers drifted away from the subject and had to be constantly probed and redirected to the interview focus (Chung, 2010; Eatough & Smith, 2006a; Plexico & Burrus, 2012). This was exemplified in the second interview by Mokgopo going on and talking about *"people in the community drinking alcohol these days,"* and by Stephans mentioning that *"the area went down badly businesswise. All the shops, the bottle store, in this area."*

In summary, I used the semi-structured conversational interviews presented in this chapter to unmask the taken-for-granted naturalist and essentialist notions of race discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 by giving primacy to subjectively lived experiences of its identity and identification. This served to echo the notion by Merleau-Ponty (in Simonsen, 2013) that sees humanity as not only a physical body imposed in a space and a time, but as actively and subjectively engaging and inhabiting its own space and time to make sense of these.

I pursued this purpose by presenting as factual information the themes, individual psychological structures and general psychological structure of same-race prejudice. I mined these understandings from the interviews using explication, and finely sifted and compartmentalised the facts of experienced same-race prejudice and then presented these as revealing a true and objectively testable reality of the co-researchers' interpretive understanding of same-race prejudice.

CHAPTER 7

REFLECTION OF REFLECTIONS

7.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW

The chapter is presented to address the questions asked here in a manner that is consistent with an interpretive phenomenological philosophy and not the naturalist attitude that objectifies existence, as discussed by several authors (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Gergel, 2012; Lavery, 2003; Tuohy et al., 2012).

This thesis developed from a hypothesis that there is same-race prejudice perpetuated through essentialist identity and identification profiling ideals that not only include, but also exclude those who are inauthentic, non-normative and non-prototypical within the races of black and white. The partisan markings of differentiation of identity and identification within the races often go unnoticed, unacknowledged, ignored, taken for granted and considered as normal. This thesis began with a wonder at the assumed prevailing robotic living of and within the essentialised races, the extent to which people are willing to acknowledge and reflect on the partisan and corrosive assumptions they hold about themselves and others within their respective demarcated races that polarise their existence and serve as boundary markers between them.

The following questions, emerging from the hypothesis of the existence of same-race prejudice, are stated and explored:

- What is being black?
- What does being and living black feel like?
- What is being white?
- What does being and living white feel like?
- Can a person be black and not be black?
- Can a person be white and not be white?
- Can a person be black and not be not black?
- Can a person be white and not be not white?

The task of the thesis therefore emerged as an exploration of these questions, from which Chapter 2 (literature definitions of the terms race, black, blackness, white and

whiteness) and some parts of Chapter 3 (informal interview definitions of the terms of black, blackness, white and whiteness) were developed. Although the layout of Chapter 2 and the relevant parts of Chapter 3 sought to answer the questions presented in the thesis, their lens of naturalist thought meant that an entanglement into the dichotomous stereotypes of authentic against inauthentic, pure against impure, normative against non-normative and prototypical against non-prototypical race identity and identification, leading to same-race prejudice, could not be evaded.

Predicated on naturalism and its naturalist attitude, these definitions (some parts of Chapter 3) and the theoretical answers (Chapter 2) provided are seen to consider race as real, as discussed by several authors (Davis, 2005; Jacobsen, 2007; Kockelmans, 1994; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983), while being imbued with a tone of same-race prejudice, perpetuating a tendency to objectify racial being and take it for granted as essentially, distinctively and objectively existing. These exhaustive and exclusionary definitions of a race indicate a blindness to how race is constituted in politically and socially composed definitions, perceptions, stereotypes and categorisation thinking (Arudou, 2013; Cappiccie et al., 2012; Freeman, 2011; Hawkesworth, 2010; Odartey-Wellington, 2011). These answers fail to acknowledge how race talk (Frakenberg, 1993; Lipsitz, 2006; McIntyre, 1997; Tochluk, 2010; Yancy, 2004), stereotypes and prejudice appear within the race, as shown in the work of Morris (2006).

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 were introduced as a challenge to the naturalist thought embedded in responses provide in Chapters 2 and 3, to address the need to explore race, racial identity and identification as subjectively lived human phenomena, as found in the work of several authors (Johnson, 1998; Lauver, 2010; Plexico & Burrus, 2012; Ray & Vanstone, 2009; Spichiger, 2009). As alternatives to naturalism and the naturalist attitude, phenomenological philosophy and critical race theory encourage the unlearning of naturalist and traditional habits of thinking about and knowing people, their existence and race (Kockelmans, 1994; Spiegelberg, 1965; Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983). Phenomenological philosophy and critical race theory encourage a sense of wonder about what we traditionally take as known and given, as they lament naturalism's objectivist attitude about and towards race (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Murray, 2012; Tuohy et al., 2012;

Zaner, 1970). In this study, this culminated in the adoption of a philosophy (phenomenology) and research method (interpretive phenomenological analysis), as described in Chapter 5, to address the need to consider race as a subjectively lived human phenomenon.

However, as indicated in Chapter 6, a phenomenological research whose philosophy sets out to merely uncover people's subjectively lived experience of race (same-race prejudice in this case) runs the risk of falling for a naturalist attitude whose endeavour is to reveal unchanging, real and objective descriptions of realities. This also portrays the researcher's perception of the co-researchers' perceptions as unquestionably real (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Earle, 2010; Lavery, 2003; Tuohy et al., 2012). By merely setting out to uncover lived experiences, the chapter raised an expectation of revealing essentially existing realities (Kockelmans, 1994; Mahalingam, 2007; Mallon, 2013; Morning, 2011; Wagner, 1983), running the gauntlet of portraying co-researchers' lived experiences and perceptions regarding race prejudice as unquestionable and objectified. There was also the risk of me objectifying my perception of the co-researchers' perceptions, and presenting it as unquestionable.

Without a carefully sustained self-interrogation, phenomenology, critical race theory and the former's embodied research style as presented in Chapter 5 may not resolve the tension the naturalist attitude is lamented to pose (Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Kockelmans, 1994; Simonsen, 2013; Tuohy et al., 2012), creating more of a challenge than they seek to resolve.

The present chapter stands out to illuminate and critique the attitude of taking for granted experiences and perceptions pertaining to race definition(s) and same-race prejudice by both the researcher and the co-researchers alike in Chapter 6. By debunking the naturalist attitude's essentialist and objectivist definitions of race, it seeks to address the sequential failure from Chapters 2 to 6. As a thoroughly self-reflective research endeavour, the present chapter highlights the task of interpretive phenomenological research, as discussed by several authors (Eatough & Smith, 2006a, 2006b, 2008; Flowers et al., 2003; Golsworthy & Coyle, 2001; Jacobsen, 2007). It necessitates a deviation from what would ordinarily be inquired upon at this point.

A naturalist attitude would force one to inquire whether the mission and goals built upon through Chapters 2 to 6 have been achieved. It would want to know whether the questions asked at the beginning of this chapter have been satisfactorily answered, and whether phenomenology, assisted in this case by critical race theory, has proven to be a better option than the naturalist attitude. It would fail to consider the multiple emerging and merging realities whose natures are constantly mapped in interrogation by those involved and not existing prior to human subjective experience, including that of the researcher (Reid et al., 2005). The discussion around the themes shown in the chapter, however, is meant to highlight how a tendency to objectify experiences and perceptions can easily establish and perpetuate same-race prejudice, even by those intending to challenge it.

The present chapter sets out to unravel the multiple, emerging and evolving nature of same-race prejudice, as interrogated by and from the interviews with the co-researchers, and not to consider the interviews as revealing its objective description, as argued in the work of several authors (Creswell, 1998; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Jacobsen, 2007; Laverly, 2003; Wertz & Van Zuuren, 1987).

7.2 THE NEED FOR A MATCH BETWEEN THE RESEARCHER'S AND CO-RESEARCHERS' INTERPRETATION

This section is dedicated to discussing the need for and importance of the researcher's interpretation and understanding matching those of the co-researchers, the challenge brought by the lack of such a match, and examples of how my interpretive understanding in these interviews seemed to have failed to match those of the co-researchers interviewed.

7.2.1 Interpreter, interpreted synergy

It would not have been necessary to discuss at such length the part that intuition plays in the understanding of personality were it not for the fact that the psychologist (of all people) tends to forget about it. The psychologist delights in the use of recording instruments... and scales of all kinds. Yet strange to say he discredits the most delicate of all recording instruments – himself. The human mind is the only agency ever devised for registering at once innumerable variables and for revealing the relation between them. It is the one and only instrument capable of comprehension. Failing to employ intuition the psychologist unduly limits

his resources. Without it he starts with analysis and ends with conceptualization; on the way he sacrifices his chance to understand living people (Gordon Allport, as quoted by Churchill, 2006, p. 105).

The above quotation brings to the fore the centrality of the human element in research. Even with highly developed research technology, the researcher remains a key element in the planning of the research, as well as the collection and interpretation of the research data (Creswell, 1998).

Even when phenomenological research is billed as the suitable method for understanding the insider perspective of a phenomenon and its experiential meaning as lived by the individual(s) (Chung, 2010; Golsworthy & Coyle, 2001; McManus et al., 2010; Plexico & Burrus, 2012; Singleton & Furber, 2014), it does not reduce the role of the researcher to the passivity of naively reflecting upon obviously existing facts (Wertz & Van Zuuren, 1987).

Interpretive phenomenological analysis is not a subjectively disengaged exercise process. It requires the constant participation of the researcher because the co-researchers' experienced lived world is never readily available. It can never be readily available in an objective sense without subjective interpretive tempering by the researcher (Jacobsen, 2007). It needs continuous digging and re-fashioning. There cannot be data analysis without interpretive meddling by the researcher to attempt to make sense of the inside experiential sense-making proffered by co-researchers. This is what Eatough and Smith (2006a, 2006b), Flowers et al. (2003), and Golsworthy and Coyle (2001) call a mediating window into co-researchers' meaning making world. It also fits in with Jacobsen's (2007) statement that the world does not externally exist without us. This is where the intricacy of the task makes it a challenge to execute.

If there is no comfort of a direct window into co-researchers' lived experiences, how does phenomenology, as a research method, stay truthful to its philosophy? How does it begin to answer the questions, allay the scepticism and satisfy the wonder about race and same-race prejudice? Although the questions' curiosity and need for clarity seem to be grounded in the naturalist attitude of seeking certainty in the objective world, they can still be responded to in the attitude of phenomenology. One needs to realise that interpretive phenomenological analysis is an endeavour to

make sense of making sense. It seeks to make the implicit explicit. It pits the insider's perspective of the co-researcher against the outsider's perspective of the researcher. It represents a culmination of a synergy of interpretation of interpretation. It is not just the naive acceptance of the insider's views or one interpretation. It is an enriched constellation of co-researchers' and researcher's meanings whose pinnacle is marked by a contestation and confluence of the two's interpretations.

Reid et al. (2005) and Eatough and Smith (2008) argue that the process of data analysis begins to be interpretive only when the co-researchers' psychologically opaque insider perspective starts to be tossed around. This is entailed in the task of the researcher attempting to comprehend their thinking, understanding and sense-making of the phenomenon (Smith et al., 2009). It is at the confluence of the insider and outsider perspectives (Reid et al., 2005). Beginning with the researcher's emphatic understanding and sense-making of the co-researchers' sense-making, it leads to a serious psychological meaning-making reading of what the researcher interprets the co-researcher as saying (Eatough & Smith, 2008). This challenge requires thinking about how to sustain this effort without the interpretation moving away from being inspired by the co-researchers' lived experiences (Smith et al., 2009), and how to keep closer to the phenomenological imperative of narrowing the gap between the fundamental structure and fundamental description of same-race prejudice (Von Eckartsberg, 1998a). However, it is more phenomenologically consistent to consider how consistent and faithful the method (interpretive phenomenological analysis) has been to the philosophy (phenomenology), and not how truthful the answers provided in the method have come to be, to unravelling the phenomenon of same-race prejudice.

The appearance of this challenge encourages the researcher to be wary of the naturalist attitude's taking for granted and to be constantly self-reflective while not assuming that research results become merely revealed to one.

7.2.2 The challenge extended

If the names we give to situations are made up of words as shorthand descriptions that fail to capture the true sense of the situation itself, and our own experience of being in circumstances (Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Johnson, 1998; Ray & Vanstone,

2009; Spichiger, 2009), how do we entrust them with matching our experiences or those of others? If there is a doubt of a fit between our reality as experienced and as expressed in words, what then of representing someone's experienced reality in words that are not his/hers? As Ray and Vanstone (2009) imply, our perceived reality and the words we use may put us in equidistance from others' experiences. Taken as they are, our cleverly worded theoretical explanations and definitions shall leave their stereotypes unexplored.

When I planned to do the research, I assumed to know beforehand how people are categorised. I classified people according to economic status as assumed from the observed nature of the work they do. Mokgopo, a petrol attendant whom I initially classified as being not economically affluent and therefore assumed to admire a higher economic and social classification, proved me wrong. He related with pride how his standing in his family, among friends and in the general community, was elevated, and how his job made him financially able to afford the things that turned his life into one to be envied. This differed from the assumption I had, which was that to be a petrol attendant is to have a lowly and an unfulfilling economic life.

Belinda, a car-guard whom I classified on the same level as the petrol attendant, noted the negative treatment she received due to evaluations made based on the nature of her work, but generally described her life as fulfilling beyond limited work difficulties.

Ranko, a nursing services manager at a state-owned enterprise institution, recounted experiences of shifting moments of pride and doubt as his status depends on whom he relates with at a particular time, although I initially classified him as being of high economic and social status. The same sentiment was expressed by Simangele, a project manager, and Magda, a store manager, both of whom I had assumed to be enjoying a stable economic and social status. In both, one can sense a fluid sense of being different from the static categorisation description to which I allocated them.

Not everybody that works at a butchery envies life outside of his/her work industry. The butchery manager I interviewed, Stephans, proudly equated his life with that of other educationally qualified employed professionals. This proved that life as

experienced is far deeper than the words we use to describe it. The expert outside opinion is far removed from the intricacies of the lived life, as deduced from work by Spichiger (2009).

My framework of understanding could not keep up with the lived world of the petrol attendant, the nursing service manager and the butchery manager, as deduced from work by Eatough and Smith (2006a). In assuming to know beforehand, I took a lot for granted. I assumed that a person's nature of work defines how he/she views him-/herself as rated by others. I assumed that the first interview would take one hour while the second one would take half an hour. I relied on stereotyped descriptions to understand and define people and their situations, a prejudicing understanding. I did all this having taken steps to fully acquaint myself with the phenomenological philosophy and a personal oath to adhere to the philosophical attitude of the research.

What the process has left me with is that thinking phenomenologically and conducting phenomenological research are different things. I had to confront my own preconceptions as I engaged with those of the co-researchers, asking myself how to refrain from making self-serving reflections and not critiquing viewing things as I do, thereby succumbing to a naturalist attitude of objective distance from others' experienced world.

Beholden to a phenomenological research method, tasked with bridging the gap between what is culturally, religiously and theoretically known, and the individually lived race experiences, I needed to keep my subjectivity in check and bracketed while employing it interpretively, keeping my mythical understanding at bay, while interrogating it and those of the co-researchers, as urged by several authors (Eatough & Smith, 2008; Giorgi, 1994; Polkinghorne, 1989; Von Eckartsberg, 1998a; Wertz, 1985). This results in the risk that the researcher may be at fault for assuming to be able to and want to leave his/her opinion unchecked, the myth of assuming that the researcher occupies a personally uninvolved and objective position in research while his/her role is only about inquiring about others' (co-researchers') opinions.

Remaining faithful to a philosophy of exploring deeper personal points of view of those researched upon and their privileged descriptive inside account of the

phenomenon (Dusi et al., 2011; Johnson, 1998; Lauver, 2010; Plexico & Burrus, 2012; Ray & Vanstone, 2009), one needs to constantly balance that with a caution against falling victim to expressing one's interpretations as perfect at the exclusion of other understandings, continuing to categorise, other and label oneself and others differently, in the process perpetuating stereotypes and prejudice.

Informed by a spirit of wonder, doubt and scepticism, and not seeking universal objective truths, interpreted themes as assisted by verbatim reflections from the interviews are presented in the following discussion to indicate what is considered the given reality and taken for granted.

7.3 KEY FINDINGS ABOUT SAME-RACE PREJUDICE

Debunking the notion that people are passive victims, same-race prejudice is reciprocally enacted and sustained by people as victimising victims of stereotypes, labelling, categorisation, intolerance and prejudice. This is done through the use of self-righteous cultural beliefs that lay an authoritative power to authenticity, normativity, prototypicality and acceptability of defining a race. People's ability to competitively define, classify, categorise, label and other themselves and others renders others as false, illegitimate and unreal.

Same-race prejudice is not merely a natural occurrence. It is actively enacted through the use of compensatory strategies to deal with and perpetuate stigmatisation and stereotypes for classification of the self and the other (for example, stereotypes and stigma about work and nature of work), the use of space and distance to justify differentness, to minimise belonging anxiety and to seek approval, thereby causing more differentiation of people. Marked by essentialist descriptions, the inability and unwillingness to reflect on one's actions and acknowledge one's acts of prejudice within a race lead to a tendency to uncritically submit to self-righteous and fundamentalist beliefs, and conventionally defined ways of being, while being aggressively punitive to violators of defined norms.

7.3.1 Competing cultural explanations – doing and undoing culture

“We can’t think like Africans, in Africa, generally. We are in Johannesburg, this is Johannesburg. It’s not some national road in Malawi.” (South African president Jacob Zuma, quoted by Ndenze & Seale, 2013, p. 6)

The comment above attracted a barrage of criticism, with the comment being dubbed as stereotypical, while Jacob Zuma himself was called “un-African” and an “Afro-pessimist” (Ndenze & Seale, 2013; Zhangazha, 2013). While his casting of Johannesburg and Malawi as dissimilar in his attempt to define his position might have been problematic, the reflection on his reflection was equally problematic. Jacob Zuma’s scornful reflection attracted literary, cultural, political and academic reflections whose scorn did, as much as undid, the initial race or cultural reflection he proffered, just as he is called “un-African” or “Afro-pessimist”. As he used a binary description with polar distinctions to define a situation of being, so those who went on to critique his distinctions did the same.

We know so much about race from what the theories inform us. We know how race is done or undone, yet at the same time, little is said about how it is done and undone. While the characterisation of existence helps to set the boundaries of what it is against what it is not, its undoing is less noticed. Stephans depicted highly cherished values of hard work, aspiring to trade and educational qualifications, being financially independent and working as attributes that lead to success and earn one respect, yet the undoing of a white race was not clearly made visible in his rhetoric. This is reflected in his depiction of values that oppose the ones he mentioned as uncharacteristic of whiteness, shutting them out of what represents being white. Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) mention that definitions of being and identity are never singular. They are portrayed in reciprocal processes of competing evaluation, devaluation and projection of attributes by groups and individuals who lay claim to authoritative power of authenticity, normativity and prototypicality of being.

Weaver (2011, p. 2724) quotes Dworkin as saying that Hispanic people prefer their own cultural kinds for marriage and neighbourly living because Anglo-American people are, among others “prejudiced... snobbish... having little family loyalty... hypocritical... tense, anxious, and neurotic... conformists... and puritanical.”

Strengthening this argument, while noticing the self-concept variations among black Americans across age, sex, socioeconomic status and geographic region, Howard (1985) highlights that an essentialist black self-image exists peculiar to its race. This is in contrast to “the poor, the sick, the weak and the ‘unfit’” black of Thomas Malthus that needs to be wiped off from the face of the earth (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994, p. 4). Such depictions of Hispanic and black people are both counting and discounting ways of being, both outside and, less noticeably, within the race. The less noticeable practice of this within the race is usually perceived as an assertion and affirmation of the race.

Chung (2010) spoke to foreign women married to Korean men to explore their experiences of motherhood. Chung (2010) found a clash between the women’s motherhood and childrearing expectations, and the Korean cultural environment they had moved into. Here, culture serves as an impenetrable insulating layer between the self and others. To penetrate such layers is to diffuse one’s sense of being, as in the social distance maintained between the Hispanic and Anglo-American people (Weaver, 2011). It is the Hispanic people who decide on the level of distance and proximity between them and others, and who name what is for or against a Hispanic family lifestyle. There might be definitions from outside, but these are balanced by those within. The comments by Jacob Zuma and by Stephans make distinctions of being within their different race beings, and not from outside.

Various attempts to maintain a race’s pure authenticity are seen in resistance within the black community to black children being adopted by white families, calling such efforts “cultural genocide”, while white families wishing to adopt a black child are faced with white disapproval both within and outside their families (Shiao et al., 2004), as they are seen to court trouble by not adopting “baggage free, desirably different, and savable” Asian children (Shiao et al., 2004, p. 9). The disapproval by white people of other white people adopting black children is a measure of insisting on an uncontaminated, pure, authentic, normative and prototypical whiteness, as is the black disapproval that terms it cultural genocide. Black people do not want an admixture with white people, just as white people are antipathetic to it. Black people and white people are respectively doing and undoing their own race. The level of entry and exit is equally monitored outside and within the races.

Jacob Zuma tried to define what qualifies as African and what does not. His definition was subjected to further definition of either qualifying as African or not. In both cases, the parties insisted upon their definition to such a degree that they seemed to think that their definition is naturally existing. One can easily dissociate and deny the very act that is one's own doing. The tendency to consider the self as the paragon of identity and definition, the sole arbiter of the standard criteria of existence, prototypicality, representationality, authenticity and normativity, contributes to intolerance towards alternative ways of being that fall outside of and do not conform to this definition (Falbo & Belk, 1985; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

Danie's comments of being appalled by how white people of his kind may easily be left dying on the side of the road by other white people seems to suggest that this behaviour of other white people is un-white, just as his perception is that the other white people will leave him dying because he is un-white. Definition of who is white or not white is done within whiteness by whiteness. Those who are considered to fall outside of the standard criteria suffer not only suspicion but also denigration and rejection, as mentioned by Danie. Their assumed non-conformity to normative, authentic, prototypical whiteness subjects them to hostility, rejection, disapproval, stigmatisation, devaluation, and social censuring (Hornsey et al., 2003; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). Just as the self-righteousness (Falbo & Belk, 1985) of others towards him rendered him un-white, he too entertained self-righteous tendencies that caused him to label the other as not befitting of whiteness, to indicate the reciprocal and competitive projection of attributes of definition and identity, as shown in the work of Mummendey and Wenzel (1999).

A sense of competing definitions of being culturally black appropriate can be gleaned from Thulisile's understanding and interpretation and those of her colleagues. Sympathising with her view that her colleagues' behaviour is culturally inappropriate not only labels them, but also categorises and others them (Moncrieffe, 2007a, 2007b). It leads to a rushed, simplified interpretation of a complex situation (Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Eagly & Diekmann, 2005).

Both Danie and Thulisile identified and differentiated people as belonging to distinct kinds as determined by discernible racial characteristics (Aspinall & Song, 2013; Mallon, 2013). A differentiation was made between the kind that leaves the

unfamiliar white person on the side of the road dying against the kind that is appalled by an unkind and aloof white person, and the culturally appropriate black person that self-righteously considers the culturally inappropriate black person with caution. The competition for authenticity, normativity and prototypicality renders the other false, illegitimate and unreal (Hornsey et al., 2003; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

7.3.2 Competing religious definitions – doing and undoing religion

Gervais et al. (2011, p. 1189) note that Americans are intolerant of atheists, who are seen as spiritually different and considered as a “group that they would most disapprove of their children marrying.” Differently defined and categorised, certain characteristics are ascribed to them as a group (Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Brown, 1995; Fiske, 2005; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Sampson, 1999). It is not as though atheists do not have values or spirituality. Rather, their values and spirituality, which are seen as contrary to and posing a threat to the American dream, make them less preferred and not trusted. They are viewed differently and are excluded due to their assumed non-prototypicality of and non-conformity to (Hornsey et al., 2003; Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008) the main American values.

While Woodford et al. (2013, p. 106) quote Gordon Allport as saying that “the role of religion is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice,” I see it as a wrongly worded statement. Religion and spirituality do not stand on their own. They need believing in and enactment by individuals to exist. They are what individuals and groups do and undo. This is the case with my maternal grandparents’ family, in which I grew up, who converted to Christianity long before I was born, preparing us to shun and look down upon all that was regarded as a black religious practice. The choice that the family and I made dictated the action we took towards ourselves and those we deemed religiously different. It was as if the choice we opted for was the only religious choice, and every other choice was judged relative to their prototypicality and conformity to the main (Hornsey et al., 2003; Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008).

Religion is another form of self and other classification (Fiske, 2005), a choice that we make to belong or not to belong, yet one that is taken as given. It is done by

drawing a boundary between us and them, yet it is seen as fixed, not interrogated and taken for granted. It is a self and other marker (Akhtar, 2007; Brown, 1995; Eyben, 2007). We do not see it as a choice for us, yet we expect others to choose our choice. We chastise their religious choice, hoping that they can join ours, yet we see ours as a given.

If a black person does not believe in or practise ancestral worshipping, and does not subscribe to the assumed norms and values of African philosophy and spiritual cosmology, does that make him/her more or less of an authentic black person? Does a white person of western ancestry who does not subscribe to any religious following other than the one of African spiritual cosmology, lose or gain official affinity to a definition of authentic whiteness?

For Gervais et al. (2011), being an atheist is viewed as contrary to American values of religiosity. Cunningham and Melton (2013) observe how, in Texas, being sexually involved with someone of one's own sex runs contrary to what is religiously defined as the norm for a sexual relationship, as also indicated in Patekile Holomisa's mention of black South African homosexuals whom he regarded as practising a sexuality that is against their African culture (Baron, 2012). Woodford et al. (2013) also found discriminative attitudes towards same-sex relationship practices.

African spirituality, African cosmology and African philosophy are preferred for their broader embracing attitude of an ecological African life, over the limited and fragmentalist European and Western view of religious following (Hountondji, 1997; Musopole, 1994; Nobles, 1980). So defined, to live an African life is to be subservient to a philosophy of togetherness with others in cosmology with one's surrounding, rather than being absorbed in individualist existence. This is a bigger philosophy within which African religion is engendered. Being left to her threadbare, lonely existence after losing her job made Simangele mournfully wonder at how relationships have changed to last only to the point where one cannot offer anything materially. Encouraging her wonder is perhaps the dissonance to the stereotypes of knowing how to be black (Eyben, 2007; Hooks, 2009). To hint that such a behaviour is a deviation from an African philosophy of togetherness is to label it (Fiske, 2005; Moncrieffe, 2007a). This offers a beautifully well-knitted persuasive thinking, however rendered as a fixed and given reality as the Western/European Christian

thought it is meant to oppose and improve on. Both are just philosophical ways of explaining how and who we should be or not be.

The challenge carried in both is a lack of self-reflective consciousness, each perched to its corner of reality. Restricted to their separate wisdom corners of self-righteousness (Falbo & Belk, 1985), each is likely to be intolerant towards and tear off some parts of it that are seen as atypical to it, those that do not conform to its upheld distinctive normative character (Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).

7.3.3 Self-classification

Cultural and religious distinctions are a form of self-classification. They are a way of differentiating the self from the other, for instance in terms of sexuality (Cunningham & Melton, 2012; Southall et al., 2011), religiosity (Anderson, 1995; Musopole, 1994; Sahl & Batson, 2011), family values (Espiritu, 2004), attitude towards education (O'Connor et al., 2007), general life philosophy (Hountondji, 1997; Jones, 1980; Nobles, 1980; Senghor, 1997), and other cultural specifics (Baker, 2010; Williams, 2006). Seen as not the self, as mostly what the self does not want to be like or associated with (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), the other is used as a referral point of distinction. The self only relates to it in distinction of disparity, for example black against white (Brooks & Rada, 2002; James, 2001; Yancy, 2004). Culture and religion become distinctions of differentness and justifications of uniqueness of the self.

Self-classification further serves to exclude the other, insisting that one is different. Changing one's hairstyle may not only be a way of looking different and good, but also as a way of looking better than the other, as mentioned by Thulisile. It is not only a way of looking closer to the admired, prototypical and normative, but a way of looking distinctively different and further dissociated from the non-prototypical and non-normative other. Being driven by a need for social domination and to leave an impression on others (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), people are given to considering those around them as competitors. Relationships are determined by competitively acquiring more material possessions as a yardstick of how advanced the person is (Duriez, 2011; Van Hiel et al., 2010). Both Mokgopo and Thulisile recounted a

number of instances where colleagues and friends heeded the drive for acquiring cars, houses, clothes and other accessories as a measure of success and having progressed in life as compared to others who have less or none of those. Higher educational qualifications (Stephans) and employment (Mokgopo), though valued, are pursued to differentiate oneself from those less motivated. The benefit of both is respect in the community.

However, this competitiveness results in less social cohesion, respect and empathy between people, contributing to intolerance (Guindon et al., 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011). It leads to the spreading of stereotypes among people, causing people to feel excluded and rejected (Higgs & Evans, 2008; Matsinhe, 2011). Danie felt undermined for looking dirty whenever he went shopping, while for Thulisile, doing domestic-type work made people look down on her. They both had to endure the challenges of conformity to definitions of an authentic and normative job within their respective races (Hornsey et al., 2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008).

Forman et al. (2002) depict a Latin Americanisation thesis in which the United States moves from a two-tier, white and non-white, dichotomy, to a three-tier system of white, honorary white and collective black racial subgroups. In it, they see a shift in people's racial classification away from being evaluated in terms of how white they are, to how black they do not want to be and thereby how white they want to be. This indicates a movement in racial preference more attuned to wanting to be white by choice and by self-presumed association to whiteness, while rejecting the black race classification.

Obsession with visible bodily appearance and being driven by a desire to reap race discrimination benefits can be seen as resulting in disloyalty to the legally defined "one-drop rule" of black and white distinctions that force mixed race offspring to take on the racial classification of the parent of the lower race status (Rockquemore, 1998). Initially required by law to be classified as black, individuals from such mixed-race unions defy existing distinctions to define themselves, highlighting not only their hybrid nature, but more so the legally suppressed white kinship (Rockquemore, 1998).

While this appears to be a self-affirming identity against the other, it is a boundary-marking distinction within the self as it wishes to be seen against the self as socially differentiated. It signals contesting definitions within the self, claiming and denying authenticity and how multiple competing definitions and positions of purity and impurity face off. Now that he is working, Mokgopo shall no longer be called “umahlalela”. He mentioned an awareness of the stigmatising treatment people endure for not being employed and being different. These range from being judged (Guindon et al., 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011), not being respected (Mokgopo) and being avoided (Danie).

Shapiro and Neuberg (2008) mention that people are constantly aware of a potential for devaluation and negative treatment. With these ranging from social censure, punishment, rejection, and being considered as inferior and false, to causing social conflict and uncertainty of belonging (Hornsey et al., 2003; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), people are motivated to use compensatory strategies of seeking approval and minimising their belonging anxiety (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008).

The negative impact of stigmatisation on people and its implication on their lives, for example during apartheid South Africa (Higgs & Evans, 2008; Pucherova, 2011), for America’s Sikh men (Ahluwalia, 2013), for South Africa’s foreign nationals (Matsinhe, 2011), with regard to mental illness (Pescosolido et al., 2013), for obese people (Hansson et al., 2009), due to sexuality (Cunningham & Melton, 2012), and with regard to economic affluence (Moss, 2003), was felt by Belinda who was regularly told to go look for another job, colleagues who kept a distance between themselves and Ranko, and friends shunning Simangele when she lost her job.

Neal and Wilson (1989) indicate how the American political and social movements of black pride in the 1950s and 1960s drew their strength as a revolt against the increasing tendency even among black people to associate self-worth, intelligence, success, beauty and attractiveness with having a light skin and being white. As their aim, they sought to conscientise black people against aligning self-definition and pride with whiteness, to a blackness whose standards are itself.

In their obsession with physical looks and as dictated by prevailing political conditions, black people have been historically known to change their looks. With appearance used as a marker of identity for people to be socially identified as similarly or differently racialised, many have been known to manipulate it to facilitate or avert entry into racial groupings and access to life amenities, and for redrawing or expanding the boundaries of their race definition (Neal & Wilson, 1989), as compensatory strategies to avert belonging uncertainty and anxiety (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). While the target individual or group is seen to pose a threat to the other groups or individuals in the form of, for instance, trust/distrust, disease/health, safety/fear, thereby serving as the building ground for the latter to hold prejudice against the target (Gervais et al., 2011), prejudice targets manage to find ways to lessen the extent of prejudice against them. Those who do, develop strategies to manipulate the threat effect they are seen to pose. They may develop other ways to be seen in a less threatening way (Neel, Neufeld & Neuberg, 2013; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), for example obese people taking part in weight reduction exercises to dispel stereotypes others have about them.

Motivated by the stigmatising experiences of devaluation, being judged, being disrespected and being disapproved of, individuals put high valence on the acquisition of requisite normative and race authentic and prototypical educational qualifications and work experience to bolster their chances of positive valuation and approval in the community, as done by Ranko, Belinda, Magda, Simangele, Mokgopo and Stephans. This leads to stereotypes and stigma, feeding back into the prejudice loop. Those defined redefine themselves in other, less unfavourable ways, for example by resisting the previous labels or asserting themselves differently (Hountondji, 1997; Neal & Wilson, 1989; Rockquemore, 1998), e.g. the application of skin whitening creams by black people (Neal & Wilson, 1989). They learn how to cope with and adjust to prejudice, while defining and redefining themselves as different. While they related instances of being treated differently, Ranko, Stephans, Mokgopo, Magda and Simangele managed their lives in terms of the same principles of prototypicality against non-prototypicality, normativity against non-normativity, authenticity against inauthenticity, and intolerance of diversity (Guindon et al., 2003; Matsuura, 2003; Moore & Walker, 2011). They used materialism and education as a yardstick for success and positive regard.

It is generally assumed that the source of prejudice, stereotypes and stigma about an individual or a group, is external to it. Prejudice, stereotypes and stigma are rarely imagined to come from within the individual or group itself. However, Cox et al. (2012) and Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) show that it is possible to be the source of stereotypes about the self. Self-hate and its resultant depression emerge due to the societal stereotypes an individual believes in and practises. People may be prejudiced against their own race because they hold stereotypes similar to those others have about them, not because any explicit pressure was applied to them to do so. In this way, they become both the source and perpetrator of a prejudice circle that feeds back into itself. Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) talk of the black sheep effect, which is a manifestation of stringent devaluation tendencies towards in-group members whose differentness and non-conformity with group norms and values are considered a deviation worthy of discrimination.

People may react emotionally sad and be motivated to improve their financial lot after being called names and disrespected for not working, because they too cherish stereotypes about not working (as illustrated by Mokgopo in Chapter 6). One wonders as to the stereotypes that both Stephans and Mokgopo held about work and the stigmatising attitudes they had towards the less educationally qualified and the loafers, causing them to be inspired not to fall into such categories.

Avoidance of those who exclude them, as used by Danie and Thulisile, may serve to buffer them against ill-treatment, yet behind it, they may themselves be motivated by their cherished stereotypes about looks and nature of work within their races. They may subscribe to the values of impression formation and extrinsic goal orientation that serve to reduce individuals as commodities of competition (Duriez, 2011; Kessler et al., 2010; Kosic et al., 2012; Nonchev et al., 2012; Van Hiel et al., 2010).

7.3.4 Other prejudice themes emerging from the interviews

“They do not invite us to their homes. You meet them. I have met lots of them. But they never invite us to their homes. So, they are not friendly – that’s what I find” (reflection by a migrant returning to Trinidad, on the race sensitivity of the society and the denouncement of racial harmony as a mythical ideal, as quoted by Potter et al., 2010, p. 810).

Stereotypes, which are sets of believed or perceived characteristics attributed to an individual or a group, are a predictor of our attitudes, emotions and generalised understanding towards ourselves and others (Aspinall & Song, 2013; Eyben, 2007; Hooks, 2009; Mallon, 2013; Sampson, 1999). As in the above quotation (Potter et al., 2010), they lead to a generalised evaluation (they are not friendly) of a group or individuals (Trinidadians) based on perceived attributes (they do not invite us to their homes). An association between a group or individuals and a particular attribute, as in a stereotype, is the bedrock of prejudice. A prejudice is formed when individuals or groups are over-included into having an identified attribute, or over-excluded from having that attribute (Kosic et al., 2012). The inconsistent perceived relation between the attribute and the group or individuals makes prejudice a “misperception or miscategorisation” (Kosic et al., 2012). An antipathy of generalised dislike towards those categorised as other (Cramer et al., 2013; Gervais et al., 2011; Kessler et al., 2010), prejudice may result in the negative targeting of the labelled.

Magda differentiated between odd and decent people, the former who behave in a snobbish way and are without respect, opposed to the preferred latter who “*greet you properly, look you in the eyes when they talk to you.*” Expressing frustration with conformity to standard measures of being that do not capture his subjective experiences (Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014), Danie expressed feelings of being negatively labelled and targeted for ill-treatment when he went shopping, and the fearful prospect of being left to die on the side of the road. From being labelled and categorised as different (Fiske, 2005; Moncrieffe, 2007a, 2007b), his differentness is likely to lead to intolerance displayed in dislike and hate (Ahluwalia, 2013; Cox et al., 2012; Gervais et al., 2011; Higgs & Evans, 2008; Matsinhe, 2011). For some (Ranko), the intolerance of their differentness is enacted through avoidance (Cunningham & Melton, 2012; Hansson et al., 2009; Pescosolido et al., 2013). These are experiences that the normative and prototypical standards of the race do not acknowledge, but categorise as unreal, inferior, inauthentic, aversive and non-conforming, while subjecting them to social punishment (Hornsey et al., 2003; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008).

I introduce the subsections below with some questions: if varieties of language within a language are called dialects and are recognised as valid regional expressions of

the practised official language (Wolfram, 2013), what do we call varieties of race within a race? Are they recognised and allowed to be? How do the views, values and beliefs we hold about ourselves and our race become stereotypes that lead to how prejudice is practised within a race?

7.3.4.1 *Work and nature of work*

To be employed is a highly cherished achievement. Even when I initially assumed that occupying a petrol attendant work position would be regarded as being of a lowly economic status, I was proven wrong. Mokgopo indicated how his sense of self improved upon finding a job as compared to when he did not have one, being called derogatory names like “umahlalela”, as his unemployed friend was called: *“They do not treat him well. They do not respect him where he stays. They call him names. They say his peers are working, he is not, is just loitering around.”* Stephans emphasised the importance of work when he described how, in the white community, not working or not showing signs of looking for a job is frowned upon. Both Stephans and Mokgopo indicated how one earns a sense of inner pride, confidence and respect from others by working.

However, merely working is not enough. The nature of work that one does is regarded as important, as shown in the following statement by Thulisile:

Even the job that I do causes one to be undermined. If people see you do work like domestic, they think of themselves being better than you. They take you as stupid for doing a domestic like work. Maybe them working in the shade, me in the open sun with garbage. If it is a white person, they ignore it as compared to being made an issue when you are black, as if it is normal for a white person.

Belinda noted the same, saying that *“maybe white people look down at car guards because they say go get a better job, you are not supposed to be here. All car guards are treated like that.”*

Ranko, a professional nurse at a state-owned enterprise institution, expressed views about his career progress shared by those around him. He described himself *“as a respectable man, man with integrity, as advanced and living a fully-fledged developed life,”* compared to those he grew up with, who were *“rejected because of*

their level of education, their status – they are not educated,” who were blamed for deliberately not going to school like him.

Attitudes we adopt towards ourselves and others are positively related to what we consider to be the normative standards of being, the prototype. A deviation from the supposed norm is frowned upon, while what is considered to be in line with the norm is encouraged and seen as a positive attribute (Cunningham & Melton, 2013; Gervais et al., 2011; Hornsey et al., 2003; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008; Woodford et al., 2013).

As with the status of Ranko's early school peers, Belinda's and Thulisile's jobs were considered not decent enough for their races, and as not authentic or race prototypical enough to earn them the recognition with which Ranko's job was viewed in the surroundings that they live. Being "umahlalela" earned Mokgopo disrespect as opposed to when he was suddenly employed and therefore fitted into the desired societal norm.

In relation to stereotypes, standards and criteria of being are cherished, practised and upheld within each living situation as aiding with the handling of inordinate amount of information in one's social life (Bowman-Kruhm & Wirths, 1998; Eyben, 2007; Fiske, 2005; Moncrieffe, 2007a, 2007b). Mokgopo spoke with pride about his newly found status of being employed, whereas he reflected upon his treatment before finding employment with sadness. Ranko also acknowledged the double-edged sword of discriminating and blaming his peers who were not on his own level, yet expressing with delight what the achievements landed him, when he said that:

It makes me feel two ways. At times I feel good, at times bad because if I do something bad they will rejoice over it. A high classification I personally never put myself in. But on the other hand, positive, it makes me feel proud for the respect I get from people. It comes in two ways.

Being torn in this way leads to a displaced sense of identity, as described by Pucherova's (2011) depiction of Bessie Head's predicament of not being white enough, black enough or male enough, Wagner et al.'s (2010) thesis of hybrid people's feeling of being devalued, dehumanised, rejected and judged for having a blended identity defying essentialism's categorisation, and Dubois's depiction of

black people's oppression that results in their split- and double-consciousness of unease and anxiety (Anderson, 1995; Biko, 1978; Mahon, 2004; Sampson, 1999).

7.3.4.2 *Prejudice and what it does to the target*

Out of the eight co-researchers interviewed, Stephans seemed to be the only one who saw the positive influence of being categorised as different:

Like I say it was hard in the beginning. That is exactly the reason why I am here today. When somebody is hard on you, it is for your own benefit. I reckon it is a good thing. Pushes you hard like to make something of yourself, a driving force.

The rest of the co-researchers viewed it negatively. We categorise individuals and groups based on the stereotypes we have about them. Stereotypes lead to stigma, the negatively tainting and discrediting attribute assigned to the target individual or group, labelling them as deviant, flawed or limited, and different from the self (Cox et al., 2012; Neel et al., 2013). Because of its negative impact on those prejudiced against, target individuals and groups actively seek ways to ameliorate this in their lives (Neel et al., 2013; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). While Magda (co-researcher) seemed to prefer to pay no attention to it, others seek different ways of coping.

Using avoidance as prejudice management strategy, Ranko said that, *“even if he relates with you and encourages you to pay a visit, he would still make you feel that your low status should be kept clearly marked. He would want you to visit them while they keep the distance by not visiting you themselves.”* Feeling bad, he said, *“you end up not visiting them, dissociating yourself from those people and prefer to be with those of your own level, those who are accepting of you.”*

For Thulisile, it was, *“I tried moving on, could not concentrate on their affairs. I made myself to accept it, to satisfy myself and not others. Otherwise you will not go anywhere in life. Will become fearful to explore life. Helps to have purpose not to be distracted,”* while Danie said: *“me too I also do not go to that guy because I will be treated the same way.”*

When he was unemployed, Mokgopo used to be undermined. The treatment he received lowered his self-esteem, as was the case with Danie, who felt as though his

sense of purpose in life was taken away while he was robbed of a preferred quality of life, as reflected upon by Russinova et al. (2011). Danie felt that he could not “go forward”, further saying that, *“it pushes us back from doing what we love to do, because they look at how you dress and say you are not part of them, push you away. Judge you,”* while appealing that he was *“not successful, not where I wanted, I know I can be of better use to someone, just give me a chance.”*

Prejudice not only limits and stunts an expression of inner strength and individual contentment in life, but also restricts venturing outside to connect with others (Pescosolido et al., 2013; Russinova, et al., 2011). In this way, it not only becomes a weapon another uses on the self, but extends to being an internalised belief destroying the self from within. What appears as an avoidance of prejudice to bolster and preserve one’s sense of life purpose and self-esteem, comes from its anticipation inadvertently serving to reduce one’s quality of life (Cox et al., 2012; Pescosolido et al., 2013; Russinova, et al., 2011). A look at the comments made by Ranko, Danie and Thulisile above attests to this. With this, people internalise the same stigma others apply to them before enacting it (Cox et al., 2012; Russinova et al., 2011). Trying to win back inner agency, they avoid those who avoid them. They restrict their movement where they anticipate being restricted.

7.3.4.3 Prejudice targets and their assumed threat

For Gervais et al. (2011), the practice of prejudice needs to be understood within the context in which it socially serves a purpose, as the sociofunctional approach explains. Individuals and groups are prejudiced against as a result of the threat they are assumed to pose. The distrust of atheists is seen as a result of their threat to the values of the American religious dream. When some will be avoided for assumed disease threat (Neel et al., 2013), or for being social, economic and political competitors (Brockett & Wicker, 2012; Kessler et al., 2010), others will be least embraced for embodying characteristics identified to be antithetical to those assumed as the core for society (Hornsey et al., 2003; Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Woodford et al., 2013).

When Phathekile Holomisa argued that black South Africans who practise same sex sexuality do so against values of their African culture, thereby posing a threat to such

values, Gervais et al. (2011) indicate that homosexual practices are viewed with disgust.

Danie said:

If you are not dressed in Nikes all-over. If I can't go to the Casino, not having enough money to be in their group, not having the looks, they classify you. They say you are not a VIP, you are a poor guy, you have got nothing we are interested in.

Such looks, as depicted by Danie, evoke feelings of being undermined because they violate the standards set for belonging into certain categories of living (Hornsey et al., 2003; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), of being white.

Standards of belonging in categories are further negatively tainted by images of the work done by Belinda and Thulisile, who were either advised to go look for work somewhere or just undermined, respectively. No one would want to associate with stigmatised groups and individuals of Danie's looks, of Belinda and Thulisile's nature of occupation, Ranko's economic standing, and Simangele's position when she lost everything.

7.3.4.4 Justified/justifying distance

No matter how varied their existence is, people's race and cultural lifestyle are still viewed as fundamentally existing from what they are not and should not be. They are still viewed as essentially constituted. They are portrayed in fundamental beliefs and principles of being (Cunningham & Melton, 2013; Mahalingam, 2007; Mallon, 2013; Wagner et al., 2010; Woodford et al., 2013). These beliefs and principles are used to guard a race's existential territory, to marshal the contours of difference between it and the outside. Accentuated race typicality serves as a criterion for inclusion into the territory or sought proximity to it.

The difference between Hispanic people and others serves as a justification for the discouragement of intermarriage with the self-incompatible other (Sahl & Batson, 2001; Weaver, 2011), just as the incompatibility with fundamental sexual relationship expectations in American society serve to evoke discomfort and dislike towards same-gender sexual practices that are seen to defy such ideals (Woodford et al.,

2013). In situations like these, one's stereotypes about the self and other become justified. Distance and avoidance are the means to justify differentness.

One's occupation expectations and normative standards are used as justifying factors to enhance distance between one and a different, non-conforming other who has a job atypical to these expectations and standards. Thulisile mentioned that, when a black person does a domestic-type job, he/she endures undermining attention, yet for a white person it is seen as a norm or can be easily ignored. It is as if hers is atypical to occupational destinies for black people.

As if being a car guard falls outside of the ordinarily expected occupations for white people, Belinda spoke of the daily scorn of being told to look for another job. Not surprised by the treatment, she considered it a justifiable reaction because all the car guards are treated the same way.

Although it caused personal discomfort for Mokgopo, it appears that being called derogatory names while not working is usual for black people. Stephans, who saw it as a motivating factor, also indicated that people who are not working may be called derogatory names.

While the above indicate how one justifies the stereotypes that serve to make others avoided, the following examples show how one actively distances oneself and avoids others because of the stereotypes one cherishes about the self and others (Cox et al., 2012). Ranko stopped visiting others because they did not visit him either, saying that you *"rather prefer to be with those of your own level, those that are accepting you."* He used his anticipation of being avoided and adjusted by distancing himself (Russinova et al., 2011). Such an anticipated negative social interaction was used by Thulisile, who distanced herself by moving on, and Magda, who just ignored them. As the other's treatment of one is race justified, one also justifies one's treatment of the other.

In this manifestation, a living space is used as a commodity that allows one to avoid and distance oneself from others; however, what one does and the stigmatising stereotypes that one believes in are not reflected upon. It is taken as a naturally given order of things (Cappicie et al., 2012; Comeaux, 2010; Hawkesworth, 2010; Ortiz & Jani, 2010), and not as a result of an attempt to adjust to the pressure of

conformity to fundamentalist life principles in which one believes (Hornsey et al., 2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008).

7.3.4.5 *Material pursuit*

Recognition and respect accorded to people is based on the number of material belongings in their possession, encouraging their pursuit and display in an overarching, all-or-nothing endeavour. People's relationships and conduct are governed by materialism, which Van Hiel et al. (2010, p. 1037) define as "the importance people ascribe to possessions and their acquisition."

A competitive yardstick of whom to include or exclude in one's related living, materialism governs the conduct of people in groups and individually. Van Hiel et al. (2010, p. 1041) quote Fromm as saying that materialism leads people to develop "a 'pseudo-self' based on a false need for possessions and an endless desire to consume while losing focus on fundamental existential questions such as 'Why am I here?' and 'Is this all there is?'" While it facilitates belonging, it can also serve to disconnect. Simangele indicated that she lost friends when she lost her job and other material possessions, and that her friends returned when she found another higher-paying work position and her material standing improved. Ranko found himself admired and avoided by early life peers whose lot did not improve and progress as his did. Simultaneously, he was made to feel unwelcome by peers who studied as far as or further than he did, but acquired more material possessions than he did.

As a motivating factor to work hard and better oneself, materialism can also serve to discourage. A desire for more inspired Stephans to acquire qualifications in his job, thereby earning him societal respect. For Thulisile and Danie, however, the unevenly acquired material possessions and low economic status caused them to be undermined, not taken seriously and socially excluded.

Because more is better (Thulisile), how much there is and how much is put on display can earn one positive recognition. It serves as compensation for social approval (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). Belinda's car-guarding duty was an indication of how little she had, causing her to receive comments like "go look for another job." Thulisile's colleagues displayed their material affluence with hairstyles, the type of

food they ate at lunchtime and their clothing accessories, while looks and how he dressed kept Danie judged and shut out by distinguishing his non-conformity to normative standards of worth, as argued by several authors (Hornsey et al., 2003; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008).

Mokgopo saw life around him as characterised by people bragging about their cars and houses, leading to snobbishness, as did Magda, who mentioned people thinking that they are better than others based on the amount of material belongings they have. The pursuit of materialism leads to a selfish life and less positive regard for others except as material competitors. All eight co-researchers defined success as having relatively acquired more materially.

7.3.4.6 Cherishing of traditional societal values

At the core of this and in line with essentialism (Mahalingam, 2007; Morning, 2011; Wagner et al., 2010), conformity to authenticity (Espiritu, 2004; Mahon, 2004; O'Connor et al., 2007; Ross, 2007; Tate, 2005), and conformity to prototypicality and normativity (Hornsey et al., 2003; Hsu & Iwamoto, 2014; Kessler et al., 2010; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008), are inflexible personality variables that cause people to stringently adhere to practices that exclude others, and be intolerant to any infringement of conventional practices.

Within some religious, cultural and many other kinds of groupings, there are beliefs that only one way of being and practice is what defines all that is to be of the group's identity. That would explain race fundamentalism (Cunningham & Melton, 2013). Any deviation from their idealised sense of being is viewed as a scornful noncompliance (Moss, 2003; O'Connor et al., 2007). Built around such a perception is a tendency to uncritically submit to the conventionally defined ways of being while being aggressively punitive to those who violate the norms (Hornsey et al., 2003; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2008). Such an uncritical conformity to fundamentalist beliefs, while being insensitive to its violation, is termed right-wing authoritarianism (Cramer et al., 2013; Duriez, 2011; Pedersen & Hartley, 2012).

The use of a strong language against Brett Murray's painting and its defendants in Chapter 1 indicates how a violation of a fundamental sense of definition can be

fiercely fought against. Danie's looks, Thulisile's and Belinda's choice of occupation, and Mokgopo's unemployment status were seen as non-allegiant violators of the conventionality of a race. They evoked and received unsavoury stereotypes of rejection and exclusion within their respective race groups.

However, to suggest that fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism take on the form of one-way prejudice is to miss a sense of the bigger picture. Prejudice is a reciprocal process of jostling for power to define and project attributes on to the other within the race(s), as shown by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999). Its positions keep shifting and being shifted. When we question the label given to us, we inadvertently label the labeller. We take on the role and position of the labeller. In expressing their dismay at the labels used to describe and thereby categorise them, Danie, Thulisile, Belinda and Mokgopo indicated how they too were using fundamentalist definitions to react in resistance to and define others. They did not passively wallow in the situation, as Ranko reacted by "also not visiting them." They were similarly governed by subservience to conventionality and aversion to novelty and diversity. They reacted inflexibly to inflexibility and intolerably to intolerance. Their dismay at being categorised suggests that they were dealt with not only untowardly, but also race inappropriately. Through this, they categorised as race inappropriate those who defined them as contrary to the dictates of the fundamentals of their race. The shifting positions of categorisation turn the stigmatised into the stigmatising, and the categorised into the categorising. The prejudice-implicated self always points at the other, oblivious of its own prejudice, seeing it with a distant origin, unaware and unwilling to see it in its proximity.

7.3.4.7 A normal way of life

What is seen as normal gets approved and is made immune from interrogation and scrutiny, taken for granted and ignored. It becomes not only life, but also larger and beyond the actively lived life. It becomes reified, a tradition imposed and a rule followed.

The first interviews brought about great deal of information, while the second interviews seem to have landed so little. The little information coming from the second interviews is not only a reflection of fatigue from answering the same

question and providing the same answer. It is less about unwillingness to cooperate, and more about being content with the essentialist definitions provided in the first interviews. The lack of free-flowing information in the second interviews is reflective of contentment with the exhaustive definitions provided earlier.

For the second interviews, Magda said, *“no questions, nothing to add.”* Stephans said, *“I am neutral, no questions.”* Belinda said, *“nothing to add, ask or change,”* while Simangele said, *“nothing, nothing really.”* Mokgopo kept it brief by saying, *“no change,”* while commenting on fights, discrimination, competition, lack of respect and other things that he saw around him. Ranko also had nothing more to say. All these were responses to an inquiry as to whether they thought of anything to add to the responses they gave in the first interviews, any questions to ask or any ideas that were evoked by the discussions in those interviews. Thulisile declined to participate in the second interviews.

It should be recalled that, in their first interviews, the co-researchers provided descriptions of particular races that they saw as the reality, even if they were not happy about it. It never emerged that any of them questioned or wondered about the descriptions they gave, be it Magda talking about the “odd people”, Simangele’s unhappiness about friends who desert one when one loses positions of power, Mokgopo talking about being called “umahlalela”, Thulisile about gossiping and rumour-mongering, Ranko about colleagues who did not visit him, Stephans about aspiring for educational qualifications and respect, Danie about being locked outside for not having the looks, and Belinda about seeing all car guards treated the same.

Although Danie seemed to sum up the normal way of life by saying that, *“you started opening my eyes, and also to tell people around, what is wrong, to ask why you people are like this? What is the problem you got? You opened my eyes a lot because people do not think about the questions you asked me. People don’t think about it, don’t make work about that in life,”* he too went no further to reflect about his own reflection, to question his own question. Like his fellow co-researchers, his essentialist descriptions were perched at a moment of righteousness against the other that he subjected to scrutiny. That is the hallmark of same-race prejudice, jostling for authenticity.

CHAPTER 8

RELEVANCE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY TO HUMAN NEEDS

8.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW

This chapter investigates the responsiveness of existing community development programmes generally to prejudice and specifically to the same-race prejudice issues discussed in this thesis. It emphasises the relevance of phenomenological philosophy to human needs. The chapter seeks to answer the following questions:

- Are there programmes in the country that relate to and address same-race prejudice issues as reflected in the interview themes in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis?
- Do existing programmes aimed at addressing prejudice take heed of people's subjective experiences, understanding and interpretation of their lived daily struggles of racial identity and identification, or are they just attempts externally arranged to coerce them out of their suffering without considering their point of view (Cann, 2012; Horsford, 2010; Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011)?
- Given the intractable persistence of practices that oppress people (Kohli, 2012; Sonn & Quayle, 2013) and worsening societal, political and economic living conditions amidst notable scientific developments (Kourany, 2013), how do these programmes encourage Paulo Freire's critical consciousness (Cann, 2012; Kohli, 2012) to acknowledge and respond generally to humanity's suffering (Greer, 2004), and specifically to the experience of same-race prejudice?
- What are the implications of enshrining reform and development programmes in general democratic principles far removed from people's subjective experiential knowledge?

Subsumed under the broader question of "what is the usefulness or relevance of the observations from the interviews in Chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis to humanity?", the chapter carries the message that the usefulness is not in the detached practice of philosophy's intelligently styled terms, society's existing smart programmes and

individuals' advanced training skills, but in the relevance of these to the human life as lived rather than as a naturally determined existence. This is in realisation of Jarmila Skalkova's assertion (as cited by Habl, 2015, p. 113) that:

it appears that science and technology, as they have functioned in the resulting society, bring about a number of antihuman symptoms: objectification of human beings, one-sided development and neglect of spiritual needs. The key problematic motifs are the alienation of personality under the pressures of bureaucratic structures, and a mass consumerist culture.

While the efforts made by some community development programmes and technological advancements are appreciated, it is necessary to consider the relevance of these and the country's post-apartheid programmes to individually experienced challenges of same-race prejudice. It is also necessary to consider what value a phenomenological understanding can and does offer regarding race, prejudice, humanity and human needs.

Investigating philosophy's usefulness to humanity (Kourany, 2013; Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011), ability to offer an interpretation to troubling human circumstances (Heen, 2006; Kohli, 2012; Neville et al., 2014), ability and willingness to respond to human curiosity, and ability to attend to pressing human needs in a person's lived world and not to stifle them (Cann, 2012; Horsford, 2010), the chapter further serves to inquire about the relevance of the observations made in this research to humanity in general, and to actual life situations in South Africa specifically. As a philosophical and research window into privately lived experiences, phenomenology in this thesis leaned on critical race theory's caution to unpack the official definitions of the races of black and white, and the daily experiences thereto.

In order to investigate the above, a randomly acquired list of individuals and organisations was drafted to find out about existing programmes run in the community. The identities of the individuals and organisations have been anonymously recorded as permission was not granted to reveal them.

Twelve interview meetings and discussions were organised and held with individuals representing community development organisations, including five national organisations, mainly in the Nkangala district of Mpumalanga province from 6

October 2014 to 28 October 2014. The purpose of these meetings and discussions was to inquire about the relevance and responsiveness to same-race prejudice and the themes discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis in the organisations' programmes. As these interviews were conducted not solely for statistical reasons but to acquaint one with a vision of the kind of humanity and society that the philosophy of phenomenology encourages, the chapter ends with a reflection on what the philosophy has engendered throughout the thesis. Although no absolute answers are provided, it hints at myriad possibilities of relating to one another.

8.2 THE INTERVIEWS

The interview discussions are grouped here into those who ignored the requests or declined to respond and those who offered their time and attempted to respond to the inquiry.

8.2.1 Organisations and individuals who ignored requests for a response or responded negatively

Several individuals and organisations who were contacted with requests declined to respond or ignored the requests. These are discussed below.

8.2.1.1 Emalahleni local Christian black pastor (06/10/2014)

A visit was made to the pastor's office to request an appointment with him. After being questioned by assistants at his church about the purpose of the appointment, I was given his telephone number. Upon contacting him and explaining the reason for an appointment request, he indicated his unavailability and promised contact through his junior pastor. In a harsh tone, he mentioned that "I am not obligated to him" and never provided the junior pastor's contact details as promised.

8.2.1.2 Emalahleni local Christian black pastor (06/10/2014)

A visit to the church to set up an appointment with the pastor resulted in meeting with the pastor's assistants in the pastor's absence. I never followed up to ascertain availability, nor did the assistants contact me again as they had promised.

8.2.1.3 National (black) traditional leaders' organisation (08/10/2014)

A telephonic conversation was held with and an SMS was sent to the secretary of the organisation's president. Although a response was promised, nothing was heard since. An email sent to the organisation's national office on 6 October 2014 was not responded to.

8.2.1.4 National human rights organisation

Contact was established with the organisation on 3 October 2014 and carried out until 22 October 2014. Emails were sent and telephonic conversations were held in this period, leading to an initial promise that I would be sent details of the programmes run by the organisation. Contrary to what they promised, no relevant information was found on their website to answering the questions about race and prejudice. No response was received to the last email communication, sent on 22 October 2014.

8.2.1.5 National Christian churches organisation

This organisation was contacted from 6 October 2014 to 22 October 2014 through email, telephone conversations and SMS. Although the organisation indicated that it would respond to the written requests, no response was received.

8.2.1.6 Reflection about the above

As an investigator seeking information on existing programmes and activities being conducted on race and prejudice, and clarity on the successes and challenges faced in rendering those programmes, I was confronted with difficulties to navigate the terrain. It seemed that, in order to have one's request listened to, it is necessary to humble oneself to the lowest point of begging and being small; alternatively, one would have to arrogantly exude confidence and an upper-class status aura to attract people's attention.

The meetings were emotionally exacting and their conditions made me to feel invisible, my request and topic of interest ignored. The repeated contact with the human rights organisation and the national Christian organisation, and being ignored by the national traditional leaders' organisation, are a testimony to how one comes to

conclude that the topic is just generally ignored, and made unimportant and invisible in the daily discourses of people of influence.

Meeting with a local pastor's assistant, I realised how he cut our conversation and limited his answers to fit my assumed nature, while resisting to delve into the background of the inquiry itself, leaving me with a feeling not only of being undermined and ignored, but also of the topic being seen as insignificant. Arriving at their church precinct, I was welcomed by an aura of material affluence, unapproachability and distance that further dictated the nature of our conversation. The same feeling emerged again from a local Christian pastor's response when he rudely said that "I am not obligated to him." A bishop of a national Christian organisation once responded that "this is really not the time to talk" when I phoned him in October 2014. I never received a response from him even after several telephone SMS and email.

8.2.2 Organisations and individuals who made time for a discussion

In contrast to the above organisations and individuals, other organisations and individuals made time for a discussion. These are discussed below.

8.2.2.1 National race relations organisation

An email request sent on 3 October 2014 was responded to on 7 October 2014, with an explanation that their organisation did not run or engage in programmes of race, prejudice, tolerance, unity and related matters.

8.2.2.2 Local black Christian pastor, Emalahleni (10/10/2014)

A leading pastor in the district that he served, this pastor gave an overview of the work his church has facilitated to correct the racial imbalances faced prior to 1994 by the country generally and the church in particular.

He indicated that the much-cherished racial integration of post-1994 did not yield positive results as promised on paper. People continue to be segregated according to race within their churches, the churches set apart according to race, and the differential allocation of power and resources continue to lie in the hands of most white people who have influence on decisions made, with white people not believing

in a black person leading while black people are content to be led by anyone who has money.

While their fraternal churches are racially segregated despite the Constitution dictating otherwise, within each racial group individuals are being honoured because of their status. Competition over status results in everyone wanting to be at the top. If one loses one's position, for example, being a chief, so does one lose the honour conferred on one. For both black people and white people, positions of power are conferred on those with more money. Considered the order of the day and conducted in the name of Ubuntu, these decisions are rarely questioned.

8.2.2.3 Black Christian pastor and moral regeneration coordinator, Kwandebele (21/10/2014)

A moral regeneration coordinator within his local municipality, this pastor mentioned that in both the church and moral regeneration activities and responsibilities, there are no activities or programmes carried out relating to the eradication of prejudice and intolerance between and within the races, except what has been written, for example, in the Constitution. He spoke about the stereotypes that are practised to divide people according to race, culture and belief systems in both the general society and the churches. He mentioned barriers to unity as embedded in cultural customs that do not allow free interaction between people.

He spoke of the churches as the main impenetrable living spheres using customs to perpetuate disunity and intolerance both between and within the races. He called it a cold war between designated cultural groupings, calling each other differentiated cultural and church names, with divisions resulting in some people and groups being more privileged than others. This social arrangement is never questioned or reflected upon, but seen as the way things should be. Church politics make it the norm. People are designated and divided according to cultural and church names, causing them to not feel at one. This, according to him, indicates that people do not need each other. It is every man for himself.

8.2.2.4 Black youth convener, national traditional organisation (21/10/2014)

This youth convener mentioned that there is noticeable discrimination within black and white people, and among the different chiefs in and outside his organisation. While the chiefs occupy their positions because of those they lead, they discriminate against those who are not chiefs.

He commented on the various forms through which same-race prejudice is practised. People consider themselves as better than others based on the assumed superior status of their cultural practices. Some people are undermined based on what they have or do not have, while their cultural practices are overruled. Respect and recognition of people and their status are based on what they have or do not have. The funerals of the rich are attended by more people.

Individuals' surnames and cultural names are signifiers of superiority and inferiority, and sow conflict and hatred among individuals and groups. They are used to differentiate people and groups according to tribes. The noticed segregation of women originates from the families.

He mentioned that his organisation had no programmes being conducted to address same-race prejudice. He lamented the existing moral regeneration programme as being spearheaded by religious pastors who discriminate against non-Christians.

8.2.2.5 White Christian pastor, Emalahleni (22/10/2014)

A pastor in a fraternal grouping, he mentioned that status is determined by wealth and that the level of education creates more problems between people. Pastors with educational diplomas and university degrees look down upon those who do not have them. Those with bigger churches undermine those with smaller churches. Wealthy pastors do not join their fraternity because they think that they do not need it. While these practices are present in both black and white communities, they are particularly rife among the former.

He mentioned that the fraternity did not have any programmes which address race, prejudice and intolerance. They do not believe in racial discrimination. They focus

their functioning on praying and looking past discrimination that is there, while hoping that God will change the hearts of those who discriminate against others.

8.2.2.6 Black local government municipal youth manager (23/10/2014)

This local government municipal youth manager mentioned that the programmes conducted by his local government municipality were geared towards closing the gap of youth development created by apartheid's racial discrimination laws. They targeted youths from previously disadvantaged racial groups and those who are disabled to empower them economically through skills training and allocation to educational opportunities.

He reflected on how race continues to play a pivotal role in people's lives. He mentioned how people still associate whiteness with being good, perfect and right. Some schools which used to be traditionally black have instantly turned into English medium schools with the arrival of a few white teachers, and now charge exorbitant monthly school fees when they initially charged a meagre annual amount. Some schools which were previously not preferred have become overpopulated with the arrival of a white principal. He acknowledged that the municipality did not go further than what is listed above here. They did not specifically engage in same-race prejudice programmes.

8.2.2.7 Farming organisation, Mpumalanga (28/10/201)

This white farmer also involved in religious activities expressed lament for cultural practices that are used as differentiating criteria for setting the various racial groups apart, calling them the "hiding place". He mentioned practices that are defended and covered in the name of culture, with their proponents shielding them from critique.

The disunity between the races is seen to be maintained by a mind-set that refuses to acknowledge that what are considered essential racial characteristics are mere cultural adaptations to living conditions. A refusal to interrogate culture as an adaptation mechanism allows many ills to continue unabated. To this, he listed the degradation of and violence towards women, people thinking they are entitled to what they did not work for, and the assumed different attitude towards money between the black and white races.

He further mentioned that an overemphasis on cultural differences wrongly makes people believe in the existence of pure races. His lack of a mention of any programmes run by his organisation to address same-race prejudice can be understood as emergent from this view.

8.2.2.8 Reflection about the above

While, for the group who did not respond or responded negatively, the topic of same-race prejudice appeared to be ignored, made invisible and rendered insignificant to be discussed by being deliberately shut out of any discussion, there was a general appreciation and willingness to entertain the subject by those in the group that made time for a discussion.

The mere mention of the subject was like an eye-opener for something they never imagined to exist. Those in the second group realised the importance and relevance of the subject to a South African life situation. However, similar to those from the first group, an impression I got from this group was that of letting it be because “it is the way things are”. Their acquiescence with the way things are caused no one to imagine any different way of handling the subject.

8.3 LESSONS FROM PHENOMENOLOGY

Chapter 1 depicted South Africa’s racially segmented apartheid history, laced with intolerance, mistrust, exclusions (Breetzke, 2012; Budlender & Lund, 2011; Higgs & Evans, 2008), stigmatisation, fear, anger and hatred (Biko, 1978; Pucherova, 2011). Their resultant prejudice infested every sphere of interracial relations in ways both supported and normalised by its various laws (Christopher, 1989; Pucherova, 2011; Seekings, 2008), for instance in the Bophuthatswana homeland (Higgs & Evans, 2008), in institutions of higher learning (Pillay & Karlsson, 2013), and with regard to sexuality (Shefer, 2010; Stobie, 2003).

The same chapter reflected on the commendable effort that post-apartheid South Africa is putting in to stamp out race-related prejudice and its societal imbalances. This is testified by the government and non-government institutions whose tasks embody redrawing a racially fair, balanced and human-rights-abiding society, by reporting on and legally instituting against racially and prejudicially unfair practices,

while legally enforcing practices that are fair and just. These are the South African Human Rights Commission (Berger, 2001; Durrheim et al., 2005; Malherbe, 2011), the South African Constitution (Du Toit, 2006; Jones, 2006; Small & Grant, 2005; Van Zyl, 2011), and the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Gready, 2009; Hamber, 2000; Marschall, 2012). These are summed as the proud gains that the country has amassed compared to its intolerant apartheid past replete with and consumed by prejudice.

However, when one looks at the themes that are discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis, it emerges that same-race prejudice is a subject that not only still negatively impacts on people's daily lives, but is also largely ignored through both mundane parlance and official community development programmes. The latter is significantly clear from the interview discussions in this chapter, when one looks at the lack of community development programmes that not only communicate about the subject, but also entertain the subject as a reality. A paucity of efforts on the subject is shown through the interviews in this chapter. This is despite existing state-assisted and non-state-assisted programmes that are aligned with the ideals of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (Sabourin, 2001).

The community development programmes that are there serve mainly to address race and prejudice, not same-race prejudice as an existing phenomenon, for example those that are aimed at giving people employment and training opportunities to redraw the economic imbalances of the past.

Phenomenology's primacy of a uniquely experienced reality is illuminated by the ethical concern that Stieb (2007) raises and to which he hopes all human endeavours seeking to better humanity will respond. Stieb (2007) questions the lack of ethical interrogation by the well-intentioned community development programmes with a pursuit for a better society, to be relevant to the uniquely experienced life of the individual. He argues that the assumed general community improvements in both science and technology are not always univocally beneficial for the individual. In the pursuit for the betterment of society, Stieb (2007) asks how suitably tested the products are for the betterment of the individual's unique life. In the spirit of Stieb's (2007) ethical inquiry, the question asked in this thesis generally and this chapter specifically is, with the popular injunction to end human suffering born out of

prejudice and intolerance from apartheid, what is the relevance of post-apartheid and community development programmes to individually experienced challenges of same-race prejudice?

The argument of the thesis is that individuals' personally lived experiences and concerns, as revealed in Chapters 6 and 7, are not attended to or acknowledged. The individual seems to be sacrificed for the benefit of the bigger and wide-ranging notions of nationhood. The nation is too busy fighting bigger battles and ignoring individually lived experiences and challenges. Like "every man for himself" as the pastor and moral regeneration coordinator noted in this chapter, and "being left to die next to the road" as mentioned by Danie in Chapter 6, it is a subject nobody is willing to notice. It is masked and hushed in a life that is considered normal, as unworthy of bothering about and ignored. This indicates ignorance not only of the subject for discussion purposes but of the individual whose experiential life revolves around it.

A befitting question to ask at this point is, given South Africa's apartheid past, its post-apartheid efforts to eradicate prejudice, the themes discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, and the interview discussions in this chapter, what value does and can a phenomenological understanding offer regarding race, prejudice, humanity and human needs? The following statements as deduced from a phenomenological understanding argued in this thesis are an attempt to respond to this question.

While acknowledging and not underestimating the social construction of human racial identities (as argued through critical race theory in this thesis), phenomenology does not deny people's racial corporeality (Connolly, 1995). However, humanity is encouraged to be sensitive to barriers of interaction that create distance between people. One is called to be mindful of the labels of racial authority, identity and identification that hamper engagement about life as individually lived and render it to never be questioned (Connolly, 1995).

The same sentiment of a tendency by people to take their life situation for granted and as naturally given is echoed by Davis' (2005, p. 563) caution against the naturalist attitude danger of humanity getting "lost in the world". The slavish adoption of an uncritical and naive attitude towards one's life circumstance as naturally given is lamented by several authors (Kockelmans, 1994; Kruger, 1988; Natanson, 1969;

Stewart & Mickunas, 1974; Wagner, 1983), as it may lead to an acquiescence with conditions that result in the proliferation of disease, worsening of quality of life, war and prejudice, even if there is high-end technological and scientific advancement in the society (Kourany, 2013).

As Connolly (1995, p. 39) mentions that “the body perceived as an object only is drained of its humanity; it is a dead body devoid of its vivifying, expressive, intentional qualities,” intervention programmes that treat people primarily as corporeal entities and as only racial types rather than individuals with an ability for interpretive intentionality (Converse, 2012; Dowling & Cooney, 2012; Flood, 2010; Greenfield & Jensen, 2012; Simonsen, 2013) and consciousness (Greenfield & Jensen, 2012) are critiqued for failing to appreciate a person’s inside experience (Macnaughton, 2011). The necessity of situating understanding and efforts to human upliftment in people’s experiential knowledge is extended by Armour’s argument (as cited by Crowe, 2012, p. 578) that, “if we study ideas apart from their embeddedness in the facts and conditions of life we come to absurd conclusions such as that there is only one way of looking at the world.”

When we do away with the hierarchical structuring of the teacher-learner, giver-receiver relationship interaction in physical education, with less focus on training the physical body, and begin to imagine what the experience entails for the learner, physical education becomes an invigorating and empowering human encounter for both the learner and the teacher (Connolly, 1995).

For Macnaughton (2011, p. 929) medical practice’s sole concern with treating sick bodies loses sight of the real experience that speaks of the patient as an individual with feelings, volition and understanding. It ignores a realisation that an “illness occurs in the context of an individual life filled with imagination, belief, feelings: subjectivities that shape meaning for that patient.” Similarly, community development programmes that lack an incorporation of human experience and feelings fail to consider what it is to be human (Macnaughton, 2011).

Racial identities and identification labels of blackness and whiteness happen in the context of people’s lives of embracing and not embracing, of being embraced and

not being embraced, and in the interpretive understanding of what it is and what it is not to be black or white.

A speech made by Richard Pring (as cited by Heen, 2006) to new teachers at a school outside of Boston is of compelling significance to the need to inculcate in our interactions a treatment of people as humans (Macnaughton, 2011). In the speech, Pring (as quoted by Heen, 2006, p. 197) gives the following warning and admonition:

I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no one should witness: Gas chambers built by learned engineers. Children poisoned by educated physicians. Infants killed by trained nurses. Women and babies shot and burned by high school and college graduates. So, I am suspicious of education. Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, skilled psychopaths, educated Eichmanns. Reading, writing, arithmetic are important only if they serve to make our children more human. I wish to argue that what makes sense of the curriculum in educational terms is that it is the forum or the vehicle through which young people are enabled to explore seriously (in the light of evidence and argument) what it is to be human. And such an exploration has no end. That is why teaching should be regarded as a moral practice.

This is in tandem with critical race theory's displeasure with socially and politically lopsided and preferential developments that are couched in legalistic fallacies (Desmond & Emirbayer, 2013) that widen the gap of inequality between the downtrodden and those who are politically, socially and economically advantaged, as argued in the work of several authors (Arudou, 2013; Closson, 2010; Odartey-Wellington, 2011; Ortiz & Jani, 2010; Powers, 2007).

8.3.1 Phenomenology, social responsibility and community intervention

The discussion in Chapter 1 of South Africa's post-apartheid efforts to eradicate prejudice, descriptions of the races of black and white in Chapter 2, interview themes and conversations with their leaning on essentialism and the naturalist attitude in Chapters 6 and 7, and the interview discussions in this chapter show that same-race prejudice is an enduring individually experienced phenomenon whose nature and magnitude are not captured and taken heed of in the official discourses and intervention programmes in the country. This is supported by an observation by Kourany (2013) of the danger incurred in scientific advancements that are detached

from appreciating individually experienced human suffering. Kourany (2013) and Balogun (2008) opine that philosophy can serve to bridge the gap between science and people's pertinent life issues by engagingly responding to the latter's dire life circumstances. They consider this a socially responsible science.

However, for some studying human sciences, the priority of a socially responsible science is subverted by what Crowe (2012) calls a leaning on being mathematised or data oriented. Crowe (2012) warns against the temptation, driven by a pursuit for relevance, legitimacy and credibility of research data, to heed the invocation by approaches in the humanities to be modelled by quantification and verification, thereby losing relevance with the experiential human element.

The importance of such a socially responsible science is underlined in Richard Pring's (Heen, 2006) warning about the inhumane treatment born from teacher's training, Macnaughton's (2011) critique of medicine's atomistic treatment of an individual, Connolly's (1995) observation of physical education solely concerned with a human being's corporeal existence, and Matthew Lipman's statement (as quoted by Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011, p. 174) that teaching should inspire children to "be more thoughtful, more reflective, more considerate, more responsible individuals," while encouraging them to be critically engaged in their life's assumptions rather than naively considering them as given (Davis, 2005).

In the same vein, the argument of the thesis considers phenomenology as a socially responsible science. In trying to be relevant to the status quo and its established modes of conventionality, we lose relevance with people's humanity. Not only philosophy (Crowe, 2012) but also community development and intervention programmes that purport to uplift humanity, run the gauntlet of detachment from people's lived reality.

Neither created nor existing in a social vacuum, philosophy should develop out of the prevailing milieu while serving to critically respond to events in the milieu (Balogun, 2008). In response to the void of ethical responsibility towards the individual highlighted by Stieb (2007), philosophy's benefit to humanity should lie in the critique and transformation of dominant perceptions, ideologies and practices that may be left intact and considered the norm (Balogun, 2008).

Phenomenology qualifies as not a mere science whose philosophy is disconnected from people's lives. It has been adopted in this thesis as a "reflective and conceptual analytical engagement with ideas" (Balogun, 2008, p. 114) of racial identity and identification prejudice within the races of black and white. It connects with the struggles individuals are confronted with daily by not shying away from but reflecting on their life circumstances (Cappiccie et al., 2012; Heen, 2006; Kourany, 2013; Schieble, 2012; Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011). By wondering and being doubtful about the familiarity and congeniality of the races, it helps with an interrogation endeavour of exposing the misgiving practices within the races that are ordinarily left untouched. According to Vansieleghem and Kennedy (2011, p. 175), it is:

a philosophy no longer regarded as a theoretical activity separate from the world, but rather as a potential that has (and can) be developed in order to get a grip on one's interactions with one's environment, and to influence change.

It moves away from the mere general terms of racial identity and identification to seek an understanding of what meaning these have for the individual and with what implication. It wipes off complacency with the general ideals of description of a white race and black race whose inclusivity may hide away those they exclude and other. Embodying a transformative element (Balogun, 2008), in phenomenology the thesis derives Paulo Freire's critical consciousness (Cann, 2012; Kohli, 2012) and interrogation of society's structures and practices of domination, suppression and inequality (Cann, 2012; Greer, 2004; Kohli, 2012; Sonn & Quayle, 2013). Not created in a vacuum, it is a medium of conversation and critical interrogation about, and of setting a tone for, transformation of people's lived circumstances (Balogun, 2008).

It is a philosophy tinged with social responsibility and responsiveness by engaging individually pertinent questions embodied in the lived world (Kourany, 2013). It resists an allegiance to reifying existence, assumptions that subjugate and tendencies that accept life as normal and naturally determined (Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011).

Phenomenology encourages a sense of responsibility by seeing humanity's existence as not merely robotic and living by the general script of racial identity and identification, but as consciously interpretive, as individually perturbed by and

perturbing life. It is beholden to serve a humanity and society that are critical, reflective and interpretive of life as lived, and seeks to encourage these ideals. It encourages accountability to the self and others as reflective beings.

It is hoped that what is considered the highest virtue and duty of people to humanity (Habl, 2015; Pallikkathayil, 2010) and of realising that every man's existence should extend beyond self-service to consider the next person (Habl, 2015) can be injected within community development programmes by embracing phenomenological philosophy.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

9.1 CHAPTER PREVIEW

The chapter forms a reflective detour into the steps followed in the thesis and is not used to formulate new findings or ideas. I use it to indicate how the various research interviews and chapters were used to form the observations made, and about the overall definition and structure of same-race prejudice.

Reflected upon in the chapter are:

- Phenomenology as a philosophy underpinning the thesis and as in opposition to the naturalist attitude, as well as how this was helped by looking at critical race theory.
- The phenomenological research and the use of open-ended interview conversations.
- The hypothesis made.
- The findings made.
- The overall psychological structure of same-race prejudice.

9.2 SAME-RACE PREJUDICE HYPOTHESIS

Same-race prejudice is a subjectively lived and experienced phenomenon. It is made up of the flawed, rigid, essentialist and taken-for-granted categorisation and labelling of identity and identification masked in notions of authenticity against inauthenticity, normativity against non-normativity and prototypicality against non-prototypicality, within the race. Informed by a naturalist attitude, it consists of notions that consider race as an objective and real marker of identity and identification, blinded to how it is constituted in politically and socially formulated and motivated stereotypes of categorisation thinking within the race.

9.3 KEY FINDINGS

Linked with the stated hypothesis and based on interrogated observations from Chapter 6 and 7, the following key findings about same-race prejudice were arrived at.

Based on observation of the themes in Chapter 6, same-race prejudice is made up of objectivist, essentialist and quantifiable virtues of the phenomenon of race. Guided by a naturalist attitude, it is displayed through notions that define a race according to objective and quantifiable virtues of acceptability against unacceptability, authenticity against inauthenticity, normativity against non-normativity and prototypicality against non-prototypicality of identity and identification within the race. Those assumed to have none or less of the authentic, normative, prototypical and acceptable virtues are categorised as different, judged and labelled as inauthentic, non-normative, non-prototypical and unacceptable to the race.

For whiteness and white race, the looks of the physical body, nature of work, how much one earns at work, educational qualifications, interpersonal manners, work experience and material possessions were the virtues that serve as a yardstick for categorisation and differential treatment. Intolerant quick assumptions made about Danie's lack of the required looks and Belinda's less respectable job, as well as Magda's consideration of disrespectful white people to be odd, were some of the examples how this was done.

For blackness and black race, such qualifying virtues were material possessions, being employed and economic affluence. Those less or none with these were subjects of negative social judgement and grading, for example Mokgopo's friend, who was called "mahlalela", and Simangele, who was deserted after losing her job.

An expanded definition of same-race prejudice was offered in Chapter 7, debunking the notion that people are victims of same-race prejudice. It is considered as reciprocally enacted and sustained by people as victimising victims of stereotypes, labelling, categorisation and intolerance. This is done through the use of self-righteous cultural beliefs to lay a claim to an authoritative power to authenticity, normativity, prototypicality and acceptability of defining a race. Both Ranko and Danie employed their stereotypes and intolerance of differentness to categorise and

stigmatise themselves and others, and used isolation and avoidance as a buffer against being further discriminated against. The assumed victims of same-race prejudice have an ability to competitively define, classify, categorise, label and other themselves and others, thereby rendering others as false, illegitimate and unreal. Magda's differentiation between the odd and decent people not only considered the former as disliked but categorised them as un-white.

Same-race prejudice is not merely a natural occurrence. It is actively enacted through the use of compensatory strategies to deal with and perpetuate stigmatisation and stereotypes for self and other classification. Stereotypes about work and the nature of work by Magda, Thulisile, Ranko, Mokgopo and Stephans, and the use of space and distance by Ranko, Danie and Thulisile, were applied to justify the differentness between themselves and others, to minimise belonging anxiety and to boost social approval, thereby causing more differentiation of people.

Marked by essentialist descriptions, the inability and unwillingness to reflect on one's actions and acknowledge one's acts of prejudice within a race lead to a tendency to uncritically submit to self-righteous and fundamentalist beliefs, and conventionally defined ways of being, while being aggressively punitive to those who violate the defined norms. This was exemplified by Ranko's definition of himself as an advanced man in relation to the peers who did not study as far as he did, and keeping a distance from colleagues who did not visit him, and by Stephans' arrogant defence of trade experience and qualifications as his guarantees of a sense of pride and respect in relation to those who did not have or were assumed to not be working towards acquiring these.

9.4 HOW THE INQUIRY OF THE THESIS WAS CARRIED OUT

Both a phenomenological philosophy debate and a phenomenological research project, also incorporating critical race theory, this thesis was arranged as a response to the naturalist attitude's notion of race as a naturally given concept of human identity and identification. By using the races of black and white as examples, this thesis viewed the naturalist attitude concept of these as masking and perpetuating the practice of essentialist, categorising and labelling stereotypes of racial identity and racial identification, not only between the purported different racial

categories, but also within each categorised racial group. The naturalist attitude is considered to mask, cause, sustain and encourage the practice of same-race prejudice.

In both its philosophical debate and the research praxis, this phenomenological response considered the human capacity for consciousness, intentionality and understanding of the phenomena regarding racial identity and racial identification, as opposed to mere corporeality. Primacy was given to the individually lived and experienced phenomena of the races of black and white and the accompanying lived phenomena of blackness and whiteness to indicate how same-race prejudice is practised within the races, as opposed to these as mere objective and quantifiable markers of unquestionable natural racial identity and racial identification.

With conversational open-ended interview discussions as the hallmark of phenomenological research and with primacy put on exploring the experiential world of human existence, the interviews were a repeated activity and are woven in the thesis's chapters. The three types of interviews conducted are indicative of phenomenological philosophy's prioritisation of a subjectively lived human experience.

A first group of informal interviews were conducted by me in Emalahleni at the interviewees' places of work or daily activity. The appointments with the interviewees were not pre-scheduled. None of the interviewees were asked to sign any participation consent forms, hence the anonymity of their responses. However, they gave verbal consent to my written notes of their responses being kept. This first sample of purposively selected interviewees was made up of individuals from organisations whose duties revolved around race, intolerance, segregation, justice, labour security and community service provision. These individuals were chosen on the basis of having a presumed understanding of matters relating to race, racial identity and racial identification. The sample was made up of three black men from three mostly black national labour unions, one white man and one white woman from two mostly white national labour unions, a white woman from a liberal national political organisation, a white man from a national extreme right political organisation, a black woman from a national government youth institution, a black woman from a government labour disputes institution, and a white male car guard.

I asked them to define the terms black, blackness, white and whiteness (see section 3.2). Their responses are not necessarily those of the organisations they represent.

The second group was also purposively sampled and interviewed by me, not asked to sign any participation consent forms, and the appointments, discussions and requests for input were not pre-scheduled, while the right to keep written notes of their interview response were verbally consented to. The responses from their interviews maintained the anonymity of them as individuals and their respective organisations as permission to reveal these was never sought. The group consisted of two local black male Christian pastors, one district black male Christian pastor, one regional white male Christian pastor, one district black male moral regeneration coordinator, one black male youth convenor for a national traditional organisation, one white male farmer for a provincial farming organisation, one black male manager for local government's youth programmes, a national traditional leaders' organisation, a national human rights organisation, a national Christian churches organisation, and a national race relations organisation.

I asked each individual, sampled from various organisations, to give responses representative of their organisations with regard to what the organisation was doing generally in society with regard to race, prejudice, intolerance, unity, the successes and challenges encountered in such programmes, and specifically with regard to same-race prejudice and the successes and challenges thereto (see section 8.2). The interview conversations or attempts thereto were conducted in the form of face-to-face interviews, telephonic interviews, emails and SMSs.

The responses of the third group of individuals interviewed are the basis upon which the crux of the thesis's key findings, interrogations and themes have been based. Details about this group are contained in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Unlike the two sets of informally conducted interviews, appointments with these co-researchers were pre-scheduled, consent for participation in the interviews was sought and granted, and the recording and storage of research information was discussed, as was the right to withdraw from participation. The sample for these interviews was purposively selected using the criteria of race (black and white), gender (male and female) and socio-economic status (economic affluence and less economic affluence, as further sub-indicated by the nature of one's work and activities).

The interviews were open-ended conversations centred around asking and responding to the question, “how do you think people of your race have been treating you, and how are they treating you now?” Guided by a phenomenological philosophy and a qualitative approach to research, this was intended to draw out responses of taken-for-granted subjectively lived experiences of the practice of prejudice within one’s race. I employed a phenomenological analysis of explication to extract themes from each individual interview in order to arrive at a psychological structure of lived same-race prejudice (Chapter 6), and further interpretively interrogated these not as essences of a quantifiable and undisputed reality waiting to be objectively discerned by the researcher who is not personally involved in the process (Chapter 7). A follow-up interview with each of the co-researchers was done four months after the first one, to solicit a reflective understanding, interrogation and additions to the responses given by the co-researchers in the first interviews.

Further reliant on answering the questions reflected upon in Chapters 6 and 7, the interview discussions and the overall study were conducted in three different but complementary tasks as follows:

1. A literature review (Chapter 2) and mundane conversations and descriptions (section 3.2) of the races of black and white, blackness and whiteness as naturalised, objectivist and essentialist identity and identification markers of race guided by the naturalist attitude. Examples of essentialist and objectivist natural notions of race in the literature are by authors who say, for example, that “I am convinced that there is a black and nonblack view of human behaviour, growth and potential for development” (Jones, 1980, p. xi). Several others speak of delineated Western psychotherapy, African Christianity, African psychology, African philosophy, black psychology, etc. Examples of the naturalist attitude about race from the mundane descriptions from the informal interviews (section 3.2) asking about the definitions of black, blackness, white and whiteness are: *“people are culturally different, conduct funerals and weddings differently.... Black people are culturally different”* (J, 19/03/2012) and *“whites do not go to traditional schools.... Blacks are known for greeting whether a person is known to them or not.... Whites are known*

for being selfish, self-centred and concerned only with their immediate families” (H, 15/03/2012).

2. Phenomenological formal interviews (Chapter 6) with individuals about their lived experiences of same-race prejudice and same-race intolerance. This was done to indicate how same-race prejudice practices are not personally reflected upon, but are merely considered to be what only others do to the self and not as what one is capable of, and are considered a natural occurrence. Danie spoke of being amazed by a white person that leaves an unfamiliar white person on the side of the road, while Thulisile spoke about the culturally appropriate black that self-righteously considers the culturally inappropriate black circumspectly. In both examples, black or white, the competition for authenticity, normativity and prototypicality categorises the other as inauthentic, non-normative and non-prototypical, thus rendering it false, illegitimate and unreal within the race.
3. Informal interview discussions about existing community development programmes (Chapter 8) on prejudice, intolerance, unity and same-race prejudice. As echoing critical race theory's scepticism of legalised human rights reforms to practices of prejudice, this was done to indicate how same-race prejudice is an ignored subject and not prioritised or considered to be relevant, despite post-apartheid South Africa's liberal laws. Reflections included the local pastor and moral regeneration coordinator who acknowledged that his organisations have not prioritised same-race prejudice, although most of their programmes were aligned with the country's pro-human-rights Constitution, and his reflection that some of their activists' actions continued to categorise, label, stigmatise and other differentness within their groupings.

9.5 THE CORE THOUGHT OF THE THESIS

The literature discussion about race and the races of black and white in Chapter 2 and the informal interview descriptions of the races of black and white in Chapter 3 were meant to serve as a springboard for the thesis's main argument as is summed up here. Using the races of black and white as examples, each definition of a race is

made with essentialist assertions informed by a naturalist attitude that considers each race as a real, objective and quantifiable marker of identity and identification, separate and uniquely distinct from the other.

These assertions help to differentiate a particular race from what it is not, in other words, its opposite. A black race, racial identity and identification are clearly differentiated from a white race, white racial identity and identification in terms of, for example, phenotype, culture, life philosophy, sexuality, family values and norms, and ideas about education and educational achievement. Responses from the interviews in Chapter 3 have statements like, *“one’s race is naturally determined”* (C, 12/03/2012) and *“unless you hold some respectable position, some blacks will disrespect you.... Whites have no jealousy although they are competitive”* (B, 12/03/2012). The literature included statements such as, “we are raised so that we don’t engage in going out with men while we are not married. I do not like them to grow up that way, like American girls” (Filipino migrant worker, as quoted by Espiritu, 2004, p. 197) and that lesbians and gays practise their lifestyle in contravention of their African culture (Patekile Holomisa, as cited by Baron, 2012).

Manifested in a strongly held general perception that there is a pure way of being that is unique to a black race and blackness as modes of racial identity and racial identification, opposed to a white race and whiteness as modes of racial identity and racial identification, each race is viewed in a manner that is prototypical, authentic, and compliant with norms and values, as opposed to a manner that is non-prototypical, inauthentic and noncompliant with norms and values. Embodied in a categorisation thinking laid in stereotypes and labelling of what it is and what it is not, each race becomes an essentialist focal point for identity and identification, with immutable characteristics that are not interchangeable with those of the other race. A taken-for-granted naturalist way of thinking that is never reflected upon or challenged, this reduces people to merely essentially existing, sharing immutable fundamental traits different from those of the assigned other race. It leads to the holding of stereotypes and making sweeping statements about “us” and “them” between and within a race, setting people apart from those of the different racial kind who possess dissimilar traits, and pitting a race against an external other and an imagined other within the same race.

It has been further argued in this thesis that the categorisation thinking is extended to employ the core prototypical, normative and authentic defining criteria of a race from an external other, to differentiate it from the non-prototypical, non-normative and inauthentic other within the same race. As a result of the stereotypes people hold about themselves, others, race, racial identity and racial identification, the categorisation thinking pits the ideal race against the other within the same race. An example is Mokgopo's statement that, "*they disregard you.... It is not well, it makes you think of bad things, and these are family people,*" as is a reflection from critical race theory literature of a Nigerian foreign national (quoted by Matsinhe, 2011, pp. 304-305) who recounted that, "once you speak their language they immediately know that you are one of them.... I felt so bad because I could not reply in Zulu, when he noticed that I am not South African his reaction towards me changed."

People are explicitly, implicitly, actively and unwittingly exhorted to live up to the stereotyped ideals of a race with its authentic, prototypical, and norms-and-values-compliant virtues, for example not practising homosexuality or engaging in sex before marriage. The race noncompliant are frowned upon, looked at with distrust, hatred, dislike, and subjected to ill-treatment, negative labelling, competition and stigmatisation. Feeling judged, Danie said that, "*it pushes us back from doing what we love doing, because they look at how you dress and say you are not one of them.*" Through behaviour and attitude, the race noncompliant are treated with intolerance based on their distinctive attributes of differentness from the esteemed race. They are unwillingly accepted and are disrespected due to their different values, cultural beliefs and perspectives. The comments about the injustices befallen on America's Sikh men (Ahluwalia, 2013) are an example from the literature.

In this way, prejudice of race, racial identity and racial identification is not only practised and sustained by categorisation and essentialist notions between the races of black and white, but also within the races of black and white in terms of what is considered as authentic, normative and prototypical of each particular race. Considered as the natural way of being, naturally designed and given, and never subjected to scrutiny or an awareness of being socially constructed, each racial identity is turned into an objectified existence of a race. Stereotypes, which are merely deferred to, abound regarding what it is and what it is not.

Apartheid South Africa formalised laws that helped in the veneration of the races and their identities as naturally given, thereby instilling more stereotypes and prejudice between the races and subtly within the races. Post-apartheid South Africa has formalised laws that give equal recognition and dignity to the different races. However, these instil a sense of the races as essentialist and categorisation markers of real, objective yet different identity and identification, each characterised by inherent and invariant essential virtues. One example from the literature is white journalists being barred from a black journalists' forum (Sesanti, 2008, p. 35). Further polarising racial identity between and within the races, it is strongly held that there is a pure and unique way of being black and being white respectively. It has been argued in the thesis that, in profiling who is authentically black and authentically white, people practise the prejudiced exclusion and intolerance of those they profile and consider as not black, or as not white within each respective race category.

9.6 PHENOMENOLOGY'S PHILOSOPHICAL RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE

The thesis used phenomenology's philosophical understanding to challenge the naturalist attitude's reliance on essentialist notions of the races of black and white as forms of identity and identification existing independent of an experiencing individual. A phenomenological understanding argues against taking for granted the subjective human experience and ignorance of people's lived experiences about racial identity and identification, by seeing these as phenomena whose appreciation is not always amenable to natural laws. It calls for the exploration of the phenomenon of human race, people's subjectively lived experience of their own blackness and whiteness identity and identification, and not just acquiescence to their corporeal racial definitions and existence.

Calling upon a revision of the naturalist attitude, it is concerned with how people make sense of their racial corporeality by going beyond an understanding that sees people as mere racial types defined in smooth universal categories of normativity against non-normativity, authenticity against inauthenticity and prototypicality against non-prototypicality to racial labels and codes. These labels are considered inadequate to capture the experiences of being a human, and fail to embrace the totality of lived human circumstance for those experiencing them.

9.7 RESPONSE FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

A phenomenological research activity informed by its primacy of the subjectively lived human experience and phenomenon of people's racial identities was embarked upon. The research was based on phenomenology's tenet of a human as a conscious being and of race as not merely an objective symbol and standard of identity and identification separate from an experiencing human subject. The research inquired about race as a phenomenon perceived and experienced by individuals, tapping into their subjectively lived experiences of being black and being white that are often taken for granted and made implicit.

It has been argued in the thesis that a taken-for-granted belief in naturally existing and essentially categorised racial definitions results in the prejudice of sameness and differentness within each of the races. The research therefore sought to ask corporeally selected black and white co-researchers to relate their experiences of being black and of being white. Using a qualitative research approach, the research sought to explore the experiential race challenges of black identity and identification, and white identity and identification in open-ended conversational interviews.

This critique has been extended with critical race theory's understanding about the consequences of the naturalisation habits of race, as entrenching essentialist definitions of racial identity and racial identification, causing labelling, stigmatisation, intolerance and prejudice of the different within the races, accentuating notions of authenticity, normativity and prototypicality, and othering those deemed to be in contravention of the races' ideals. According to critical race theory, this leads to intolerance as displayed in racism, racialisation, racial profiling and a refusal to inquire as to who gets to define a particular race, who is included or excluded in a particular racial identity, who benefits from upholding the ideals of a normative, authentic and prototypical race and racial identity, and the human rights violations and injustices the naturalist attitude about race brings into people's lives.

9.8 THE OBSERVATIONS MADE

The observations that have been made during this research are discussed below.

9.8.1 Descriptions of races

The literature review in Chapter 2 and elsewhere in the thesis, and the informal interview discussions in Chapter 3 about the descriptions of the races of black and white, show that descriptions of the races of black and white, racial identity and racial identification are states of being that are couched in official objectivist and essentialist terms, of a race and within the race, and of normativity against non-normativity, authenticity against inauthenticity, and prototypicality against non-prototypicality. This argument has been shown by the discrimination, labelling and othering of American black people who submit to education and educational achievement by other black Americans, of Filipinos who engage in sex before marriage by other Filipinos, and of black South Africans who practise homosexuality by other black South Africans. This argument is indicated by the definition and affirmation of blackness in terms of, for instance, its core philosophy of life, religion, psychology and mental health, and cultural values and norms. It is also indicated by the definition of whiteness in terms of, for instance, natural and deserved privilege, skin colour, economic affluence, intellectual astuteness, work ethic, and superior rationality.

This is further established from the discussion and themes of the research interview conversations with the co-researchers in Chapters 6 and 7. Danie commented about the distinction of the whiteness that is not well kempt, poor and without the looks, from the preferred whiteness. Magda differentiated the odd white people from the preferred white people with good manners, as Belinda differentiated between white people who understand her situation and white people who think they are better than white car guards. Thulisile identified a discriminated blackness that does a job that is not considered respectable and is without accessories, against Mokgopo's devaluing blackness that shows off and wants fame.

9.8.2 Type of phenomenological research

Chapters 6 and 7, both of which are dedicated to showing how same-race prejudice, stereotypes, intolerance and categorisation emerge, are done or played out, show a distinction between descriptive and interpretive phenomenological research. While the same phenomenological philosophy informed both, in Chapter 6 this is explicitly

expressed and named as unfair treatment when it is done to the self, for example Danie being avoided and Thulisile being disrespected or excluded. Not named as such by the co-researchers, it is mainly treated as a normal way of being when one does it, as shown by Mokgopo who said *“ja, that is the way. Their treatment is bad as compared to that of the whites”*, and by Thulisile who said that:

I take it life has to be balanced. Some must look poor, do work that appears not right. It makes life balanced. We can't all be the same. They happen all over, but it is up to the person how he/she takes it. You have to stand the ground and face all that is thrown at you.

While the gleaned themes are about the understood experiences of subjectively lived same-race prejudice and same-race interactions, these are offered as being merely out there, as what others do unto the self. While the chapter presents these as experiential phenomena and not as taken-for-granted occurrences governed by the naturalist attitude, they are offered in an essentialist and objectivist manner that excludes the self in the moment and act of defining. They are offered as uncontested pure descriptions of the phenomenon existing separately from the inquirer and the experiencing individual. They are marked in normalised tendencies provided in dichotomies of acceptability against unacceptability, normativity against non-normativity, authenticity against inauthenticity and prototypicality against non-prototypicality of a race that does not evaluate the critiquing self in the act of critiquing. Assuming to reflect the true meaning of experiential reality, these descriptions are similar to the descriptions made in both Chapters 2 and 3. The chapter therefore conforms to descriptive phenomenological research.

Chapter 7 conforms to the tenets of interpretive phenomenological research, whose task is not to merely uncover lived experiences, objectify, and take experiences and perceptions about same-race prejudice for granted. As critiquing the taken-for-granted attitude adopted in experiences, perceptions and opinions shown in Chapters 2, 3 and 6, it steers clear of objectifying the researcher's and co-researchers' experiences as the final arbiter of objective and unquestionable reality. It ushers in a redefined role of the researcher as not passively and naively commenting on co-researchers' obviously existing facts of experienced same-race prejudice. Aimed at showing that interpretive analysis of research data begins with pitting the researcher's interpretation against the co-researchers' interpretive

understanding to add a psychological understanding to the latter's perspective, the chapter is on a higher level than Chapter 6. It uses psychological theoretical language to interrogate the themes offered in Chapter 6 about how same-race prejudice plays out.

Some of the psychological interpretive theoretical understandings used are the need for social domination, self-classification, labelling, stereotypes, devaluation, self-hate, self-righteousness and fundamentalism. Against the simplistic display of same-race prejudice in Chapter 6, here it is shown that same-race prejudice is a phenomenon of multiple emerging and merging realities constantly interrogated by those involved, and is not merely out there. It indicates that same-race prejudice is not passively experienced but actively brought to be by both those involved, and is not experienced along economic indices only, but along culture and other signifiers. This point is shown by a challenging renegotiation, reclassification and self-classification by the co-researchers beyond my simplistic classification of them into economically affluent and less economically affluent groups. Their definitions of themselves and of them by others in relation to others, among other factors, challenged how I and others viewed them. This was done by Mokgopo, Belinda and Stephans, who expressed a sense of contentment with their economic life status different from my prior assumption that they were economically not affluent. Ranko, whom I considered to be economically affluent, showed how he was regarded with both respect and disregard among his peers.

Seeing others as culturally inappropriate, categorising and othering them, both Thulisile and Danie employed fundamentalist cultural signifiers to differentiate a pure, authentic, prototypical and normative race from its opposite. Danie did this by being appalled by white people who leave other white people, seen as un-white, on the road side dying. He too seemed to entertain self-righteous ideas about racial identity and identification. Simangele questioned the treatment she received from other black people who deserted her when she was not employed by calling them un-African, and not acting in line with the African philosophy of togetherness. This indicates that definitions of racial identity and identification are not singular but are multiple distinctions of both the self and others within a race. On a deeper level of reflection, the chapter indicates that same-race prejudice is a reciprocal process of

jostling power contestation to define and project attributes on the self and other within one's race. Spurred on by a need for social domination, Stephans' cherished values of hard work, trade and qualifications not only describe a particularly preferred whiteness but also shut out others as un-white or uncharacteristic of whiteness.

These show how same-race prejudice is displayed in reacting intolerably to intolerance and inflexibly to inflexibility, as governed by subservience to conventionality and aversion to novelty and diversity. It is debated in the chapter how each of the co-researchers managed him-/herself according to the same principles of prototypicality against non-prototypicality, normativity against non-normativity, authenticity against inauthenticity, and intolerance to diversity with which they reckoned others treated them. Not reflected upon, but merely taken as a naturally given order, the practices of reciprocal labelling, othering, stigmatisation, categorisation and stereotyping lead to and sustain intolerance and prejudice within a race, for example self-hate and self-devaluation. As source of prejudice themselves through the use of avoidance by Danie and Thulisile, educational qualifications by Stephans and the accumulation of material and educational qualifications by Ranko and Stephans, each of the co-researchers lived by the principles of social domination, self-classification and positive self-regard to assert themselves as normative and authentic to their identified races.

Chapters 6 and 7 are set apart by the use of a theoretical flair in Chapter 7 to interrogate and name the interview themes, and the strategies people employ to deal with social judgement, stigmatisation, social disapproval and intolerance. In addition, Chapter 7 is set apart by the argument about people's unwillingness or lack of ability to reflect on the practices they actively contribute to and are not merely victims of, considering these merely as being naturally given. A further distinction is that, by merely revealing subjectively lived and experienced same-race prejudice from the interviews with the co-researchers, Chapter 6 conforms to a descriptive phenomenological research, whereas Chapter 7 takes this further by interpretively interrogating how the subjectively lived and experienced phenomenon of same-race prejudice is played out and sustained. It goes beyond the taking for granted, silence and lack of self-reflective interrogation of played-out and sustained same-race

prejudice. The chapter reveals a pattern of reciprocal enactment by the victim of the very acts whose origin is considered external to them.

9.8.3 Responses of the community to same-race prejudice

Although it is a phenomenon prevalent in people's lives (Chapter 6), same-race prejudice is neither acknowledged in existing community development programmes (Chapter 8) or post-apartheid South Africa's response to the racial intolerance and prejudice of apartheid (Chapter 1). This was mentioned by the moral regeneration coordinator (section 8.2.2.3). Requests for an interview were ignored by the national human rights organisation, the national traditional leaders' organisation and the national Christians organisation', and responded to in an unfriendly manner by a local black pastor. Critical race theory is a reliable recourse for critiquing the lacklustre complicity of existing structural and political arrangements that leave the perpetuation of prejudice unhindered.

9.9 FINAL THOUGHTS

A scourge of incalculable negative effects on people's quality of life as argued with reference to apartheid South Africa and reflection from critical race theory, same-race prejudice is not considered less troubling than prejudice between races. A dearth of mention thereof in community programmes and lack of reflective acknowledgement in the interviews speak of the lack of a concerted effort to minimise it and how unlikely people are to take personal responsibility for it. Although some literature speaks of instances indicative of intolerance, stigmatisation and stereotypes within the races, none refers directly to same-race prejudice as a phenomenon. The call for activism by students to align their academic work to speak about, expose and address injustices prevalent in people's lives, and not be merely inspired by acquiring accolades for themselves (Culkin, 2016; Madeloni, 2014; Suzuki & Mayorga, 2014), appears to not be heeded yet with regard to same-race prejudice. This is also besides the stated relevance and impact that phenomenological philosophy can bring in relation to people's daily struggles (Chapter 8). Some literature speaks of instances indicative of intolerance, stigmatisation and stereotypes within the races without directly referring to same-race prejudice as a phenomenon.

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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW REQUEST

The request for the interview looked like this: **My name is Paul Makena. I am a UNISA DLitt et Phil student in the subject of psychology busy with a thesis on same-race prejudice (using whiteness and blackness as examples).**

I am interrogating the prevalence of the prejudice of sameness as it impacts or may impact on societal unity, human rights, individual and collective livelihoods and the quality of life, to mention a few.

I am making a request for information about your organisation's programmes and activities that are planned and busy implemented to achieve its stated mandate, and information (if any is available) about the challenges and successes regarding these.

APPENDIX B – CONSENT FORM

I (full name and surname) am willingly taking part in the research project that explores the experiences and perceptions of living with and among people of my same race as conducted by Paul Makena for the fulfilment of his D lit et Phil degree studies at UNISA.

My participation is based on the knowledge that my personal identifiable details shall be erased from both the recording and storage of information and the write up of the finished project.

Signature. Date.